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SUMMARY
This is a report of a three-year field study of airline crews at
two major U.S. airlines who were flying an advanced technology
aircraft, the Boeing 757. The study addresses the opinions and
experiences of these pilots as they view the advanced, automated
features of this aircraft, and contrast it with previous models
they have flown.
The report addresses a large number of aspects of automated
flight, but concentrates on the following topics:
i. Training for advanced automation
2. Cockpit errors and error reduction
3. Management of cockpit workload
4. General attitudes toward cockpit automation
The limitations of the air traffic control (ATC) system on the
ability to utilize the advanced features of the new aircraft is
discussed. In general the pilots are enthusiastic about flying
an advanced technology aircraft, but they express mixed feelings
about the impact of automation on workload, crew errors, and
ability to manage the flight.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
The decade of the 1970s saw a rapid introduction into the
cockpits of transport aircraft of automatic devices designed to
aid the flight crew, and to make flight more efficient. In this
context the term "efficiency" usually refers to reduction of fuel
consumption, but it may also be extended to include economies in
crew and aircraft time, and with increasing importance,
conservation of airspace, particularly in the crowded terminal
areas. The larger turbine aircraft were equipped with highly
sophisticated automatic navigation devices such as inertial
navigation systems (INS), omega navigational systems (ONS),
flight guidance systems which could steer the aircraft laterally
in response to commands from these systems, and autothrottle
systems (ATS) which could govern power plants more efficiently
than manual control. More sophisticated warning and alerting
systems, including the ground proximity warning system (GPWS),
stall detection systems, and a variety of crew alerting systems
supplemented the crews' ability to sense and detect hazardous
conditions.
Generally pilots welcomed these devices on a one-by-one basis:
each seemed to do a satisfactory job, or as pilot jargon put it,
they worked "as advertised." But as the number and
sophistication of the these devices increased, pilots, flight
managers_ and governmental officials developed a growing
discomfort that the cockpit may be becoming too automated, and
that the steady replacement of human functioning by devices could
be a mixed blessing. Terms such as "complacency", "automation
atrophy," and "loss of scan" started to appear in the language of
pilots, flight managers, and training departments. These terms
expressed a concern that the pilots were becoming over-dependent
on automation, that manual flying skills may be deteriorating,
and that situational awareness might be suffering. In short,
the industry seemed to welcome the functional capabilities of the
new devices, but feared that flight crews might be falling "out
of the loop."
Training departments, especially at overseas carriers flying long
segments which offer little chance to keep proficient in
departures, approaches and landing, expressed concern over the
possibility that manual skills may be deteriorating. This was
particularly evident when senior first officers transitioned from
wide-body aircraft to captaincy in less electronically
sophisticated narrow-body aircraft.
In addition to these concerns, it was clear by the end of the
decade that the era of the flight engineer might soon be drawing
to an end, even in wide-body aircraft, as the new two-pilot
models replaced the old. What would replace his function in the
cockpit? Certainly not an increase in workload for the two
pilots, who were already seriously loaded in the terminal
environments. The answer the designers proposed was an increase
in automation.
In 1981 the Presidential Task Force on Aircraft Crew Complement
recommended that transport aircraft could be safely flown by a
two-pilot crew; their findings were based largely on the
assumption that the flight engineer's duties could be absorbed by
increasing the level of cockpit automation (McLucus, Drinkwater,
and Leaf, 1981). [i]
The report also stated that the FAA had properly certified the
Douglas DC-9-80 (now MD-80) as a two-pilot aircraft.
Furthermore, their findings removed the cloud over the soon-to-
appear Boeing 767, which the manufacturer had designed as a two-
pilot plane, but was prepared to offer with three seats if
necessary. In fact, a few 767s and at least one 767 simulator
were built with flight engineer stations.
The findings of the Presidential Task Force assured the future of
the new aircraft. The MD-80 series, the B767/757, and the A-310
and A-320 models have been an operational and commercial success.
At this time, there are EFIS models of the MD-80 and B-737
available, and operators can retrofit older models, and Airbus
now offers the EFIS equipped A-300-600.
Despite the success of the new aircraft, there has remained a
growing uncertainty about the role of the human in future
transports. A number of incidents and accidents, some quite
dramatics were attributed by many to problems of crews operating
automated equipment (see Wiener and Curry, 1980; Wiener, 1985a,
1988). The introduction of automation in the older aircraft had
been piecemeal. The MD-80 brought to the short and medium haul
aircraft the electronic sophistication previously seen only in
wide-body and four-engine transports, but it did not represent an
advance in cockpit technology, only in application.
The 767/757 avionics represented a generation of change in
cockpit sophistication: an integrated system, built around the
inertia] unit for guidance and advanced displays, a sophisticated
autopilot/autothrottle and electronic engine control system, and
a systems monitoring system, Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting
System (EICAS), of previously unknown sophistication. Many
referred to EICAS as the "electronic flight engineer."
Other events impacted on the concern for safety. In August 1981
the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO)
[I] Dates in parentheses point to the references cited in
Chapter XII. No attempt has been made in this report to
provide a comprehensive review of the literature of human
factors and automation. Comprehensive reviews can be found
in Wiener and Curry, 1980; Wiener, 1985a, 1988; and Chambers
and Nagel, 1985.
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strike and subsequent firing of the striking controllers by
President Reagan left the system stripped of most of its
experienced controllers, a problem still reflected today in the
relatively low experience level of the existing controller _orc_.
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 brought not only inc[eas_d
traffic, but a concentration of that traffi_ in the newly
emerging hub-and-spoke terminals. Serious questions were raised
about not only the ability of two-pilot crews to handle the
workload of the modern aircraft, but also about the loss of the
"third pair of eyes" to maintain extra-cockpit scan in the
terminal areas.
Equipment reliability was not the issue. The dispatch
reliability of the new aircraft proved to be higher than those
with traditional cockpits. The problems appeared at the human-
device interface.
NASA Studies
In 1979r the Aerospace Human Factors Division of NASA-Ames
Research Center undertook a broadly defined study of human
factors in cockpit automation. The project was begun under the
direction of Dr. Renwick Curry, assisted by the author, on leave
from the University of Miami.
In the summer of 1980 NASA-Ames held a joint NASA/Industry
workshop to discuss the problems of defining automation and
determining directions for future research. This workshop was
summarized in a paper by Boehm-Davis, Curry, Wiener, and
Harrison (1983). Another NASA/Industry workshop was conducted in
August 1988 (Norman and Orlady, 1989).
Early in the project we recognized the need for guidelines and
principles for the design, operation, and training for cockpit
automation. These guidelines might aid designers, aircraft
operators, and training departments to recognize and deal with
the various human factors in automated aircraft, especially those
with advanced digital flight guidance systems. The first
guidelines appeared in a 1980 paper by Wiener and Curry. These
are reprinted in Appendix i. Other authors (Hoagland, 1984;
Braune and Fadden, 1987; Speyer, 1987) have discussed the
status of present automation guidelines, their inadequacies, and
the need for future guideline development.
At that time the McDonnell-Douglas MD-80 (DC-9-80) was about to
come onto the line, and the B767/757 was not far behind. The
appearance of these new aircraft offered a very attractive
opportunity for a field study of the initial transition of crews.
Two field studies were undertaken: by Wiener on the MD-80, in
cooperation with Republic Airlines (now Northwest) and by Curry
on the 767. These studies documented the problems encountered
during initial transition and early line experience, as well as
aspects of automation that had been thought to be problems that
turned out not to be (see Curry, 1985; Wiener, 1985b)®
Desictn philosophy
Much has been said of design philosophies of the "glass cockpit"
aircraft. This is a complex matter and it cannot be covered
adequately here. For a review of cockpit integration philosophy,
see Sexton, 1988. Suffice it say that Boeing's philosophy
centered around a low-workload environment, in which systems
would be simplified, checklists minimized, and to the degree
possible routine systems operations would be automated. Boeing's
cockpit philosophy emphasized as a first step system
simplification, rather than automation. Systems displays would
remain silent or blank when in normal configuration, and would
display information only when abnormal conditions existed. The
EICAS would relieve the crew of most systems monitoring, which
had been the primary duty of the flight engineers. The new
design philosophy was referred to as the "quiet, dark cockpit."
Furthermore, the CRT displays offered a capability not attainable
with traditional electromechanical displays, or even most digital
displays: for the first time the displays were reconfigurable.
Crews could select or deselect information to be displayed on the
primary flight display (PFD), consisting of the ADI and HSI, both
displayed on color CRTs, and could select, from a list of
alternativest the display configuration. For example location of
adequate emergency airports could be displayed on the map mode of
the HSI at pilots' discretion, and the pilot may select from six
modes of display on the HSI. The map scale was pilot-selectable.
A planning mode allowed the crew to review their lateral course
on the map display. Thus the "Boeing philosophy" included
maximum discretionary ability of the crew to configure the
displays as they deemed appropriate at various phases of flight
(see Wiener-Curry guidelines, Appendix 1).
B. PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY
The emphasis of the first two field studies (Curry, 1985; Wiener,
1985b) was on initial transition of flight crews, and their early
operating experience. The present study sought to extend the
scope of the investigation, to include the full range of crews
operating a state-of-the-art transport aircraft. Primary focus
would be on management of the flight, the impact of automation
on workload and extra-cockpit scan, and errors in operating the
equipment. The training programs would also be examined, as well
as the impact of automation on crew coordination ("cockpit
resource management").
The Boeing 757 was chosen as the "test vehicle" for this study,
partly because of its shorter stage lengths, and hence greater
experience of Crews operating in terminal areas, with more
departures, arrivals and approach/landing operations. It should
be emphasized that this study was not intended to be a design
review of the 757. The focus was on generic automation and
human factors areas. Questions were posed to elicit information
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from volunteer crews that addressed broad, we hoped aircraft
model-independent issues. However, as the author noted in a
previous field study (Wiener, 1985b), it was inevitable that
crews would discuss minute details of their working environment,
and hence some of the information may appear to be a review of
the 757. In spite of this, the author feels that the findings of
thisstudy are representative of all advanced technology
(AdvTech) aircraft, and are independent of the particular mode]
studied.
Out of the study we hoped to gain an increased understanding of
the usage of automatic equipment, problems faced by the crews,
areas needing improvement in training programs, and a database of
cockpit errors in operating the equipment, from which an attack
on human error could be launched. We also hope to gain
information by which our automation guidelines could be expanded.
C. ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT
This report is organized in Chapters designated by Roman
numerals. Chapters I through III are background, methodology,
and biographic information on the volunteers. The heart of the
study is in Chapters IV through X, which are organized as study
topics, such as cockpit equipment and environment, training, etc.
These sections are organized as follows: an introductory
section, data tables and figures as appropriate, and direct
quotations from the respondents. Section XI is a series of
conclusions and recommendations based on the entire study.
The results of the 36 attitude scale items ("probes"), displayed
as bar charts, are assigned to the appropriate sections. The
assignment of the probes to the various chapters was based on
their content, and not on any statistical clustering technique.
For the reader's convenience, all 36 charts are displayed four to
a page in Appendix 6. These graphs display the percentage of
responses in the five response categories ("Strongly agree"
through "Strongly Disagree"), by Phase 1 (1986) and Phase 2
(1987) of the study. Since these probes carry their own numbers
(i to 36), they are not designated by figure number in the text.
Other figures and tables are designated by Roman numeral for the
chapter and Arabic number for the figure or table, in order (e.g.
Figure IV-l).
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If. STUDY METHODOLOGY
A. OVERVIEW
The intent of this study was to extend the scope of the two
previous automation field studies (Curry 1985; Wiener, 1985b) to
cover a wide variety of topics, and draw upon the experience of
line pilots with a range of 757 flying time from those just
completing their initial operating experience (IOE) to those with
experience levels of over 3000 hours.
This study, which was conducted at two host airlines, referred to
in this report as Airline-i and Airline-2, focused on the
following topics:
i. Operation of the flight management computer (FMC),
mode control panel (MCP), and other automatic features
of the 757
2. Errors and error management
3. Workload and workload management
, Crew coordination and communication ("cockpit resource
management")
o Training and transition to the 757, and re-transition back
to older models
This is primarily a study of line pilot opinion. The theory
behind the NASA field studies is that line pilots constitute a
vast database of operational experience, and this database is
seldom tapped. This represents both a loss of resources to the
aviation community and a source of frustration to the pilot, who
often feels that his/her viewpoint is ignored_
Another source of information on field operations is NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). However, this database
is usually confined to errors, and largely errors in which the
reporter might be culpable. The ASRS database and the data from
the field studies have been described by the author as "two
windows on the real world." Though the sources of data,
methodology, and coverage are vastly different, there is a great
similarity in the outcomes. This has been seen recently in the
congruence of ASRS's study of altitude deviations ("busts") of
high technology aircraft and the results reported in Chapter VI.
The primary sources of information in this study were:
i. Interviews with management pilots, check airmen, and
instructors.
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Attendance by the author at 757 ground schools at both
carriers.
Interviews with volunteer line pilots conducted by the
author.
Questionnaires filled out twice (one year apart) by
volunteer 757 pilots. These contained forms for:
aa
b.
c.
An 36-item attitude toward automation scale
Open-ended questions on various topics
Biographical questions on 757 experience, prior aircraft
and aircraft flown after the 757 for some
. Jumpseat observations by the author both in simulators,
and during line operations.
. A special series of open-ended questions in Questionnaire 2,
for pilots who had left the 757 for other aircraft
("backward transition" as it is called in this report).
B. DESIGN OF THE EXPERIMENT
The research design called for two sets of questionnaires, mailed
to the pilots one year apart, the first being in the summer of
1986. The questionnaires are shown in Appendix 2. The attitude-
toward-automation (Part II) was identical in both questionnaires.
Otherwise all questions but one were different. The one open-
ended question repeated in both questionnaires dealt with errors
that the respondent had made or observed in operation of the 757
(Chapter VI of this report).
Questionnaire Development
Questionnaires were designed to elicit pilot opinions, experience
level, and specific information and viewpoints. The 36-item
Likert scale was adapted from the one previously used by the
author in his field study on the MD-80 (Wiener, 1985b). Some
probes were identical to those in the previous study, altered
to conform to the 757 systems, and others were totally different.
A Likert scale is a standard tool in attitude assessment. It is
a form of "intensity scale," whereby not only the direction but
intensity of the response is measured. An item consists of a
"probe", which is a positive or negative statement with which the
respondent is asked his degree of agreement/disagreement. The
response scale contains an odd number of possible responses,
typically five or seven levels from strong agreement to strong
disagreement, with a neutral value in the center. The center
response is somewhat ambiguous: it can mean "no .pinion",
"undecided", or a truly neutral or centrist position on the
probe. In this study, five response levels were employed:
"strongly agree", "agree", "neither agree nor disagree",
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"disagree", and "strongly disagree".
in Appendix 2.
The response form is shown
The items are referred to as Item 1 through Item 36, and data are
displayed as histograms. Most of the histograms simply report
the percentage of responses to each probe at the five levels with
Phase-i and Phase-2 data on the same graph. Some statistical
contrasts, such as opinions of captains vs. first officers, and
pilots with DC-9 (hence two-pilot crew) experience versus those
without, were tested, and those with statistically significant
results are also shown as histograms.
Open-ended questions gave the volunteers the opportunity to spell
out in detail their opinions or experience in response to a
variety of issues (see Appendix 2 for a list). Also included on
the Phase-i questionnaire was a request that the respondent
suggest a question that the author might ask during interviews.
It was felt that these suggestions might be an insight into what
the crews felt was important. The suggested questions are listed
in Appendix 4.
The questionnaires were designed so that it could be filled out
in one hour. Some respondents attached lengthy answers to some
questions, often written on typewriters or word processors,
indicating rather strong feelings about the topic. As stated
previously, the Phase-i and Phase-2 questionnaires contained
several independent parts. These included:
Questionnaire
T__qpic Phase
I. 36 item Likert attitude scale 1,2
2_ Biographical history - past aircraft
flown and most recent before 757 school 1
3. Open-ended questions. Six on each, one
of which appeared on both (errors witnessed) 1,2
4. Request for suggestions of questions to ask 1
5. Tabulation of types of approaches flown, 2
(e.g. number of autolands, VOR, ADF etc.)
6° Special form for those who had left 757 2
7. Preference for aircraft in fleet 2
8. Suggest a question we should ask during
interviews 1
The Likert scale items were identical on both questionnaires for
comparison from Phase 1 (summer 1986) to Phase 2 (summer 1987).
As mentioned above, the open-ended questions were different in
each phase, with one exception: the question on errors that the
respondent had either committed or observed was present on both.
Data Handlinq of Numeric Data
Numerical data from the questionnaires were entered into a
computer-based file, and statistical analyses were performed, and
figures were produced, employing commercially available software
packages for a personal computer (see Chapter XIII, Note No. 4).
For each of the 36 attitude items (PI to P36), a figure is
displayed, showing the Phase-I and Phase-2 responses. These are
displayed in the appropriate chapters. For each of the 36
attitude items, statistical tests were performed to determine
whether there were significant differences.
i) Phase I and Phase II (Bowker test for matched groups). Only
two contrasts were found to be statistically significant,
indicating little movement in opinion from the first to
second phases. One of the experimental hypotheses was that
there would be movement in opinions of crew members from
Phase 1 to Phase 2, as the crews became more experienced in
757 operations. Specifically, the author hypothesized that
crew opinions would move toward a more favorable view of
cockpit automation, particularly on the more global
questions discussed in Chapter X. This hypothesis was not
substantiated by these tests, which are discussed in
Appendix 5.
2) Captains versus first officers (chi-square test for
independent groups). Six contrasts were found to be
significant, two in Phase 1 and four in Phase 2. Thus we
can summarize that there were essentiall _ no differences in
opinion between 757 captains and first officers. Bar graphs
displaying the data by "seat" (captain versus first officer)
follow the corresponding bar graphs in the appropriate
chapters in this report. These are indicated by the letter
"A" following the item number (e.g. 31A), and the
designation of "Capto" and "F/O" in the figure legend.
3) Pilots with and without previous DC-9 experience). In order
to test the hypothesis that having had previous two-man crew
experience would affect ones views in this study, the
Airline-i group only was subdivided into those who had
previously flown the DC-9 and those who had not. No
Airline-2 757 crews had flown the DC-9. Chi-square tests
were performed on responses to the 36 items in Phase 1 and
Phase 2; only three of these 72 tests (4 per cent) yielded
significantly differences. Bar graphs depicting the three
significant contrasts are displayed at the end of this
chapter, and are designated with the letter "B" following
the item number (e.g. 24B). It is safe to say that the data
did not produce evidence of differences between those with
and without prior two-pilot (DC-9) experience.
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Other statistical tests on the data are noted in the appropriate
chapters. Intercorrelation matrices are shown in each chapter
for the attitude scale items in that chapter, plus the variable,
HIT (hours-in-type in the 757). See Chapter XIII, Note. No. 9
Data Handlinq of Open-Ended Questions
Non-numerical responses, such as replies to the open-ended
questions, were individually read, analyzed, and classified by
the author. Much of the analysis of these free text responses
was subjective. Direct quotations were chosen to represent a
variety of viewpoints. There was no attempt to make the number
of quotations on any viewpoint represent the proportion in the
database. They were selected for inclusion on the basis of
representing a variety of opinions.
The quotations are as close to verbatim as possible. The author
performed "light editing" to make the quotations more clear,
improve punctuation where needed, and put them into complete
sentences. Where words are underlined for emphasis, these were
the choices of the respondent, not the author. In a few places
editorial insertions were made for clarity, and these are
delimited by the symbols < >. Where ever possible, results were
tabulated and presented prior to the body of direct quotations.
The four-digit number at the end of each quotation is for cross-
referencing.
C. PANEL FORMATION
Request for volunteers
Initial meetings were conducted jointly with management and
representatives of the Safety Committee of the Air Line Pilots
Association at both carriers, during which a written proposal
from the author was discussed. At each carrier, the two parties
agreed to cooperate on the project, and a joint letter signed by
management and the Safety Committee was drafted. This was
attached to a detailed brochure which explained the purpose of
the experiment, the need for volunteer 757 crews, and what would
be expected of a volunteer. The last page was a sign-up sheet
asking for some information on the 757 flying experience of the
volunteer, total flying time, and whether he was an instructor or
check airman. Included was an envelope addressed to the author.
These packages were distributed to all 757 line pilots, and crews
going through the ground school at the time of the recruiting
effort. 201 pilots agreed to join the panel. A distribution of
these pilots by airline, seat (captain vs. F/O), and domicile are
shown in Figures II-i and II-2. A statistical summary of flying
experience is found in Chapter III.
i0
Volunteers by airline, seat In=2Oll
(Airline-I), F/O i7.4% (Airline-I), Capt. 26.4-%
(Airline-2), Capt. 32.3% (Airline-2), F/O 23.9%
Figure II-l. Distribution of volunteers by airline and seat.
Bose distribution at time of volunteering
for the study (1986) In=2°11
Base-B, (Airline-I) 27.9%
Base-A, (Airline-I) 15.9%
Base-C, (Airline-2) 21.9%
Base-D, (Airline-2) 34.3%
Figure II-2. Distribution of volunteers by base.
ii
Confidentialit Z
Volunteers were assured of confidentiality. This was implemented
in the following way. When the pilot volunteered by sending in
his form, he assigned himself an six-character code of letters
and numerals of his choice. The information on the form was
encoded into two data files: one contained the volunteer's name,
address and telephone number. The other contained the ID code,
and the biographical information. Both files were then sorted so
that they could not be matched. The volunteer was sent a self-
adhesive tag with the ID code to keep as a reminder. The ID-to-
name keys were kept by the author only until all of the
volunteers were in the database, and then they were sent to the
Safety Committees. They have since been destroyed.
The ID-code block contained eight characters: up to six for the
volunteers' self-assigned code, the final two being a code for
the airline and base for data handling purposes. On the two
subsequent questionnaires, the respondent entered the ID code at
the top, so that they could be matched. This system had its
drawbacks. A number of questionnaires were received without ID
codes, and there was no way to contact the sender. Of the 166
responses on Questionnaire I, and 133 on Questionnaire 2, only
106 matches could be made. In spite of this, all of the data
could be used except in the analysis of shifts of opinion from
Phase 1 to Phase 2, which required matched groups. Only the 106
matched pairs were used for these tests.
During the face-to-face interviews, the author of course knew
the name of the interviewee, but did not record it with the
remarks. Thus once the interviews were completed, no remark
could be attributed to an individual. All formal interviews were
conducted at the four crew bases in a room set aside for this
purpose. Either one or two pilots were interviewed at a time.
In a few instances, more than two pilots participated at the same
time. Several 757 pilots who were not volunteers on the study
panel came in and asked to be interviewed, and they were
accepted.
The conversations which took place during jumpseat trips could be
considered informal interviews; no record was kept of flight
numbers, dates, or crew names. In most cases no notes were taken
during flight. In a few instances, where it was considered
valuable to retain some information in detail, the author asked
permission of the crew to write down what he had just seen or
heard, and permission was always granted.
There was no attempt to quantify the information garnered from
interviews, jumpseat or simulator observations. This information
became part of the data which influenced the discussion and
conclusions in Chapter XI of this report, and perhaps elsewhere.
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III. FLYING EXPERIENCE OF VOLUNTEER PANEL
This section contains data on the flying experience of the panel
members at the time they volunteered for the study in 1986,
filled out the Phase-i questionnaire in mid-1986, and the Phase-2
questionnaire in mid-1987. Data are reported on total flying
time, time in type (B-757), and past seats held at their airline.
In a few cases, respondents added seats held in other airlines,
corporate flying, and military transport aircraft, but these data
are not reported here. Flying experience with other than the
present airline is therefore reflected only in the total flying
time data.
The sample sizes are indicated on the graphs. Note that the
sample size of 201 refers to all of those volunteering for the
study. The sign-up form included the information on seats
previously held (Table III-l) and total flying time at the
beginning of the study (Figure III-l). Sample sizes of 166 and
133 refer to the number of completed questionnaires received in
Phases 1 and 2 respectively, and is reflected in Figures III-2
and III-3 which report the time in type (B-757). The sample
sizes are summarized in the table below.
Data Source N
Total flying hours
Seats previously held
Seat prior to 757 [i]
Time in type (757)
Time in type - Phase 2
Seats held since the 757 [i]
Sign-up sheet 201
Phase-i questionnaire 166
I! II
I! 11
Phase-2 questionnaire 13 3
11 I!
Total Flyinq Time
Total flying hours at time of volunteering for the study are
displayed in Figure III-l. The median for this distribution was
ii,000 hours. It is noteworthy that 15% of the crews had less
than 2,500 hours. Although this is possible, we believe that _t
may be due to an error in the interpretation of the question,
which may have led some of the crews to fail to include their
[i] Reported in Section V (Training), Table V-l.
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Figure III-l. Distribution of total flying hours of
volunteers at time of joining the study (early 1986).
flight engineer time in response to the question "total flying
time, all aircraft." We have since asked several pilots if they
would include engineer time in response to such a question, and
we have obtained mixed results. The author regrets the ambiguity
in these data.
Previous Seats
On the Phase-i questionnaire, crews were asked to check each seat
on each aircraft in their company's fleet that they had occupied
at any time. Number of hours was not requested. These data are
displayed below in Table III-l. The Phase-2 questionnaire
requested information on the seat held immediately prior to
attendance at 757 school, and also for, those who had left the
757 for other aircraft, the seats held after leaving the 757.
These data are displayed in Section V (Training) in Table V-i and
V-7o
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TABLE III-l. All seats previously held at present
airline (n = 201). For data on seat held immediately
prior to 757 school, see Table V-I (Training).
SEATS PREVIOUSLY HELD
CAPTAIN F/O S/O TOTAL
DC-9 36 28
B-727
A-300
L-1011
DC-10
B-747
TOTAL
81
4
0
7
4
132
113
7
26
42
40
256
124
13
11
35
42
225
64
318
24
37
84
86
613
Time in _ (B-757)
Figures III-2 and III-3 display the numbers of hours in type in
the B-757 at the time of the Phase-i and Phase-2 questionnaires.
The median time was 500 hours for Phase 1 and i,i00 hours for
Phase 2.
The growth in hours in type from the first to the second phase
was reduced somewhat over that which a pilot would normally
acquire in the roughly 14 months that separated the two phases.
This was due to the fact that at one airline many of the newly
trained 757 pilots had to return to their previous seats for a
number of months before 757 seats opened up. Thus they did not
obtain a full (average) 14 months of 757 time between their two
questionnaire phases. Note also that the time between
questionnaires varied between pilots, depending on how quickly
they sent them in. The 14 month figure is the time between
mailing out the two questionnaires. By normal crew scheduling at
the time of this study, a full time 14-month schedule on the 757
should have yielded about 700-800 additional hours.
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Discussion
The data presented here support a generalization about the 757
pilot at the time of this study. From the data on both the
flying hours and the previous seats one can conclude that the 757
is essentially a mid-seniority airplane, flown largely by former
727 crews at the two host airlines. The data in Chapter V, Table
V-i indicates that close to 60% of the crews entering 757
training came directly from 727 seats, and the data in Table
III-i shows that considerably more had at one time in their
airline career flown the 727, partly because at both carriers,
second officer in the 727 has been the usual starting position
for new hires. Over half of the total seats occupied (318 out of
613) were in the 727, and 124 of the 201 pilots volunteering for
the study had served as flight engineers in the 727.
At both carriers, the 757 pay schedule was not considerably
higher than that of the other narrow-body aircraft. The big jump
in pay occurs in moving from a narrow-body to a wide-body
aircraft. For this reason the 757 represents a way station in
seniority progression to the wide-bodies, resulting in many
pilots serving only very short tours on the 757. The departure
of crews from the 757 to other aircraft is discussed in Chapter V
on training. The 757 also afforded an opportunity for a number
of 727 second officers to become first officers, rather than
going through the usual seniority path of first officer on a DC-9
(Airline-l) or a 727 (both carriers).
A surprising number of the 757 crews in this study (38) came from
wide-body aircraft. Eleven were second officers, upgrading to
the right seat of the 757, but the remainder were captains and
first officers, presumably taking a cut in pay to fly the 757.
To the extent that we could determine it, there appeared to be
two explanations for this: i) the desire to fly a more modern
aircraft; and 2) the desire to stop flying long legs and
international schedules.
In summary, the 757 crews did not represent the usual progression
up the normal seniority ladder. As mentioned, a number of
pilots, including captains of wide-bodies, moved to the 757, and
a number of 727 second officers leaped over more senior first-
officers who could have bid it. Even those who came from other
first officer seats did not do so for seniority or salary
advantages, as they could have remained in the DC-9 and 727 right
seats until ready to move to similar positions in the wide-body
aircraft. Most indicated tothe author that they bid the 757 for
one reason: the desire to fly a high technology aircraft before
moving to more lucrative, but less technologically attractive
wide-bodies. A similar motivation to fly the most advanced
technology aircraft in the fleet had been noted in the author's
previous study of pilots transitioning from traditional DC-9s to
MD-80s (Wiener, 1985b).
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IV. COCKPIT EQUIPMENTAND ENVIRONMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
In this section we shall discuss cockpit equipment, how it is
perceived by the crews, their likes and dislikes, and use of the
automation. A large amount of data from the two questionnaires
will be reported. This section is intended to be a general
overview of automation, as well as a detailed look at the cockpit
environment. The section contains four parts:
Be
C.
D,
mo
General likes and dislikes about the cockpit environment,
and automation in general.
Specific questions and comments on programming the FMC, and
on programming duties in general.
Features that would be missed and not missed if the crewman
were to leave the 757. This section is perhaps another
way of asking the questions explored in part B.
Tabulations of usage of the various modes of instrument
approaches, and automatic features, including autoland.
The movement toward automation has largely been built on three
basic assumptions:
. Automation would reduce workload (and therefore also
fatigue), and would replace the duties of the second
officer°
. Automation would reduce human error by replacing human
activities with error-free devices.
. Automation would therefore be uncritically accepted by
flight crews.
The designers, certification specialists, and purchasers often
took these not as assumptions, but as given facts. Beginning
with the work of Wiener and Curry (1980), these assumptions were
challenged. Our early work indicated that:
i. Workload was not universally reduced. In fact it appeared
that a paradox existed: workload seemed to be reduced when
it was not heavy or critical, and may be increased by
automation when it was already heavy or critical. Workload
is discussed in detail in Section VIII of this report.
• Accident and incident experience, and the ASRS database,
while not allowing a statistical comparison of error rates,
2O
.raised serious questions about the proper use of automation
by the crews, and pointed toward a potential for automation-
induced errors. Indeed, it appeared that automation might
be reducing small errors, and creating opportunities for
large ones. Section VI of this report is devoted to a
discussion of human errors in automation.
Field studies showed that many pilots were quite critical of
automation, both as a concept, and as to specific
applications and usages.
The data reported in this section summarizes the viewpoints of
757 crews regarding the automation, specific cockpit
equipment, and the overall environment of the cockpit. Following
Table IV-i are seven figures reflecting general crew attitude
toward automatic flight features.
B. LIKES AND DISLIKES
On the first questionnaire, crews were asked the following [i]:
1-1. List the features or modes of the 757 automation,
instrumentation, or avionics that you like or dislike.
why if you wish.
Explain
The results are given in Table IV-I below. (Note: some of the
"why" information is covered in other sections of this report
dealing with specific features and modes.)
[i] Throughout this report, the questions are numbered by two
digits: the first is the questionnaire phase (either 1 or 2),
the second is the question number (i through 7), e.g. 1-2
indicates the second question on the Phase-I questionnaire.
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LIKES
Item
TABLE IV-i
Times
Mentioned
GENERALAUTOMATION
Everything (so stated)
Everything, when it all works
Automatic functions (in general)
Autothrottle
Autopilot
CWSmode
Multiple autopilot
Autoland (and low vis. approach capability)
VNAV
LNAV
Navigation instrumentation and concept
Amount of information available at all times
EICAS
EFIS ("glass cockpit) in general
Flight director
FMC (general)
HOLD page and holding capability
DIR INT page and capability
PROGpage
FIX page
NAY DATA page
Concept of pages
Route-2 capability
CRZ page
Abeam fix capability
Stored company routes (Airline-2)
Stored gate positions
Ease of programming route
Ability to program to avoid weather
Autotuning of VORs
HSI (general)
HSI map mode
HSI radar plot with map
Ability to scale map
Wind vector
Map display of airports and navaids
Green arc (point on map reaching altitude)
Ability to see point where will intercept ILS (Loc)
Map plan mode
Track predictor display ("noodle")
ADI (in general, and esp. mode info on ADI)
Ground speed readout
14
2
Ii
25
14
1
1
14
22
21
7
ii
i0
24
7
21
7
7
6
2
2
1
1
1
1
3
1
4
1
2
17
52
21
1
13
ii
1
1
4
1
I0
5
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OTHER DISPLAYS
Redundant analog and digital instruments
Display of performance data
Continuous update of fuel and arrival information
Color coding of system status, engine instruments
Time (ETA) display
Distance to go display in FMC
Instruments easy to read
IVSI (emphasis on "instantaneous")
Altitude alerting system
2
1
1
2
1
1
4
1
2
CONTROLS/MODES
Ability to program at the gate
Speed mode
Heading select
Pressurization controls
Ability to cross hard altitudes accurately
FLCH (flight level change) mode
No need for lat/lon of W/P to be entered by keyboard
Ability to override FMC with MCP (e.g. FLCH)
"User friendly" software
Center ILS head to program both F/Ds
Altitude capture
Ability to go to 300' RVR some day
Go-around and missed approach programming
Ease of intervening in programmed flight with MCP
Dual com head and sel call
3
1
1
3
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
PERFORMANCE
Smoothness of auto flight
Airplane performance and power
High altitude capability
7
2
1
COCKPIT LAYOUT/WORKLOAD/EASE OF WORK
Mode control panels and layout
Cockpit layout in general
Ease of en route planning
Ease of route insertion
Cockpit lighting
"Semi-heads-up" while using autopilot
Low workload at cruise
"Color coordination" of cockpit
Outside visibility
23
SYSTEMS
Exceed limitations/duration recording for maintenance
Electrical systems
Fuel systems, controls, and displays
Automatic systems (other than flight systems)
Automatic cabin temp control
IRUs (IRSs)
Auto-tuning of VORs
Fuel saving procedures
EEC/thrust management systems
ACARS (Airline-2)
Alternate gear/flap lowering (simplicity of)
APU
Auto speed brakes
Autobrakes
1
1
1
5
1
4
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
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DISLIKES
Item
Times
Mentioned
GENERALAUTOMATION
None (so stated)
F/D and A/P need speed hold for descents (like 747)
Never get to use "basic functions" (NDB, VOR, ILS
display modes) except on check ride
No manual capture of LOC and GS in F/D mode
Automation creates complacency
Autothrottle on takeoff
Automation useless in terminal area
Too much time with head in cockpit
FMC
Slowness of FMC to respond to input
FMC resynchs too often
Poor performance of fuel projections
Poor performance of holding page
No efficient way to intercept radial outbound
"Insufficient Fuel" message comes on too often
Direct intercept (to distant waypoint) wipes out
intermediate waypoints; difficult to reprogram
Too much programming
One airway intersecting another difficult to progra m
Database (FMC) will not be current on weekly basis
Step climb unreliable
Descent information unreliable
Descending in VNAV in holding pattern is difficult
Unnecessary steps to put alt. in MCP, then program
it via CDU into the cruise page
Some numbers on FMC cannot be erased
Can't get ILS-DMEs when in map mode
FMC underestimates top-of-descent point
Descent logic in general
LNAV programming logic
VTRK error should be on Page 1 of PROG Page
Can't cross-check position with VORs in auto position
"BITE check OK" message appears too often
Top-of-descent point lost if Xing restrictions added
Descent forecast page unnecessary
Can't capture glide path from above
VNAV logic in descent (esp. drag required)
7
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
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3
1
2
1
1
3
5
i
1
i
1
i
i
I
I
i
1
i
i
i
1
i
i
3
8
DISPLAYS
Non-availability of FMC maintenance pages in flight
Weather radar -- various complaints: low intensity
on HSI map, too much red; underestimates intensity
ii
30
25
F/D - would prefer V-bars (like FD-109) - Airline-I
F/D V-bars should be filled in (not outlined) - Airline-2
F/D - calls for extreme corrections
F/D - misc.
Magenta/cyan poor choice of color contrasts
Auto-squelch on com radios
HSI should show all selected airways
Aural warnings too loud
Blinking displays
LOC on ADI (sensitivity)
ILS display mode
Lack of aural tone on altimeter alerter
Need more territory displayed behind own aircraft on map
Map display should be 360 degree compass rose
Com radio frequencies on LCDs hard to read
Airways should be identified on map
ADF is on wrong needle
Should have voice messages for advisories
Incorrect EICAS messages
Can't separate code ident from voice on navaids
Engine gauges should not have "hollow" arrows
Need larger scale on map display
1
9
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
8
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
CONTROLS/MODES
VNAV-- (specifically below i0,000')
VNAV -- various complaints
VNAV -- takes too long to program crossing restriction
VOR and ILS frequency selectors difficult to set
Transponder toggle switch too small
Control of airspeed in FLCH
Need separate mike for cabin PA
Need third com radio for guard channel
No synch feature to eliminate engine beat
Single ILS head; subject to failure; need two at LAX
ADF performs poorly
Need bank angle limitation in LNAV at cruise
Not clear what the autothrottles are doing
VOR head - too much spinning and lag
Need a pitch control knob on autopilot
Layout of autothrottle controls on MCP
Parameters for altitude deviation too loose
No turbulence mode on autopilot
5
3
3
3
1
3
1
1
1
2
2
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
PERFORMANCE
Autothrottles unstable, surge, too much movement
Too much draft/crab in autoland
Climb/descent should allow more lead time
Altitude capture at low level (esp. after T/O)
Excessive vertical speed in last i000'
Excessive bank angle intercepting course
8
1
2
1
1
3
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COCKPIT LAYOUT/WORKLOAD/EASE OF USE
Excessive "head down" time due to programming required 7
Remote location of side panel 2
Fuel gauge location 1
Too many annunciators and lights _ could be on CRTs i
Mode displays on ADI should be at top i
Too many lighting controls 1
Headsets and boom mike uncomfortable 1
Air noise in cockpit 2
Two-man cockpit 3
ACARS - various complaints - don't like on same scope
with radar; nuisance messages; cumbersome (Airline-2) i0
Too many identical switches 1
Circuit breakers to hard to reach i
Door warning light too high overhead 1
Oxygen mask fits too tight 1
VHF should have press-to-talk on glare shield 4
Sun visors 1
Alt and hdg knobs (MCP) should have fast & slow slew 1
Location of RDMI i
Need light to indicate "video on" in cabin 1
SYSTEMS
No mechanical "last ditch" way to lower gear 1
Need override of EEC for EPR in case of engine loss
at V-I 1
Autobrakes too grabby on manual release i
Electrically caused problems that can't be duplicated
for maintenance 1
Lack of systems monitoring instruments for trouble shooting 1
No safeguard for fuel imbalance - just warning
Brakes too touchy
Rudder trim constantly changing
Need better cooling in E&E compartment
Yaw damper too sensitive
Need more information on system status (e.g. packs)
POLICY
Excessive company tasks not related to flying
Not enough emphasis on basic flying skills (A/S, alt.)
Dispatching with one generator or APU out
i
i
1
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7. I always know what mode
the autopilot/flight director is in.
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15. I feel that I am "ahead of the plane"
more in the B-757,
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C. PROGRAMMING DUTIES
The Phase-2 questionnaire contained an open-ended question about
programming the FMC, and programming duties in general is
discussed. (Note: crews often use the terms FMC and CDU
interchangeably.) The motivation for this question was the oft-
stated view that excessive programming duties were required; that
this often resulted in high workload and distraction from extra-
cockpit scan in the terminal areas; and that programming could be
eliminated or simplified. This will be discussed further in
Chapter VIII on workload. The term "programming" is not exactly
correct in the context, as it includes data and parameter entry
as well, but it is the term most often used for any CDU input.
Since the introduction of the advanced technology aircraft, which
require a high degree of FMC programming, there has been
considerable controversy surrounding this activity, particularly
on departures and arrivals from terminal areas, which often
require a heavy programming workload due to rapid ATC changes.
Most frequently mentioned is the arrival to Los Angeles
International Airport (LAX), where frequent runway changes occur
between the time when the crew receives the ATIS runway prior to
descent, and when the final runway assignment is made. Pilots
often refer to this as "musical runways." Typically one runway
is assigned on the ATIS, and the crew programs this into the FMC.
Sometimes crews, in anticipation of a runway change, will program
a second approach into RTE 2, so that all they will have to do is
activate that route and reset their ILS receiver for the new
runway.
But it is not unusual for "musical runways" to occur, with
changes beginning as they join the arrival, and continuing all
the way down to near the outer marker. (See Figure IV-l, the 29
PALMS profile descent into LAX, next page). The runway
programmed in RTE 2 may or may not ever become activated.
Various views are held on how to handle this, especially as the
flight progresses closer to the final approach fix, and the
opinions are quite polarized. One view says that solutions to
ATC changes should be programmed and automation, particularly
LNAV, VNAV, and approach coupling, should be exploited to the
fullest. Those who hold this view generally feel that persons
not exploiting the automation have simply not gained the
necessary proficiency level.
The other view holds that in a two-pilot aircraft, descending
into a terminal area (particularly LAX, due to its heavy traffic,
frequent TCA violations by VFR aircraft, and aircraft flying VFR
in questionable VMC conditions), at least one pilot should be
looking out of the window at all times in VMC conditions. The
CDU, it is felt, tempts both pilots to go "heads-down" and become
overly involved in programming duties. The critics hold that
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under such conditions, the FMC induces an excessive workload, for
little actual advantage in completing the approach. They believe
that safety considerations dictate that they "click it off" and
proceed in autopilot or flight director mode resetting the ILS
head as required by runway changes. Those who hold this view
also feel that their training over-emphasized the use of
automation in such circumstances. Curry (1985) recommended that
this problem be confronted by giving the crews "turn it off
training."
There is not likely to be an early or uncritically accepted
resolution of this question. It is interesting to note that as
crews become more experienced in the 757, they tend to move
toward more extreme positions on this question. The first side
develops perceptions of high crew proficiency and machine
efficiency, and makes full use of the automation; the other gains
experience which convinces them more and more that good piloting
judgment calls for less CDU programming and more "basic
airmanship."
Interviews gave the impression that this is one area that seems
to separate the captains from the first officers, though the data
presented below do not support this. In interviews it is quite
apparent that many captains express the latter viewpoint, and
specifically mention their concern that the first officers are
"computer happy," and sometimes try to "program their way out of
trouble" to the detriment of situational awareness. It is seldom
that the author hears first officers complain of too much
programming going on, or recommend that one "click it off" when
workload accelerates. First officers often speak of the
captains' conservatism toward accepting new technology, as
illustrated by their reluctance to program solutions to problems.
This may in part be an age and educational difference: the
younger pilots grew up and received their education in the
computer age, and many flew military aircraft with high degrees
of automation. The older captains are less comfortable with, and
less enamored with, computer solutions to anything, and tend to
put their trust in superior airmanship, training, judgment,
discipline, and experience. Observing from the jumpseat, one
quickly gains the impression that the first officers are more
attracted to, and more proficient in the use of the FMC. Often
the captains feel that they need to restrain the first officers'
zeal for programming.
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The table and comments which follow are in response to the
following question:
2-6. What changes in the method of programming of the CDU or
additional features, pages, prompts, etc. would you like to see?
Do you feel that the programming tasks could or should be
simplified? In what way?
Some of the more frequently mentioned comments are listed in
Table IV-2.
Table IV-2
Times
Response Mentioned
It's OK as is; simpl e enough; no changes needed 29
Too much time programming below i0,000 feet 9
More information needed for approaches (MDA/DH etc.) 6
Computer should update faster 13
FMC computer should display approach speeds 3
FMC should be more helpful for diverting 3
Latitude and longitude should be displayed on map display 2
Visual approaches should be in database 3
"Abeam" waypoints should remain in memory in case
of change in direct routing 3
ILS should be auto-tuned with runway selected in FMC 4
Should be a way to program intersection of two airways 4
FMC should calculate and display V-speeds 3
Maintenance information should be available to crew 3
Latitude and longitude should be displayed on FIX page 3
All waypoints (fixes) on a route should be in FMC 3
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Crew Comments
It would be helpful to have the ability to program a +/-
distance/altitude from a__nfffix on the LEGS page in same way it
can be done for active W/P. 4001
Get rid of excessive intersections and data that clutter the HSI.
4002
Fix the descent/speed problem. The aircraft will not slow up as
the pilot expects. Put state boundaries on the map (switch
selectable) 4004
Immediately after training emphasis should be placed on flying
the airplane, not on programming the FMC, especially for
inexperienced first officers. Because of heavy emphasis on FMC
work in training, some pilots think the plane won't fly without
considerable programming. 4007
Some changes require multiple page entries; these could be
simplified. 4010
We need to be able to select two ILS frequencies and just throw a
switch like the 727. New, younger people get wrapped up in not
having a route discontinuity at the end of the segment. Just
leave the boxes blank and put in the proper runway later. 4013
When you select VNAV from T/O power, it should go automatically
to climb EPR. Also need a prompt "unable to comply" with
subsequent altitude restraints after the first one, e.g.
descending from cruise altitude to 10,000 at 40 miles out and
then 8000 at 38 miles out. There's no indication that the plane
won't be able to make both restrictions. We need this
information early so we can advise ATC. 4014
I would like an emergency mode. When selected, the A/C symbol
(triangle) would be positioned in the middle of the map display,
and any airport long enough to accommodate the 757 would be
displayed. I would also like to be able to select a fix on the
RTE page, then select an airway into or out of that fix and have
the FMC fill in the previous/next waypoint. 4016
Only problem is inability to interact with ATC. 4018
Pilots should be given current runway and arrival procedures as
early as possible, before descent to lower altitudes (i0,000).
This would allow programming in airspace where conflicts and
traffic are less of a problem, and allow pilots' full attention
on weather and aircraft avoidance. Local approach information
should be accessible through ACARS, rather than only through
ATIS. Little or no programming should take place below 10,000.
Training continues to emphasize programming the FMC on approach
or within the TCA. This is an unfortunate emphasis which causes
poor habit pattern formation. 4019
35
I can always spot a new pilot on the plane because he is spending
far too much time on the CDU with his head down. 4020
Our system of stored company routes <Airline-2> is a big time saver.
4021
i) Often we are given vectors to intercept an airway. It would be
nice if there were some way to show an airway in our area, much
like calling up a fix. 2) When diverting, it would be nice if
the FMC could be easier to program to accommodate a diversion,
i.e. by resetting new field elevation in the pressurization
panel, sending an ACARSmessage to the company. 3) When a
particular approach is selected, why not have the FMC tune the
approach facilities, ILS and ADF frequencies, and inbound
heading. 4) The FMC knows how much the A/C weighs. Why not
have the airspeed bugs (especially on electronic airspeed
indicator) set automatically for the configuration? 5) The FMC
knows the temperature, altimeter setting, and with pilot-inserted
wind could calculate max runway weights for T/O and landing. 6)
In each case there must be provisions for the pilot to quickly
and easily override the automatic features of the FMC; i.e.
changing ILS frequencies etc. 4022
No change. I feel our 757 training department has done an
excellent job. Emphasis should be on all pilots, especially
pilots with limited experience, to stay out of the CDU when near
an airport. 4024
Need ability to draw lat or lon on the map. ATC sometimes asks
us to call when we cross a certain lat or lon. (This happens
when we are not under radar control). No way to find it out from
map. 4026
The biggest complaint is difficulty in changing runways after
runway has been programmed. A pilot is programmed to put data in
the FMC every time there is a clearance issued. The head goes in
the cockpit and nobody may be looking outside. If the runway
could be changed with just one button push it would help. 4029
Too many steps to program "abeam" positions. Also the VNAV
program gets behind on descent unless you "lie" and give it
greater tailwinds or lighter headwinds on DES page. 4030
Data base could be expanded to include more information on
instrument approach procedures, e.g. DH/MDAo We need a smaller
scale on the map for landing to depict taxiways, e.g. ORD. This
would simplify taxiing and maybe prevent runway incursions. 4031
Need some indication on LEGS or PROG page that you have actually
exited holding (other than simply EXEC light extinguishes. 4033
When a different altitude is selected in the MCP when you're on
CRZ page, it should automatically go to altitude slot in the CDU,
not to the scratch pad. Also LEGS page should advance by itself
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when inserting "abeam" positions and one gets to the bottom of
the page. 4035
Would like vertical deviation written next to arrow on the HSI;
airspeed indicator in ADI; and direction and velocity of wind on
HSI. 4036
The NAY DATA page could also provide spelled out names of
navaids, for example, if you enter IRW instead of seeing lats and
lons for the two points, it should say: i) Will Rogers Oklahoma
City VOR; 2) Some localizer in Canada. Also, once a direct route
has been selected and abeam fixes entered, the fix W/Ps should be
held in memory, so if another direct route is selected, the
abeams can be displaced over the new course, and not have to be
reentered. 4040
HSI map should display the airway you are on, i.e. J-79 should be
displayed next to the magenta line. I would like to see wind
speed display next to arrow on the HSI. 4041
Put in visual approaches (e.g. DCA 18 and the 13/31 at LGA).
4042
Paper flight plan and the FMC often don't agree (e.g. DTW-SFO).
If dispatch sends us a route, we shouldn't have to build it.
4043
Should be programmed to prevent aircraft from descending through
I0,000 feet regardless of mode. 4045
CDU is straight-forward and user-friendly. 4046
Should be able to view maintenance pages in flight. 4047
ACARS and CDU should be better integrated; e.g. load should go
directly into CDU. ILS should be tuned by CDU when you select an
approach. 4050
First give me a QUERTY board <standard typewriter keyboard>, then
put it on an extension cord so I don't have to type one-handed.
How about menu-driven software? Organization of prompts should
be more intuitive. Our company's procedures are cumbersome and
needlessly complex. The company doesn't get full benefit of
automation. This results in a loss of operational flexibility
and safety. 4061
Standard arrivals (STARs) should be totally correct or should be
eliminated. We have a frequent problem with incomplete stored
arrivals. 4063
Change the wording on the HOLD page to read "Exiting Hold"; it
now reads "Exit Armed." 4064
CDU information should be in different colors, to make critical
numbers stand out. 4066
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Need ability to go directly to any page, rather than through
other pages. 4069
On PROGpage 1 I would like to see the wind readout and SAT temp
in place of Econ Spd and To Step Clmb on that page. We often
need to look at gross weight to determine how high we can climb.
That would be nice on the PROG page. Our procedures call for the
PF to be on the PROG page, and the PNF on the ACT RTE LEGs page.
I would like to see Offset on the latter. 4070
EXEC light should be brighter.
4073
Relocate CDU to center pedestal.
I'd like to be able to intercept a leg from... 3001
Eliminate VNAV and go to MCP for altitude control. Use VNAV to
attain econ speeds only. 3002
TAKEOFF page is unnecessary and seldom used. 3004
Would like to see included in FMC: MOCAs <minimum obstruction
clearance altitudes>, approach plates. 3006
Would like to see: gate at destination; station ATIS; clearance,
ground control, and company radio frequencies at station. 3008
Would like the screen to give:
margins. 3009
V-speeds, buffet speeds and
Need to be able to put lat and lon on FIX page. 3014
VNAV profiles should limit climb/descent rate to 500 fpm in the
last I000 feet. Easier on passengers, less rapid power changes,
and not cause pilots to "wonder" if it's going to level off in
time. Would also help to flash mode change on ADI as well as
color change. 3015
Should be able to program intercept leg to a fix as part of
flight plans. 3017
Would be nice to have area chart for major airports available on
map display. 3018
t
All waypoints <fixes> on all our routes should be in database.
3020
Need capability to program intersecting airways where no named
point at intersection exists. Also confusion in co-located
facilities, e.g. ZBV and ZBBNB are both on our charts. <CDU
contains only ZBBNB> 3026 <See Chapter X, section on workload°>
It would help to have a list of the names of intersections of two
airways (e.g. J42 and J48 is CSN40). We have to get out the
charts and define the intersection. 3032
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Need a better and quicker way to fly a given radial. Present
method takes too long to set up and you usually end up flying it
the old way. 3034
After EXIT HOLD has been executed, the holding pattern oval
should disappear to eliminate concern about whether the airplane
is going to depart holding, and if so, how. 3035
Too much use of VNAV, given ATC changes.
3039
FLCH works better.
All aircraft in our fleet are not all the same. Some will not
allow the cost index (CI) to be inserted first (only after CRZ
ALT). Can't override mandatory altitude on LEGS page. Would be
nice to be able to do that. Some aircraft will not take a + or
new waypoint unless it is from the active waypoint. 3042
Someone should invent a real-time turbulence meter. 3043
On reaching intermediate altitude (descending) the CRZ page goes
blank. You have to reenter new altitude to regain FMC cruise
speed control. If the clearance contains two altitudes, the
problem is compounded because as the intermediate altitude is
captured, VNAV is lost and the TOD point is passed over without a
second descent. More "catch up ball." VNAV is almost useless
between RIC and BOS; westbound is a different story. Three
changes I would like to see: i) A discrete light on any time the
speed brake handle is deployed. It's easy to miss it on a level
off. I see this happen at least once a month. 2) Allow flight
crew access to maintenance information on the EICAS. 3) A
discrete light on any time the fuel cross-feed valve is open.
Every 757 pilot has been caught on this one. 3049
Building of approaches should be eliminated. 3051
Should have a warning bell and light for inadvertent turning off
of the autothrottle. More extensive data on non-precision
approaches would also help. 3053
Documentation for holding patterns needs improvement. 3057
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Do FEATURES THAT WOULD BE MISSED OR NOT MISSED
IF ONE WERE TO LEAVE THE 757
As mentioned previously, the 757 tends to be a short-term
assignment for flight crews. In the following question we asked
the volunteers to imagine that they were leaving the 757 for a
less automated aircraft in their company's fleet.
The results to the question below are given in Table IV-3, and
the specific comment which follow. This question provides an
insight into what the crews saw favorably and unfavorably about
flying an advanced aircraft.
2-2. If you were to leave the 757 for an older model aircraft,
what features would you miss the most? What would you be happy
to leave behind?
TABLE IV-3
FEATURES THAT WOULD BE MISSED
DISPI_AY SYSTEMS
HSI map mode
HSI (in general)
HSI map - nearby airports
HSI map - wind vector
HSI map - green arc (altitude projection)
HSI map plus radar overlay
HSI map - track line
HSI map - runway center line
ADI (in general)
ADI - ground speed readout
EFIS ("glass cockpit") [i]
ETA at destination
EICAS [i]
Flight director
Situational awareness (from EFIS instruments)
Large instruments
AUTO-FLIGHT
Automation (in general)
FMC (in general)
FMC direct intercept capability
FMC HOLD page
FMC - ability to plan and visualize flight
[i] See notes at end of tables.
Times
Mentioned
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7
5
3
5
4
1
1
4
1
Ii
2
i0
3
3
2
21
33
7
3
7
44
FMC - crossing restrictions
FMC - entering waypoints by letter (not coordinates)
Cockpit in general - "the whole package"
Altitude capture capability
VNAV
LNAV
Autothrottle (and EEC)
Autopilots
IRS; navigation systems in general
Fuel management systems
Autoland; Cat II and Cat III capability [5]
Automation allows time for extra-cockpit scan
FLCH mode
TOD planning
MCP
ACARS [2]
Stored routes [2]
1
1
4
2
7
9
ii
7
19
3
3
1
1
1
1
5
1
HANDLING AND PERFORMANCE
Handling, performance, and engine power
High altitude capability
Fuel capacity
Flex takeoff capability and reserve power
Short runway stopping capability
Reliability of Rolls Royce engines
21
6
1
1
2
1
BASIC SYSTEMS
Air conditioning systems
Auto pressurization and heating/cooling
Reliability of systems in general
2
2
1
COCKPIT LAYOUT AND ENVIRONMENT
Quiet cockpit
Roomy cockpit; comfort; color scheme
Good outside visibility
Simplified checklists
Simplified manuals
Simplified weight and performance charts
Simplicity of cockpit layout
Newness and cleanliness of cockpit
3
4
2
1
1
1
2
1
MISCELLANEOUS
Better trips
Pride of flying "state-of-the-art" aircraft
Passenger comfort
Two-man crew
1
2
1
2
45
FEATURESTHAT WOULDNOT BE MISSED
Times
Mentioned
None (so stated) 25
Avionics/automation
Computer "glitches" [3]
Programming demand at low altitude
Way the compass heading is displayed
Autopilot/Fiight Director
Autothrottle system
Possibility of programming errors
Two-man crew
Excessive workload in terminal areas [4]
Tendency of both pilots to be programming at once
Auto squelch on radios
Weather radar (esp. in light rain; esp. on higher scale)
"Surrendering my experience and judgment to a computer"
Ability to lose all instruments including standby
No manual backup on autothrottle
Need to analyze what the plane is doing
ACARS
Single ILS head
Speed brake used excessively due to ATC, often forgotten
FMS not good in todayVs ATC environment
High workload during malfunctions, short legs, or
entry into complex TCAs
Lack of aural altitude warning
EFIS
Slow :response of FMC
3
2
1
1
2
1
20
7
2
2
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
Performance
Landing - to easy for tail to strike; no tailskid
Landing - nose wheel characteristics
Loss of aileron effect at low speed
"Springy" ride in choppy air
Need for rudder trim in descent
Dutch roll during turbulence
Two engines only
2
1
1
1
3
1
1
Basic systems
Lack of information on systems in flight
Malfunctions of systems
Over-sensitive brakes
Erroneous status messages
5
1
1
1
46
Cockpit layout and comfort
Effect of low humidity at high altitude
Seat (too short; not enough room for crew meal
tray to avoid yoke; too little movement;
yoke blocks view of HSI)
Sunscreens
Cockpit noise
Needs mike button on side panel
2
8
1
6
2
[i]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
Some responses of simply "glass cockpit" may apply to
EICAS as well as EFIS
This capability in Airline-2 aircraft only
"Glitches" actual word used
"Below i0,000 feet" specifically mentioned in most responses
Cat II and III approaches not flown by Airline-2 at time
of this study.
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Crew Comments
(Note: where respondent indicated he was no longer flying the
757, the new seat is listed in parentheses at the beginning of
the comment.)
I would miss the FMC and the HSI presentation most, and the
flexibility it provides with mundane navigational duties. I
would miss the performance margins the aircraft offers (i.e.
takeoffs are usually done with reduced power, but more is
available if needed). I have never been concerned about the
necessity of an abort in this aircraft, while in other transport
aircraft IWve flown an abort at V-i may not have been successful
due to runway remaining. 3004
I would definitely miss the IRS and the map functions.
Navigation would require much more attention, so I would miss
LNAVo Crossing restrictions and TOD would require more planning,
so I would also miss VNAV. Loss of wind velocity vector would
make wind shear detection more difficult. Fuel use and ETA at
destination would require much greater effort. I would miss the
pride of flying _'state-of-the-art" equipment. 3008
(Capt._ A-300 and B-727) I am happy to leave the two-man crew
behind. Experience will soon prove that too much safety is
compromised going to the two-man crews exclusively. The system
is too complex, the traffic too heavy, and the pressure on crews
to fly 12, 13 or 14 hours too fatiguing. Would a third man have
prevented the near disaster to Delta's 757 at LAX <two engine
shutdown at low altitude>? 3013
(Capto, A-300). I miss the simple layout of all systems.
Whatever drawbacks the 757 may have, in no way is it as
distracting as the S/O reading checklists, fighting flight
attendants over temperature control on the 727 or A-300. 3018
I will not miss the landing of a 757. It is entirely too easy
to have a tail strike in this aircraft. It is ridiculous for an
aircraft designed today to be this critical on landing. For many
pilots, this is more important than automation. 3021
Would be happy to leave behind the possibility of misprogramming
or having the other pilot programming without informing me of
what he is doing. Especially serious when he is flying the
aircraft at the same time. 3026
The automation leaves us free to scan for other aircraft more
than most aircraft. Flying the 757 requires more crew
coordination than most aircraft. The tendency of the PF to come
back into the cockpit to program is very strong; training to
avoid is not nearly emphasized enough. 3027
I would miss VNAV and LNAV most_ Tracking a VOR leg and figuring
time to climb to any altitude and start descent are things I
48
gladly let the computer do. They usually are more accurate than
I ever was, but interestingly, not always! When it's needed,
there is no substitute for autoland: I need visual cues, it
doesn't. But I dislike surrendering most of my experience and
judgment to a computer, especially when it's judge, jury, and
executioner. 3033
I cannot think of any features of the 757 that I would want to
leave behind. The aircraft was well designed as any first
generation aircraft, and has few if any faults. Exception:
having to put in rudder trim on climbs and descents. 3034
(Capt., retired from 757) My other main airplane for 15 years
was the DC-9. I liked it fine, but I can't think of anything on
it that isn't better on the 757. 3038
The airplane has the best of all worlds:
automation, and hand flying. 3039
automation, semi-
(Capt., DC-10) I missed the map feature of the HSI, esp. the
runway center line profile, and the green arc <altitude
predictor> for descent planning. Also miss the holding pattern
aids, alternate airport information. I don't miss the single ILS
head and the two-man cockpit. Low altitude FMC work should be
prohibited! 4007
(F/O DC-10 and Capt., 727) I enjoyed the automation. I made it
work for me, however I never lost sight of basic airmanship and
always monitored raw data. I found no aspect of the airplane
that I would be "happy to leave behind." 4009
(Capt., DC-10) I left the B-757 and I was happy to get the third
pilot back. I really notice how helpful the extra set of eyes
and hands are during higher workload times. I do miss the glass
cockpit, especially the map display and descent arc, and the
quick availability of VORs without fumbling with a map. I do not
miss the company busy work and checklist fumbling on the 757. I
notice that I have more time to monitor the F/O when he is PF on
the DC-10. 4011
It is the most fun fixed winged A/C I have flown (old helicopter
pilot). I put in a DC-10 captain bid because of the money and
chance to fly to Europe. It will be hard to go back to needle,
ball and airspeed. From the cockpit door forward there will be
nothing I will be happy to leave behind. I love the whole
aircraft. 4015
(F/O, DC-10) I have just checked out in the DC-10 (F/O). I
definitely miss the FMC. I found the DC-10 autopilot and flight
director system cumbersome and antiquated when compared to the
757. Navigation <DC-10> is less accurate, more cumbersome, and
there is more room for error using the INS system on the DC-10.
I also miss the EICAS for systems monitoring and trouble
shooting. 4021
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(Capt., 747) I miss the ADI, HSI and the FMC. These are
tremendous tools for the pilot. I did not like the "limit EPR"
function of the EEC. Out of SEA one day I lost the right engine
at 140 feet above the field at near max gross weight. I wished I
had had the capability of overriding the EEC in order to obtain
more than "limit EPR'_ power° 2024
(F/O, 747) I enjoy flying the 757. I also fly the 747. I miss
the MCP, FMC, simple autopilot functions, and the map. There are
no features I am happy to leave behind except the two-man crew.
The three-man crew enhances safety, especially regarding ATC
transmissions, altitude busts, and handling emergencies. The
design flaw that really sticks out is the lack of a mike button
in the corner of the glare shields. 4026
(Was bumped off 757 for one month and took 727 F/O training, then
returned to 757) I did not leave it by choice. I missed the map
display most, next the precision of the ADI. The ease of
navigating with the FMC vs. and INS is a tremendous boost, e.g.
going direct some place the 757 uses 3-1etter identifiers instead
of ground coordinates..°less chance of error. 4030
(F/O, 747) I miss everything. Of course the 747 is a piece of
ancient junk, so it's not a fair comparison° If I had gone to
the DC-10, which I have flown, I would probably have to say that
I would have missed the EICAS and the EFIS and the amount of
information available on the CRTs. Also the autothrottle on the
757 is very nice. 4041
(F/O, 747) One of the neatest features of the 757 is the FMC's
ability to meet crossing restrictions° If you program everything
correctly, it really saves you a lot of mental gymnastics, and
you can concentrate on other things. I would be happy to leave
behind the two-man crew, automatic or not. It just gets too busy
at times. 4045
Systems that relieve workload in one area tend to increase the
workload in new areas. 4049
I would be happy to leave the two-man crew behind. My experience
as a instructor and a line pilot on the 757 indicates that during
an emergency there is less attention to looking outside and also
to careful perusal of checklists than with three crew members.
In addition, I have seen more personality conflicts in two-man
than in three-man crews, which led to problems during
emergencies. 4057
I would be happy to leave behind some of the people in the left
seat. In other aircraft you have another person to combat the
left.-seater if he is a "five striper." 4064
5o
E. EQUIPMENT USAGE
On the Phase-2 questionnaire, crews were asked to enter into a
blank the number of times they had made various types of
approaches or used various capabilities of the aircraft. These
are shown in graphic form in the next two pages. At the time of
this study Airline-2's 757s were not authorized to descend to
Category II and III minimums, so some of these graphs reflect
only Airline-I data,
The term "man-made" refers to waypoints that are not stored in
the FMC database, but are "built" from stored navigation points
by the crew, usually employing the place-bearing-distance
capability.
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TABLE IV-4
Intercorrelation matrix for attitude probes in this chapter.
HIT refers to hours-in-type (B-757).
PHASE 1
HIT p7 pl0 pll p12 p15 p16 p21 p23 p25 p32 p35
HIT
p7
pl0
pll
p12
p15
p16
p21
p23
p25
p32
p35
1.00 -.17 -.14 .08 .07 -.13 .26 -.29 -.08 .25 .18 .12
1.00 -.01 -.32 -.02 .22 -.13 .12 -.01 -.08 -.09 -.Ii
1.00 .01 -.19 .41 -.21 .28 .24 -.14 -.07 -o21
1.00 -.03 -.22 .13 -.12 -.02 .06 -.08 .17
1.00 -.23 .14 -.16 -.16 .03 -.06 .19
1.00 -.23 .37 .24 -.19 -.12 -.29
1.00 -.42 -.39 .28 .16 _35
1.00 .26 -.25 -.15 -.38
1.00 -.32 -.ii -.25
1.00 .13 .27
1.00 .18
1.00
For n=166, Irl > .15 necessary for significance
at the 0.05 level
PHASE 2
HIT p7 pl0 pll p12 p15 p16 p21 p23 p25 p32 p35
HIT
p7
pl0
pll
p12
p15
p16
p21
p23
p25
p32
p35
1.00
.01 -.05 -.01 -.01 -.06 .06 -.27 -.II .06
1.00 .15 -.35 -.02 .18 -.05 .04 .13 -.03
.08 -.04
.01 -.18
1.00 -.08 -.04 .47 -.22 .34 .37 -.19 .12 -.34
1.00 -.08 -.08 .02 .01 -.15 .13 -.03 .19
1.00 -.i0 .06 -.09 -.02 .01 -.05 .14
1.00 -.26 .31 .24 -.18 .16 -.23
1.00 -.34 -.24 .27 .ii .35
1.00 .28 -.19 -.06 -.38
1.00 -.47 .01 -.20
1.00 .27 .38
1.00 .22
1.00
For n=133, Irl > .17 necessary for significance
at the 0.05 level
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Vo TRAINING
A. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we shall examine a wide range of issues dealing
with training of flight crews for high technology cockpits.
These topics will include transition training, initial operating
experience (IOE) on the line, retention and loss of skills ("loss
of scan") _ and finally "reverse transition" for those crew
members who left the 757 for other cockpits. Since at both
airlines which participated in this study the 757 was the only
"advanced technology" cockpit, those who left would be
transitioning back to less automatic aircraft. In some cases
they would be returning to aircraft that they had previously
flown, in some cases not.
The subject of air crew training is considered critical in the
airline industry, both for its importance for safety of flight
and for its economic implications. Airline flight training is
sometimes considered synonymous with simulation. This is a
unwise, since the simulator is only a technological tool for
achieving a desired result at maximum safety, reasonable cost,
and regulatory conformity. Training must include a consideration
of curriculum, educational psychology, instructors, training
techniques, materials, equipment, philosophy, and policy. For an
overview of pilot training, see Caro (1988).
It is in the training departments that not only are crews
prepared to fly the aircraft, but standardization and company
operating procedures are introduced as wello Standardization is
the foundation of cockpit safety.
In recent years new topics and techniques have been introduced as
part of the training packages. Most carriers have introduced
Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT), developed by airlines in
collaboration with NASA, as a means of adding realism of
operations to simulator training. Prior to the LOFT movement,
realism was considered largely in hardware terms, as "fidelity of
simulation" became the goal of simulator developers. "Fidelity"
referred to the degree to which simulators looked like and flew
like the aircraft. The concept did not extend to fidelity of
operations. LOFT has enabled instructors to provide training
under highly realistic conditions encountered on line flights,
rather than a cascading of abnormal conditions that has
characterized simulator training in the past.
A companion movement has been the introduction of cockpit
resource management (CRM) into flight training. LOFT has been an
enabling mechanism to provide realistic training in CRM. More
will be said about CRM in Chapter VII, Crew Coordination. For an
up-to-date discussion of LOFT and CRM, see Foushee and
He]mreich, 1988.
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Cockpit automation offers new challenges to training specialists
for the following reasons:
i. Presently most pilots are encountering advanced technology
cockpits for the first time. In this report, advanced technology
cockpits are those which contain EFIS instrumentation and CDU/FMC
based flight guidance. The first generation in the airline
industry includes the Boeing 767/757 and the A-310.
2. Some initial resistance has been shown, particularly by older
pilots, though in general pilots have reacted enthusiastically to
the new technologies.
3. Operation of the automatic equipment is particularly
difficult to teach and demonstrate in the classroom, due to its
dynamic and interactive nature. Real-time training devices which
can overcome this are extremely expensive, and therefore much of
the training is simulator-intensive. In response to this, a
generation of intermediate simulators has been developed. These
are called variously cockpit procedures trainers (CPT) and
cockpit systems simulators (CSS). While they download some of
the training from the more expensive Appendix H, Stage II and III
simulators, the CSS-level trainers are often used inefficiently,
with most of the capabilities lying idle while crews learn to
program on the CDU, and CDU-MCPrelationships. Often one will
see a multi-million dollar CPT with most of its remarkable
capability standing idle for long periods while the crew performs
drills on the CDU.
4. Automatic flight is probably qualitatively different than
flight in traditional cockpits, though this is yet to be proven.
New skills must be developed and practiced. These might be
described as "cognitive skills," including an emphasis on
planning, alternative selection, and predicting and monitoring
the performance of the automation. This is more than traditional
scanning and monitoring: it requires management and supervisory
skills, and a greater effort to maintain "situational awareness",
which can easily be sacrificed in highly automatic operations.
5. There appears to be a wider range of performance in the
training programs (higher variance). In any training program
there are faster and slower learners, but in the training for the
advanced cockpits the differences seem to be more extreme. This
is perhaps because it is not just another aircraft, but a
qualitatively different experience.
6. The combination of the deregulated environment and the
expansion of the airlines has brought a rapid movement of pilots
through training programs. The training departments are working
long hours in an effort to meet the demands, and simulator time
has become a commodity in great demand. Even airlines with well
equipped training centers are shopping around for simulator time
wherever they can find it.
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5. Younger pi ors ccltch on to the
new systerns (like the CDU)
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7. The modern aircraft are all two-pilot cockpits. Many pilots
are encountering two-pilot turbojet operation for the first time,
and this can represent a severe cultural change.
8. Training specialists have no place to turn for guidance on
the question of training for automation. Though the human
factors profession has recognized the problem, it has not been
forthcoming with much in the way of guidelines and assistance.
9. Due to the factors mentioned in No. 6 above, there is also
a steady flow of pilots departing the advanced cockpit for less
modern cockpits, which will be discussed at the end of this
chapter. This in itself may be a challenge to training.
i0. Pilot opinion runs strong on the subject of training. They
tend to be severe in their evaluation of training programs.
Pilots' morale and acceptance of new aircraft and technologies is
driven by their perception of the quality of their training.
ii. Pilots are concerned about their potential for skill
degradation (often called "loss of scan" by the pilots) under
automatic flight, and see the prevention of this as partly the
responsibility of the training departments, partly their own
responsibility.
12. The overloading of the ATC system impacts on airline
training. To a great extent, flight crews are called upon to
compensate for the inadequacies of ATC. This problem may find no
relief until the end of this century when new systems come on
line.
TABLE V-I. Seat held prior to 757 training.
SEAT HELD
PRIOR TO
IMMEDIATELY
757 SCHOOL
DC-9
B-727
A-300
L-1011
B-747
CAPTAIN F/O S/O TOTAL
62O
61
0
2
TOTAL
I
32
0
2
3
9
8
51
6
3
5
3
26
102
6
5
14
13
89 26 i 166
B. TRANSITION TRAINING
What follows is a documentation of pilot opinion and experience
with training and transition to the advanced cockpit, and reverse
transition of a sizable number of the volunteers.
1-7o Question: Which seat in which
immediately before going to 757 school?
difference in your easy of transition?
explain.
aircraft did you occupy
Do you think this made a
If .yes.., please
See Table V-I (previous page) for results of the first question.
(Replies to second question: 52 % replied "yes"; 48 % "no").
TABLE V-2
Paraphrase of replies of those who stated "yes" and gave an
explanation.
Times
Mentioned
Great similarities to former plane (mostly 727);
Already knew company procedures; my flying skills
were current, so could concentrate on differences;
didn't have to learn to fly 16
It was an easy transition since I was already a
captain; I was used to making decisions and flying
as capt.; particular aircraft makes little difference 16
I was already familiar with two-man procedures
(mostly DC-9 pilots) 14
Had prior time on DC-10; L-1011; B-747 etc.;
automation, INS, Omega, MCP similar 15
Knew 2-man coordination; not dependent on third man
Transition was easy due to F/O time in other aircraft
I found it hard to adjust to 2-man operation
The big change is not the airplane, but S/O to F/O
I_m a 727 pilot; would have been easier transition
from a DC-9
S/O experience was helpful, esp. learning 757 systems 2
6O
Crew Comments
(Aircraft designated at the end of the comment is the seat held
immediately before transition to the 757.)
There is a great deal of similarity in design and operational
characteristics between the DC-10 and the B-757 in most phases of
flight guidance and autoflight. Also, basic flight
characteristics are similar. (DC-10 F/O) 2001
If I hadn't had a few years of experience of flying captain, the
complexity of the new technology combined with an initial upgrade
would have been distracting. (727 Capt.) 2009
My company has an initial "up and out" rule. Having already
qualified as captain took the pressure off. The two-pilot
aircraft requires that the captain be much more assertive.
Previous captain experience helped to identify this. (727 Capt.)
2011
Only in that the 727 keeps a person more current in approach
procedures, landings, and scan etc. The experience in the 747
and DC-10 was a big help in transition to the FMC and MCP.
(747 Capt.) 2014
Since the 757 was the first F/O seat I was checked out in, there
were no habit patterns or procedures peculiar to other aircraft
that had to be broken or adjusted for in the 757. For example,
the pilot's eye view, handling characteristics, and automated
flight systems of the 757 are the only ones I am trained on, and
so the only ones I am used to. (727 S/O) 2015
At times the 757 cockpit workload is somewhat busy. It is very
similar to the "paperwork" workload put on our second officers.
Since my flying skills were still somewhat current, and my S/O
skills very current, I had a smooth transition. (727 S/O) 2022
I believe that is easier to transition because having been the
captain on another aircraft, I found it more natural to make
decisions and put them into effect. As a copilot, I found that I
was relying on the captain to make decisions that thus I was
rusty at flight management techniques. Having been able to
sharpen my management techniques on another aircraft smoothed my
transition, as I was able to make my decision and carry it
through quickly. I understand that other individuals upgrade to
captain for the first time on the 757 sometimes took considerable
time deciding which course of action to take, which added
considerably to their difficulties. (727 Capt.) 2028
International flying on the 747 for a F/O results in few landings
per month (as few as five landings and takeoffs), in an aircraft
with characteristics which are substantially different from the
757. Moreover, the 747 airports of entry usually have different
entry procedures, and other handling characteristics than those
used by the 757. (747 F/O) 2044
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The biggest job for the captain of an aircraft is to be a
captain. This does not have to be relearned with aircraft type
changes. (727 Capt.) 2051
The main job of a captain is to manage resources to complete a
successful flight. The time as 727 captain was very educational
in this regard. It should be noted that my DC-10 F/O time was
more helpful as regards the automation of the 757. (727 Capt.)
2056
The new technology in this aircraft made the check-out a little
more intense than in previous aircraft. Having already been
captain qualified in another aircraft (727) eased the transition
somewhat. In my opinion, anyone transitioning to the left seat
of the 757 from the right seat of an older aircraft would have an
extremely difficult time without having first flown as a captain
on some type of air carrier high performance aircraft°
(727 Capt.) 2064
Improved instrument scan, profile planning, aircraft slowing
capabilities, and flying approaches are skills that are improved
upon in the 757 after learning somewhat similar techniques in the
727. The confidence built in the 727 allows me to make more
knowledgeable inputs to the control and information loop as it to
crew coordination. The new systems in the 757 require
participation and decision making by both pilots in practically
all phases of flight (on the ground and in the air). This
abilit_ began in most other aircraft seatse but is most
i_mnortantl_ and actively used in the 757. (727 F/O) 2072
The 757 program was so busy qualifying me on the airplane that
not enough attention was paid to the fact that it was my initial
copilot upgrade. People in my situation should be targeted for
more scrutiny regarding knowledge of basic ATC and company
procedures as they are on the 727. (DC-10 S/O) 2087
Being familiar with two-man crew procedures decreased my reliance
on the third crew member. Increased workload during
descent/approach/landing phases requires careful coordination of
effort with two-man crew. (DC-9 Capt.) i001
I never felt so comfortable so quickly in any new aircraft than
in the 757. It is difficult to explain, but in a design like the
757 it seems that every action in the cockpit, every pilot
function, every need has been thought through extensively and
designed to be a straight forward task, simple to perform.
Countless simple duties are made easier, e.go the ease of use of
the altitude reminder or the autobrakes compared to other
aircraft. In summary, Boeing aircraft seemed to be designed with
common sense. (727 Capto) 1002
]5 years on the DC-9 have given me total confidence and ease with
the two-man crew, so no real transition here. Also, the basic
autopilot functions are not all that different. This left the
new locations of controls to be learned, o.pretty quick and easy,
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and the computers of course. (DC-9 Capt.) 1015
The school is more intense for a new captain. Having been a
captain is a confidence builder. (727 Capt.) 1028
It was the same crew position, same role, same responsibilities,
only the machine was different. So all I had to learn were the
specific aircraft systems and procedures. (DC-9 F/O) 1035
Transition was easier than if I had transitioned from a non-
Boeing aircraft, or from a F/O or S/O seat. I would not
recommend the 757 to a new captain unless he flew it first as an
F/O. (727 Capt.) 1040
It would have been easier coming from a more automated plane,
like the L-1011 or the A-300. (727 F/O) 1042
I found that pilots from the 727 had the added problem of
increasing their scans to include systems (formerly monitored by
the S/O). Example is check to see that cabin is actually
pressurizing after T/O; fuel flow etc. On a two-man crew, this is
automatic, having ridden right seat mother-in-law (check airman)
time, I see that transition from 727 is a little more <than
expected>. (DC-9 Capt.) 1056
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1-5. What did you think of your training forthe 757? What topics
should receive more/less emphasis? Any comments on training aids
and devices that were used, or needed?
TABLE V-3
The following table is based on overall evaluations of the
training where these were given. These were usually stated in
the first sentence of the reply, probably in response to the
first question. Generally the words used in the table below to
categorize the response were those used by the respondents.
Excellent/best training I've had/best training
program in the company
Good, or very good/no problems/well done
Fair/satisfactory/adequate
Poor
33
24
II
i0
TABLE V-4
Specific comments regarding overall view of training.
Numbers in parentheses are number of responses with this content.
Note: the terms CPT and CSS are interchangeable in this report.
CPT was excellent; CPT "a must"; good preparation for simulator
(24)
More "hands on" needed with FMC (CDU) ; training device (part-task
simulator) needed for FMC (CDU) (28)
Slide-tape devices poor; boring; poor quality; contain errors
(9)
Course too intense; 1-2 more days needed (25)
Liked the system of going through as a two-pilot crew
("'partners") (5)
Too much "cramming"; low retention (4)
Should have jumpseat ride in 757 before training (4)
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Manuals poor; contain errors; incomplete or poorly written; not
in proper format (7)
Training course should begin with a conceptual overview; design
philosophy (4)
Video tapes would be superior to slide-tapes (4)
Important to have access to manuals before attending school (4)
More emphasis needed on systems (14)
Pilots should be assigned to plane immediately after training;
not be sent to another aircraft first (3)
More emphasis needed on "flying the plane", less on "nuts and
bolts"; more on manual operations (6)
Ground school schedule too inflexible (3)
Program tends to be "self-taught" (3)
Boeing simulator not fully compliant, ours was (3)
Early class instructors not well enough informed, but problem
seemed to vanish later (3)
Need more hand-flying in simulator (2)
Need some open discussion between instructors and students (2)
Need crew coordination and communication training (2)
More training needed on FMC (CDU) functions (5)
Need more training on abnormals (2)
PLATO training is worthless (2)
Need one more CPT session after school is over
Instructors shouldbe present at all times when slide-tape
instruction is in progress (to answer questions as they occur)
Circuit breaker index should be provided
More needed on VNAV
Need training devices at all 757 bases, not just training base
More simulator work on approaches
Too much emphasis on "magic" <automation> (7)
More training needed in simulator on ATC changes in a terminal
area, and going to a manual approach
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Should get orientation tour through actual plane before school
Need more emphasis on landing techniques
Manual should have a list of all EICAS messages
Need more raw data flying in the simulator
Use of FMC during missed approach not well explained
Training needed on handling electric "glitches"
Should have a LOFT ride in the middle of the simulator course, as
well as at end
A weak partner affects the quality of your training
Need more information on what automation does in the event of
engine failure in climb
Too much time spent on "unusual situations" (e.g. building
approaches) and not enough on everyday operations
Need time in the schedule to allow repeated viewing of slide-
tapes
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_Crew Comments
I thought training in ground school and simulator were excellent.
If time had permitted, I would have liked a little more training
in normal operations. I thought the training in emergency
procedures was excellent. 1016
I thought that my 757 training was a terrible, traumatic ordeal
closely akin to the USAF Aviation Cadet training of the early
1950's. Aircraft systems_ normal and abnormal procedures, were
easy. FMC and autopilot, MCP and their relationships with one
another were very difficult. Lack of FMC/MCP training aids
required us to study the flight manual and attempt to relate its
rather abundant information to rather brief periods of instructor
telling us that the flight manual was for the full-up system,
which ours was not, and we should ignore all the documentation
except what he told us. I felt that a much better training
syllabus could have been developed, and training aids made
available so that we cou]d have "hands-on" study at our own pace
during periods of "free time." i001
It was almost like a self-taught course. I would have liked an
old-time instructor classroom type. 1004
The training was good in the 757. I liked the crew concept, and
the CPT training to ].earn the FMC before getting to the
simulator. The point that should be stressed is that if
automation isn't doing what you want it to do, turn the magic off
and flying it like any other plane. Too many checkrides are
almost total automation checks° 2095
The ground school curriculum was backwards. No pilot feels at
ease in an airplane he knows nothing about. Yet, from Day One
the emphasis was on the FMC-CDU, with the aircraft left for the
end° With the student first comfortable in the aircraft, the
FMC-CDU could probably be taught in two days. i010
Training was adequate for" showing "how" to operate the airplane,
but there was almost no '_why" training. In most cases, the
instructors themselves don't know "why 'a. 1035
I went to school when the aircraft was relatively new. There is
no question in my mind that it was the worst school I've ever
attended at the company. I feel that Boeing did a very marginal
job instructing the people who went to Seattle. I feel well
qualified and knowledgeable about the aircraft, but a lot of this
was on-the-job training and some from ground school bulletins and
tech references. I understand the 757 much better now. The FMC
should be taught in the classroom, going through the CDU
page-by-page, with the appropriate training aids available. The
first period in the simulator should be spent examining the
autopilot, MCP, and working with the different buttons. 1037
_!l pilots should ride jumpseat on a three-day trip prior to
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going to school. Training was fast and furious, and even though
I "passed" and did well, I didn't feel comfortable and that's
important to me. 1042
757 training, ground and simulator, grossly over-emphasized
automation. A great deal of time was spent learning aspects of
the FMC that are unusable in the ATC environment. The FMC is a
sub-system, not God. Ground school gives equal emphasis to all
aspects of the FMC without regard to operational reality. It's
really a simple, easy-to-use system, but it's not taught that
way. 1045
There was too little emphasis on aircraft systems. The CDU work
would have been easier to grasp if it had been taught in an
operating environment such as LOFT. I suggest that pilots ride
the jumpseat for a couple of days to see the "big picture" before
they attend ground school. 1048
I really don't see how it can be changed much. So much came at
me so fast that for the first few months, every trip was a
relearning experience. 1054
Training on the 757 was intense! Perhaps because the 757 is such
a departure from what is considered "normal" by most pilots,
there was a very flat learning curve for the first Week or so of
training. It was not unusual to hear complaints of the physical
and mental demands imposed by the program. Personally, I found
the school was the most demanding I have ever had, with no free
time to deal with personal affairs, an ever-increasing
distraction. 1061
It was the best training program I have been through. Real
organized. Enjoyed the reinforcement from audio visuals to
lectures to CPT. CPT was a must for training. For me it also
made the transition from S/O to F/O quite easy. 2005
Good. No problems. High pressure, but I enjoyed the check-out.
As I prepare for my second 6-month check, I do notice that I seem
to be losing my system knowledge. May be the result of total
immersion training. 2006
My training was too structured. I knew 28 days in advance when I
would be taking my type rating ride. I think training should be
to proficiency, not training to fill the squares. More training
on VNAV would have been nice. My training on VNAV was poor. It
took several months before the subtle differences between VNAV
Speed and VNAV Path were clear. A program for a home computer,
where one could just sit and play with the FMC, would have been
helpful. 2011
The only real problem I had was not enough approaches. This has
been corrected, because our simulator will use snapshots and we
can pop right back for more. With Boeing's simulator, you might
as well fly the whole pattern. I was able to do twice the work
on my last check that we could have done at Boeing. 2012
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_i felt the 757 program was well structured. The program made
more sense having had access to the manuals three weeks prior to
the class. 2013
The training on the 757 was much too intensive. We were asked to
read 70-100 pages per night. Most pilots received their manuals
two weeks in advance; one base did not. Also, most of the
captains hadn't been in school for 25 years, and it was very
difficult for them to study 7-8 hours a day after class. They
ended up feeling stupid and having their confidence destroyed.
Checking out in 757 was no more difficult than any other
airplane° Combination of training aids and stand-up instruction
was very good. 2017
The training was interesting, hecticr and went fairly smoothly,
considering the new aircraft and the limited knowledge of our
instructors. The complaint you hear is that at our company, the
757 is a small, junior airplane, and the training department is
just not that interested. Nothing like when the wide bodies were
new. 2018
757 training was unique for us. I feel it was excellent, and
more demanding for self study. The CPT is a must as an aid. By
the time of your check ride, youVre fully prepared for anything
that may be required. 2023
Overall ground training was good. Slide-tape was inaccurate, and
instructors said they had trouble getting corrections made. My
biggest problem was over a month delay between school and getting
my !OE time, then another month before getting assigned to the
75'7 permanently. Meantime had to fly other aircraft and return
to 757 each time. Continuity was poor, and leads to loss of
retention and reinforcement of previous training. 2024
I wasn't overly impressed by the crew training. There are still
many functions of the FMC that are not understood by all of our
pilots, and sections of the flight manual that are wrong. Today
there are still friendly arguments in the cockpit about how this
or that is designed to function of what the information on a
certain gage is telling the pilot. The FMC should be explained
in depthr and every line on every page explained in detail.
Sitting in a hard chair and watching slides several hours a day
cannot be called effective training° It is possible to take
video tapes of actual parts of the aircraft in action, for
example gear doors, slats and flaps operatinge On the first day
of training the student should be given aircraft familiarization
on the actual aircraft. 2028
I felt training was outstanding. Breaking the training into 1/3
lecture, 1/3 slides, and 1/3 CPT was very effective. I feel more
emphasis should be given to landing techniques, especially in
light of the number of tail strikes we and others have had.
2035
7O
Slide-tape is vastly inferior to live instructors. FMC on our
aircraft was fully compliant, Boeing's was not. More practice on
the FMC would have been useful. Two-man crew coordination
problems are frequent. A good review of high-altitude meteorology
would help us. A good explanation in our manual of all EICAS
messages would help. 2038
Outstanding! I felt better prepared and more comfortable sooner
than on any aircraft I've flown in 12 years. The CPT is
indispensable! The opportunity to practice what you've read or
seen in class aids rapid, lasting learning. 2052
Training was very well done. Too much emphasis on lecturing
about each specific mode of the FGS, one at a time. Material is
very dull when presented this way. Needs to be presented in
various hypothetical flight regimes, with a more integrated
approach to FGS and FMC operation. The CPT is an excellent aid,
and greatly streamlines simulator training. 2067
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C. INITIAL OPERATINGEXPERIENCE (IOE)
1-2. Describe any problems that you had during your IOE (initial
operating experience) and early months of flying the 757. Are
there still areas you have trouble with, or don't understand?
Note: some of the replies to this question overlap those to
question No. 1-5 on training. The intent of this question was
not a critique of the training program, but to learn specifically
what problems the crews encountered in their early experience
with the 757. In cases where the response was specifically
related to the training program, it was considered in connection
with 1-5. A number of responses to this question were blank. It
is difficult to say whether this should be regarded as "No
problems" or "No comment" (see below).
TABLE V-5
List of perceived problem areas in Initial Operating Experience.
Numbers in parentheses are number of replies if more than one.
No problems (so stated) (36)
Too much time spent programming; slow at programming, especially
responding to ATC changes; difficulty finding right CDU page (18)
Confusion over modes, esp. vertical modes (14)
Too much time had been spent in training on computer, and not
enough on basic flying of airplane (7)
Interfacing to ATC (18)
Slowing the aircraft and descending ("getting it down") (13)
Too much head-down time (7)
High workload initially (6)
Trouble getting used to two-pilot environment (4)
Schooled on old computer; had trouble adjusting to fully
compliant computer when it came into service (3)
First officers programming too much below i0,000 (3)
Too many ways to do a given task; too many options (2)
Reactions of autothrottle (2)
Usage of brakes (too sensitive) (6)
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Building non-precision approaches on the CDU (2)
Gaining confidence in and staying ahead of automation (5)
Difficult learning to use ADI mode annunciations instead of
looking at the MCP (2)
Crews are not hand-flying plane enough to get feel of it (2)
Maintaining vigilance for failures
Learning that I needed to know where I was on my charts
Programming crossing restrictions at a fix
Lock-in of localizer frequency
Forgetting to retract spoilers (3)
Rudder trim constantly changing during climb/descent (3)
New terminology
Too much pitch change with power change
Trouble with landings; judging position of nose wheel on landing;
judging rotation/derotation (4)
Speed and speed intervention modes
Abnormals manual is ambiguous and time-consuming; poor manuals in
general (2)
Crew coordination; lack of standardization of "who does what" (2)
My rough positioning of flap handle caused LE and TE lockouts;
problem lasted for two or three months
Very high workload if one pilot is weak (2)
Still not confident in radar (2)
Still not sure what some FMC information means
Still not sure how IRUs work
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Crew Comments
Initial aircraft operations were easy and pleasant because of the
attitude of the "baby sitter" <check airman>. Relieved of the
extreme pressure of "Tension Tech" <training program> and
"checkitis" and seeing that equipment was reliable and easy to
use plus the pride of operating most modern equipment in the
industry makes flying the 757 more fun than work. i001
Lack of standardization of crew members duties and who is to do
what when operating with autopilot on vs. off. Both crew members
reaching for the mode control pane] at the same time to change
the altitude select or heading, etc. Our manual covers this
subject, but not enough emphasis given during ground school or
IOEo 1008
The design of the 757 is clear and straight-forward, making the
actual operation of the aircraft problem-free. I feel that the
only real problem is in the operation of the aircraft in the
present ATC system. The programming of the FMC is too slow and
diverts time that should be used in operating the aircraft. This
is not a problem en route of departure as much as in arrival
traffic° The system needs a more efficient way to update the
arrival displays to tell me the changes imposed by ATC. 1025
The shift to automation and the two-man crew was more radical
than I expected. I very often was not sure what was happening
when using full automation, particularly VNAV mode. Went
frequently to manual modes until I had confidence in systems and
my understanding of them. It took longer than most transitions
to feel comfortable with the airplane and new concepts. Part of
this I believe was due to training. I feel that the airplane
(basic) should be taught first and FMC applications taught last,
mostly as an aid. Our training seems to teach the airplane
around the FMC. I also feel that two more days of ground school
added to normal curriculum and dedicated to the automation would
be most beneficial. I began feeling comfortable and confident
after approximately six months. I have been flying it now for
just over one year, although it occasionally throws me a new
look, I prefer it over any aircraft I've ever flown. I have
recently gone back to the 727 and given my druthers, I'd fly the
757. 1026
My biggest problem isn't with the 757 automation itself, but
rather on increasing reliance on the visual simulator and rote
movements for teaching landings. In my opinion, no pilot should
be allowed to fly passengers, even with a check captain
accompanying him, until he has made a minimum of three
(preferably more) takeoffs and landings in the real aircraft°
Total simulation is a totally unacceptable teaching method,
especially in an aircraft with such great differences in cockpit
height at touchdown and individual handling characteristics. The
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worst, i.e. hard, landings I've ever ridden through was as a S/O
on a wide-body with a captain on his first flight transitioning
from a much smaller narrow body. The best visual simulators do
not really give a realistic view of the cues a pilot uses for
critical phases of flight. 1027
The biggest problem is remaining vigilant for unannounced system
failures, especially VNAV, LNAV failures and errors. The
computers work so impressively well most of the time that they
inspire more confidence than should be prudently placed in them.
1035
No problems, just amazement. Yes <still areas not understood>,
but it's a matter of not enough experience. Best learned by
doing it, and the various crew members each other. Sometimes ATC
can run me into disconnecting everything. Thus far, my
mind/hand/feet combination is faster than my monitoring-
programming capabilities. 1052
The FMS is s_oocomplex, it takes quite a while to feel
comfortable in its use. However, for me, this becomes a positive
thing because it reduces the tendency for complacency. 1053
I had to discipline myself to not devote too much time
programming the CDU below i0,000 and thereby neglecting my
traffic scan. 1060
When I went through school, I was told that it was impossible to
lose all flight instrumentation. Yet that's exactly what
happened to me in July 1987, due to an IDG speed sensing problem.
The aircraft was without an_ instruments for about 45 seconds in
the weather. Basically, I believe that the schooling in the
aircraft should utilize the FMS/CDU as separate training aid, and
let the students experiment with same. In this way, full
capabilities of the equipment can be realized. 1067
Getting down and slowed. The 757 loves to fly. The flight
director shows climb when you're above the glide slope and haven't
captured. Can cause you to level off to capture rather than to
keep going down to capture if you're not watching it. 2012
I've had only one major problem and it could have been dangerous_
Going into LAX for the first time, getting all set up to land on
25L, then at the last minute they switch us to 24R. We spent too
much time trying to program, and we came in too high and had to
go around. I believe that habit <frequent R/W changes by ATC> is
an accident waiting to happen. 2017
On a new aircraft, it's easy to become "head down" far too much.
This is a great aircraft for a mid-air collision. The major
problem on this aircraft is that if one of the pilots is weak, it
becomes a solo flight with high workload. The weak pilot can
fowl things up with just a few keystrokes. 2018
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The pitch attitude of the aircraft is quite deceiving. After
coming off a wide-body (DC-10), I had a great tendency to start
the round out early. 2019
Only problem is that my copilot got frustrated and upset when I
asked him to fly a manual approach into LAX° 2020
I had a tough time believing that the automation was going to do
what I programmed it to do (e.g. capturing altitudes, proceeding
direct to fixes, etco). 'i found myself turning off the A/P,
placing the aircraft where I wanted it, and turning the A/P back
on. 2022
I had difficulty getting the aircraft to follow the VNAV path.
This was probably because the instructors didn't understand how
the aircraft was supposed to function or why. When I started my
IOE, I expected the aircraft to fly the VNAV path, and I rather
rudely learned that in the real world that's a joke, and you have
to resort to FLCH, VNAV speed, or vertical speed modes, and use
speed brakes at some point in every approach in order to make
your altitude. As a result I had considerable trouble in IOE
getting the aircraft down the way I expected VNAV to do ito 2028
Yes_ What information is avaiiable from what page of the CDU and
when? Example: VOR/ILS frequencies? Field elevation? 2033
We had the tendency to mess around with the CDU too much,
especially at low altitudes. It's difficult to accept that it's
just a 727 with fancy stuff, because all the emphasis in training
was on automation. I am still in the "early months" of flying,
was checked out sporadically, and now face a six-month check with
less than I00 hours. Skill retention is very poor with low time°
2034
In the event of a malfunction below i0,000, one pilot is flying
the aircraft° The other is taking care of the problem. You have
two sets of eyeballs inside the cockpit, and nobody outside.
This also happens if you have a change of runways and are re-
programming -- very unsafe! 2036
The only problem was getting acclimated to the two pilot
environment. My training over the last 18 years has been in the
three pilot loop. Now, one pilot flies and the other is solving
the problem, with nobody to cross check. I must say that if it
is handled properly, and both pilots are up to speed, a two-pilot
aircraft can be handled as safely and efficiently as a three-
pilot aircraft. 2043
No problems so far. Our training was superb! The use of the CPT
in ground school was very helpful° This training and simulator
prepared me better than any flying program I_ve ever had. The
IOE went along very well, as have my line trips. I do feel that
I've lost some of my sharpness and knowledge of the 757 by not
flying it continuously since finishing the simulator. 2052
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I feel that after ii months, I'm still learning about different
ways of doing things. I received my IOE from the jumpseat and I
was not happy with that, given the vastly different nature of the
glass cockpit. All IOE should be done from the right seat. 2054
During departures and arrivals, the workload became excessive
with the slightest change to our flight plan. It was difficult to
make the copilot leave the FMC alone below i0,000. Both problems
have been cured by experience. 2056
My biggest problem was the lack of a second officer, especially
with a brand new F/O and busy terminals and low weather. Once
you accept the fact that there are only two in the cockpit, it
makes the operation more efficient. Maybe you pay more
"attention" to what is going on, since the third person isn't
there to back you up. I learn something about something on every
trip. 2070
No problems. Training cannot cover all the idiosyncrasies of the
FMC, but intelligent operation, along with adherence to standard
ops procedures, makes learning them more enjoyment than problem.
2076
Both the F/O and myself had trouble putting our holding pattern
right in the CDU after takeoff. We took off from DCA. The first
waypoint was Martinsburg VOR. We were cleared to hold before we
got to the first waypoint, and we couldn't get it into the HOLD
page, so we flew it manually. We also had trouble putting in a
revised routing in the air. We were cleared to intercept a jet
airway and we couldn't put it in the RTE page because we didn't
start with a point behind us. Both of these took place in our
first week. 2082
During first i00 hours missed approach at LAX due to high
minimums. Workload was high, particularly since ATC did not
expect a miss, although we warned them (RVR 5000', ceiling i00')
We were cleared to hold at an unfamiliar VOR. Flight attendants
called three times, company one time, after workload reduced and
we were in holding pattern. I remarked to the F/O that I hadn't
looked out of the window for 20 minutes. He hadn't either.
Moonless night, VMC conditions. 2084
No problems except too long between training and flying the
aircraft. You lose a lot of what you learn unless it is
reinforced through usage immediately after training. I waited
almost three months. 2093
Most of the problems on the 757 are ATC and crew workload
related. There are times that you are rushed with not enough
hands to do it all. For example, on approach to LAX we had a
"leading edge disagree" message. We requested a 360-degree turn
to make time for the alternate procedures. With all the radio
frequency changes there wasn't time to properly do and cross
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check the prOc'edure. In about four minutes, we were given four
frequency changes to do a 360. It took one person to work the
radios and left little time to look for traffic. 2096
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D. SKILL LOSS AND RETENTION
2-1. Do you feel that you have experienced any problem with loss
of proficiency (skills loss, or "loss of scan,,) due to
automation? Did you have any concern about this? If so, what
did you do to prevent it?
(Note: for further information on this topic, see the next
section of this chapter dealing with crew members who left the
757 for other aircraft. Many commented on the absence or
presence of skill loss as they transitioned into less automated
aircraft.)
TABLE V-6
For those who gave a clear-cut answer to the first question
above, their responses are tabled below.
Yes 32
Somewhat/slightly Ii
No 51
Unable to say 2
Specific Problem Areas and Assets
Inattention on auto capture of altitude
Too much reliance on map mode (HSI)
Larger ADF and HSI made scan easier
Loss of memory of VOR frequencies, distances, radials
LNAV, VNAV if used too much could lead to skill loss
Loss of airspeed and EPR awareness after too much use of
automation
Failure to monitor is the trap
"normal human laziness"
Scan is easier in 757
Feelings of "lack of security" if map display or IRS is lost
Spent too much time looking at ADI, since most information needed
is there
Had to fly 727 one month and noticed loss of scan
Too many altitude excursions in auto flight
When I returned to 757 after period on 727, it took 4-5 months
to get up to speed on FMC
Noticed skill loss when I went to A300 (capt.), especially in
entering holding patterns
Any loss I attribute to age, not automation
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Methods for avoiding loss of proficiency
Hand flying in general 32
Hand fly below I0,000 i0
Hand fly 15-20 minutes each leg 1
Hand fly to I0,000 or to cruise, and down to 10,000 3
Hand fly manual mode of LNAV 1
Fly trips using only RMI, VOR, ILS modes of HSI 1
Hand flying works, but defeats purpose of automation 1
If VMC, land manually 2
My military reserve flying (C-141) 1
I fly light planes 2
Raw data approaches (no F/D) 3
Hand fly to i0,000 and all approaches after localizer capture 1
My scan returned with little trouble when I went to DC-9 1
Alternate one leg automatic, one leg manual 1
Alternate one approach automatic, one manual 1
Use VOR compass rose display 1
i) hand fly; or 2) bid another aircraft 1
(Note: many mentioned the "pleasure" of hand flying the 757)
8O
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Crew Comments
(Note: those respondents who had left the 757 for other
aircraft, and also those who had returned, are indicated in the
parentheses preceding the comment)
It takes self-discipline to prevent a loss of skills. I feel if
you fly the aircraft as designed, it would tend to make you
reliant on automation° Manual flying and mental planning is
discouraged by the design. 3003
I don_t feel that I've lost any of my flying skills in the five
years I have been on the 757, because I have always made a policy
of hand flying as many approaches as possible. When I say hand
flying, I mean both the A/P and the autothrottles disconnected°
I also make it a policy of advising the F/O verbally that I am
disconnecting the A/P and A/Ts. I think this is very important
from a safety standpoint, so that both pilots will always know
what configuration the A/C is in. 3007
The potential for loss exists, but will not occur if you hand fly
now and then° I often shoot raw data (no F/D) practice
approaches and also use VOR and ILS modes <of the HSI> as well
during approaches. Unfortunately, the "_lack of time ($),w during
initial training and when getting simulator checkrides usually
precludes the chance to get enough hand flying in other than full
A/P or F/D modes. Naturally the economics is important, so we
always operate in that mode. 3015
(A-300 capt.) I prefer to hand fly in busy terminal
areas.°.helps the F/O keep watch outside, and by using raw data
and switching to VOR mode it helps my instrument scan. 3018
(Retired) The flight instrumentation <of the 757> is so superior
to those of the past "Basic T" format that the scan requirements
are not nearly as critical as yesteryear. No problem. As far as
skill loss, any pilot who has five or more years piloting
transport categories should be able to disconnect and continue
with no one noticing the transition. That's what periodic
recurrent training is all about. 3025
i notice a feeling of insecurity when the map display or the IRS
fails_ This feeling soon disappears when using a manual
back-to-basics mode for a while. I try to hand fly as much as
possible using manual throttles. Lack of autothrottles would be
the most missed feature if I went back to 727 or DC-9. 3028
Yes. Every 757 pilot I know has the same concern. I like to
turn off all automation and fly using raw data at least once a
month. By doing this, I know that my scan and proficiency have
declined. This will force me to work much harder when
transitioning to a non-automatic aircraft. I think that raw data
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flying should be a part of the training program and periodic
instrument proficiency checks. 3032
It is a concern - some hand flying proficiency may be lost. The
plane can be hand flown for proficiency if desired. No doubt
automation gives a better balance to the total flying
requirements. Monitoring is the problem that has to be
constantly fought. Automation gives a sense of security that is
not always as it appears. 3039
(A-300 F/O) I don't feel that I lost any proficiency flying
the 757, nor did I have any such concern. The airplane is such a
pleasure to fly that I hand flew it as much or more than previous
A/C I have flown. 3043
(A-300 F/O for three months, then returned to 757) I was
somewhat concerned with the "I can't fly any more, but I can type
80 words a minute syndrome" <refers to use of CDU keyboard>.
Can't really say it was a problem. I flew the A-300 for three
months and had no problem. Biggest concern is that when I check
out as captain (I'm 70 numbers away) that I will be going from
the most automated (757) to the least (727 or DC-9). 3045
(727 F/O) I was concerned about this, but after two years (and
I000 hours) on the 757 I went back to the 727 and had no
difficulty transitioning "backward". 3046
I feel that I definitely lost flying skills on the 757. Also, I
have lost the skill to scan. This will be a problem for me when
I upgrade to captain on the DC-9 or 727. I have flown some trips
using only the RMI, VOR and ILS display modes on the HSI, and
this helps some. I also hand fly to cruise, and below i0,000
unless it's a coupled approach. You know the saying: "I can't
fly any more, but I can type 40 words a minute." 3047
(L-1011 F/O) Yes! That is the reason I left the 757. I was
afraid that my check-out in the 727 would be very difficult.
3052
(DC-9 Capt.) Automatic altitude capture tends tO encourage
inattention in this important transition, including setting
cruise power. Transition back to older aircraft requires more
attention to detail, and less management. 3057
(DC-10 Capt.) I feel you develop a "different kind" of skills on
the 757. You must use the autopilot to a greater degree in
terminal areas to free up your eyeballs for external observation.
If you have poor skills in either hand flying or auto work, you
will lose a set of eyes that could be used for looking for
traffic. Certainly scan skills are not as sharp but they are not
required. 4007
(747 Capt.) No, but only because I refuse to use automation
below i0,000 unless necessary. I feel that the automation is
good, but its use should be discretionary with the pilots rather
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than required on a routine basis. 4010
(DC-10 Capt.) I left to return to the DC-10 after two years on
the 757. I found my descent planning and approach speed and flap
management had deteriorated considerably. All other stick and
rudder skills seemed OK. 4011
(747 F/O) I noticed a loss of scan in transitioning to the 747,
but part of that is due to the increased information on the 757
HSI and ADI. it takes more scanning and thought to stay oriented
in the 747_ Some loss of scan can be prevented by hand flying
the 757. 4014
No, but our airline does not require us to use the auto flight
system below i0,000, and I do not. If we were required to use
the automation, my answer would be quite different_ 4016
Yes. The first few months on the line I used the autopilot-
flight director 90% of the time. When I saw that my hand flying
skills were deteriorating, I began to do more hand flying below
i0,000. (Not necessarily the safest, since the see-and-avoid is
reduced considerably while hand flying the 757). 4018
While at first the pilot may tend to "loaf" and let the
automation handle approaches and/or maneuvers, he soon learns
that the automatics require a greater degree of monitoring and
attention. Awareness for me occurred about six months after
check-out and is reinforced monthly° The net result is not a
loss of scan or skillsv but rather an enhancement. The major
difference lies in the fact that automation provides its own
agenda of cues that the pilot must be aware of, while in other
aircraft the pilot selects his own cues which provide the most
satisfactory performance for him. 4019
(747 Capt.) No! I feel that the automation of the "757 actually
aided the pilot. There is a wealth of information in the ADI and
HSI which is generated from advance technology that is available
to the pilot that we never had in the previous airplanes. Use of
this datag along with hand flying at lower altitudes, will keep
the pilot proficient. 4024
(747 Capt.) No. I feel that automation does not in any way
contribute to the loss of skills or scan. It does relieve the
workload (if allowed to) in the critical airport terminal areas
so more time can be spent with the eyes outside the cockpit. I
might also add that I feel that every time one goes through an
extensive training program such as checking out on a new
aircraft, an upgrading of skills and scan occurs. 4027
When I check out on the 747 it will take some effort to get used
to older methods of navigation, especially since there is no more
display to assist in spatial orientation° 4032
It takes longer to learn pitch and power requirements because the
autoflJght is used so much. Scan tends to break down because I
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seem to be programming or discussed the aircraft more while the
autopilot is flying. I'm not worried about it because I hand fly
a portion of every leg and my systems and equipment knowledge is
improving. 4033
I think my scan is better on the 757, but worse on the 727. I
hand fly more than I used to when I first went on the 757, but I
find that I used the automation a great deal more late at night
or at the end of a long day. To improve your scan, you must hand
fly, which is getting dangerous in the crowded environment. 4042
(747 F/O) If I feel "rusty" I just hand fly from T/O to cruise
and cruise to touchdown; and others often don't use the F/D at
all. When you move between aircraft as I do, you must maintain
your basic skills and hand flying the aircraft is the only way to
do it. 4045
I don't feel that I have lost any skill or scan. However I have
noticed that in the course of 2 1/2 years that this problem is
very subtle and can sneak up on you if you get in the habit of
pushing buttons etc. At first I would hand fly below i0,000 and
later it got be below 9000, then 8000 etc. Eventually I would
take the autopilot off inside the marker and land by hand. On
occasion when hand flying below i0,000 I would overshoot a
heading or sag a little below the assigned altitude. Once the
altitude alerter reminded me, and once the co-pilot. During
training this problem was pointed out. Now, after taking three
six-month checks I note that all the checks have been with all
the auto stuff working. In fact the instructor frowned when I
did an ADF approach with the RMI needle. The emphasis seems to
be on the automation for some reason. I have had several co-
pilots tell me that some captains will not let them hand fly
except for landings. I think training should put more emphasis
on hand flying and raw data than is being done now. This should
be done after initial check-out, during the six-month check or
annual checks. Training should encourage hand flying more and
keep emphasizing how subtle this "let the autopilot do it"
problem is. 4048
The use of the autothrottles reduces your feel of the aircraft
for pitch changes and power settings for different speeds and
configurations. Using the automatic features of the plane to the:
fullest gives the pilot more opportunity to direct his attention
outside the cockpit and provide for a more economical ope]:ation.
4055
(DC-10 Capt.) Additional, not supplementary, skills are required
on the 757. These skills are operating the "magic." You should
not practice those skills to the exclusion of others you've
already developed. The vertical guidance/planning provided by
the FMC can erode your planning skills, but that doesn't show up
until you leave the aircraft. 4061
Yes, although NDB approaches are rare, it is much easier to build
one in the FMC and fly it with the autopilot in LNAV than to
85
simply use the RMI on the 727 and no autopilot. If I had to step
down to the 727, it would take quite a few hours before I would
feel comfortable on that type of approach. 4069
Loss of scan or skill has not taken place because I do not allow
it to. In a real world, automation is used less than in the
simulator. On a proficiency check, there is less evaluation of
airmanship because our airline will not allow the 757 to be flown
like a 727 (i.e. FMC must be used, not raw data). 4073
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E. TRANSITION BACK TO OLDERMODELSFROMTHE 757
2-7 SPECIAL FORMFOR THOSEWHOHAVE LEFT THE 757
The following questions were on a special form attached to the
Phase-2 questionnaire, with the instruction that only those who
had left the 757 for other models were to fill it out.
A. Please list all aircraft and seats that you have flown since
leaving the 757, and indicate which seat you occupy now. If you
left the 757 and returned, please indicate.
B. What features of the 757 did you miss after you went to
another plane?
C. Did you have any trouble adjusting to the older model
aircraft? If so, please describe.
D. Based on your 757 experience, please describe your feelings
about flying highly automated aircraft versus less automated
aircraft.
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A. Please list all aircraft that you have flown since leaving
the 757, and indicate which seat you occupy now. If you left the
757 and returned, please indicate.
TABLE V-7. Tabulation of seats held at the time of the
second questionnaire. Following this are comments by those
who have flown more than one aircraft, or had left the 757
and returned. Note that of the 130 respondents to this
question on the Phase-2 questionnaire, 94 (72%) had remained
on the 757.
SEAT HELD AT TIME OF
SECOND QUESTmONNAIRE
TOTAL
DC-9 2
8-727
A-300
L-1011
CAPTAIN F/O S/O
2
10 1
2 3
2
11
5
2
.......... t .......... _ ..............
DC-10 6 6
B-747 6 3 1 10
B-757 58 1. 36 94
TOTAL 84 45 1 130
The following is a list of assignments of pilots who indicated
that they had moved off and back onto the 757, or were flying the
757 and another aircraft.
Off on 727 one month
747 F/O to 727 capt.
DC-10 F/O to 727 capto
Off on 727 capt. 4 months
Alternating 727 and "757
Alternating 747 and 757 F/O
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fI •
Alternatin_ 747 F/O and 757 capt.
DC-10 F/O/to 747 S/O and F/O
DC-10 capt., and 747 training capt.
Alternating 747 S/O and 757 F/O
Alternating 757 and 747 capt.
DC-10 capt. to 747 capt. (2)
DC-10 F/O to 727 capt.
Alternating 747 and DC-10 capt.
727 capt. back to 757 capt. to DC-9 capt.
A-300 F/O 3 mo., returned to 757 F/O
L-1011 F/O to A-300 F/O
Alternating A-300 and 727 capt.
727, with TDYs to 757
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Bo What features of the 757 did you miss after you went to
another plane?
Results of this question are tabled below. In many cases a
single response could have appeared in several places; an
arbitrary assignment was made as well as possible.
TABLE V-8
Response
Everything
Everything but two-man crew
Nothing
Automation; FMC etc.
Map mode of HSI
Navigation systems
Extra information (wind vector; time to chk. point
airports, etc.)
IRS wind vector
Climb and descent arc
Fuel vs. time computations
Computed descent point
"Glass cockpit"; EFIS
Flying and handling characteristics; performance
Autopilot
Autothrottles
Quietr comfortable cockpit
High altitude capability
Simplicity of layout of cockpit
Auto-pressurization, heating, cooling systems
EICAS
Engine power
Auto level-off
Capability to fly direct to a point
visibility
Mode annunciations on ADI
Digital engine instruments
Mode control panel
Ease of instrument scan
FMC capability for making altitude restrictions
ACARS
System simplicity
Accuracy (non-precessing) of ADI
LNAV and VNAV
No.
2
1
1
16
15
7
4
5
3
2
2
9
6
6
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
9O
C. Did you have any trouble adjusting to the older model
aircraft? If so, please describe.
Yes: II
No: 28
Crew Comments
Aircraft type in parentheses indicates aircraft respondent
transitioned to after leaving the 757.
(747) I had a little trouble adjusting back to the old VOR
presentation and more constant need to use charts with multiple
radial fixes. 4010
(747) My cross-check was a little slow, and it was harder to
stay oriented in terminal areas. 4014
(DC-10 and 747)
VW bug. 4027
No trouble. It's like going from a Porsche to a
(727) Smaller primary instruments. I couldn't see small pitch
changes as easily. Less power, and couldn't climb as high to get
over weather. 4030
(747) Yes. In the simulator I did not keep the second officer
in the loop, and I was used to doing for myse]f. 4034
(747) No. I had understanding captains, who were also curious
and are looking forward to the 747-400. 4045
(747) My scan was slow to adjust back to scanning all the
instruments needed to follow flight conditions. 4046
(727) Yes° It was more difficult to maintain position
orientation. Flying approaches well was harder due to the lack
of wind information. Had to get used to making throttle
adjustments. Aircraft could not be flown as precisely. Spent
more time on basic aircraft control. 4047
(DC-10) No. In fact, the skills I learned in the 757,
especially autopilot usage, were a benefit on the DC-10. 4061
(747) I rather enjoyed the increased navigation tasks.
more "involved." 4066
I felt
(A-300) I wondered where I was at for a while. Took some time
adjusting back to flying radials and airways, etc. 3001
91
(A-300)
3018
Found some problem with getting scan back to top speed.
(L-1011) No, because the AFCS systems retain some similarities.
I do think if you were on the 757 for an extended time there is
a tendency to become "brain dead" in such basics as holding.
3021
(A-300) A little...more buttons to push on the A-300 flight
director and AFCS control panel. On 757, a much simpler setup.
3029
(A-300) No. After watching "color TV" for three years, I didn't
really want to go back to "needles banging around in cages," but
it was no trouble at all. 3043
(L-1011) Yes! The first two or three simulator rides I didn't
know where I was. Three times I got disoriented on an approach.
After that it all came back to me. 3052
(L-1011) The 757 experience actually enhanced my understanding
and handling of more antiquated avionics° 3053
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D. Based on your 757 experience, please describe your feelings
about flying highly automated aircraft versus less automated
aircraft.
Note: the author made an attempt to classify and table the
responses to this question into generally favorable and
unfavorable, but this proved to be too difficult to interpret.
Suffice it to say that the responses ran about ten to one
favorable toward automation, with a considerable number of "mixed
feelings." The specific comments listed below reflect the
feelings on this question. Aircraft type in parenthesis
indicates seat occupied at time of questionnaire.
Crew Comments
(A-300) I like the 757 automation. It has a tendency to keep
one heads-down, but I can't say one way or the other if it made
the job any easier. Sometimes I think we perform better if we
have to work harder. 3001
(B-727) The transition to the 757 was radical. It took me
approximately six months to feel comfortable in it. About
another six months to feel that I had seen all the different
looks it could give me and that I could handle them. I was 49
when I checked out on the 757. I prefer the automation now, but
wasn't sure about it until approximately six months experience.
I feel that with the automation comes a higher workload in the
757, but it does not require the third man. I would prefer to
fly the 757 full time. 3009
(A-300) My personal belief is that the 757 carries automation
too far. The tendency is to be tied up with last-minute program
changes in the very environment which requires the most
vigilance. Also in an attempt to eliminate the third crew member
with automation, the crew is deprived of a human with which to
watch for other aircraft and serve as a backup in abnormals or
emergencies. All too often, with a long list of C.I.s <carried
items>, which may be very legal according to the MEL, the value
of automation is virtually lost. The third crew member is not
subject to these reductions in performance. 3021
(Retired) Automation properly programmed and applied is a great
help to the pilot who uses it as a tool, not as an end in itself.
I think the GPWS is an example of poor automation, because it is
too sensitive, too restrictive etc., but maybe just another
example of growing pains. Automation should never be used to
replace judgment or common sense, which are the pilot's unique
capabilities. And the pilot must always use the computers with
alertness and awareness. 3038
(A-300) The pilot gets more into proqramminq and monitoring, but
still can hand-fly all he wants. I'm sure that all future
airliners will have but two pilots and an array of even more
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automated flight and other systems and better performance. I
enjoy it <automation> and look forward to more of it. 3043
(L-1011) I liked it, but would have liked to have known more
about the 757 before going to the line. Training was much too
compressed when I went through the program. Too much time on
computer and not on the plane or flying° But "time is money" and
emphasis is to get us back on the line fast. 3052
(B-747) I enjoy the 757 and its systems. I find the 3-man crew
more appropriate on the wide-body aircraft° I would like to see
the FMC and glass cockpit on the 747-400, but I see a problem.
Many promises were made to add additional equipment for
international flying, such as SatCom, automatic position
reporting with improved ACARS, etc. It is now apparent that the
costs are too high for many of those features. The -400 will be
introduced with the same frustrating problems we have with the
present wide-bodies, but we will have to handle them with one
less person. Every problem you have on the 75"7 will be
multiplied on the -400 due to the fact that every leg will be
!2o14 hours and no chance to maintain proficiency. 4002
(DC-10) I enjoyed the experience of flying the 757, particularly
as I gained more experience (500+ hours). The less automated (3-
man) cockpit is a more forgiving environment due to the extra
eyes and hands. There is little room in the 757 for a weak or
complacent pilot. But with a good professional crew it has to be
the best machine around! 4007
(B-72"/) I always felt extra good going to work when I flew the
757. 4009
(B-747) I loved the automation as long as I can decide when and
when not to use it. I desire to maintain my own flying skills
and would not want to see required usage of the automation. 4010
(B-727) Highly automated - you work quite hard, intensely to
I0_000 feet, then it gets very boring° Basically nothing to do
till descent. Three or four hours of this with a smoker or one
with a personality conflict can turn into a very long trip. Less
automated - the workload (727) is more even. You have something
to do all the time, rather than heavy, then light loads. The
attention span seems to be better with this situation. 4022
(B-747) I can't wait for the 747-400. I feel that it's a
dramatically superior cockpit environment and even at peak
workload times, a feeling of less tense atmosphere exists. This
is because one has a greater "handle" on all aspects of the
flight regime, and I feel this is directly attributable to the
flight instrumentation. 4027
(B-747) To fly automated aircraft, you need to constantly use
all functions to keep refreshed. Because there are so many
options, it is easy to forget. I found this to be a problems
bouncing between the two (757 and 747). I was never as
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proficient as I should be. 4029
(B-747) I enjoyed the 757, but Boeing should consult more with
day-to-day line pilots before they release something on us.
After all, we're the ones that have to use it -- every day. 4034
(B-747) I think that the automation has come of age. I liked
it. The reality is that when something does go wrong (system
malfunction) you better have a sharp partner. Each pilot becomes
isolated during a problem. One flies, one handles the problem.
Neither particularly knows what the other one is doing. So you
must trust your crew members i00 per cent. No checks. For that
reason I feel that the F/O on the 757 should also take the six-
month refresher training. 4044
(DC-10) As with any tool, you learn which features will help you
and those that can make more work for you. The only way to learn
how to make automated features work for you is by experience.
When you go through training you feel that you're working for the
FMC. I takes (at least me) 500 hours before one can appreciate
what automation can do for me and realize its limitations. 4051
(B-727) More automation, more to go wrong, and in many_L manv
more ways. Some of the autopilot errors defy human explanation.
4062
(B-727) Automation is a must if we are to fly larger and larger
airplanes with only two pilots. Like it or not, that's the way
the industry is going. Part of being a professional in this
business is being adaptable to changes. If automation provides
an identifiable increase in safety, then I'm all for it. 4066
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TABLE V-9
Intercorrelation matrix for attitude probes in this chapter.
HIT refers to hours-in-type (B-757) o
PHASE 1
HIT p2 p5 p9 p24 p34
HIT 1.00 .14 .09 .12 .30 .15
p2 1.00 .13 .41 .02 .09
p5 1.00 .04 .08 oli
p9 1.00 .02 -°09
p24 1.00 -.05
p34 1.00
For n=166, Irl > .15 necessary for significance
at the 0.05 level.
PHASE 2
HIT
p2
p5
p9
p24
p34
HIT p2 p5 p9 p24 p34
1.00
.04 .12
1.00 -.01
io00
.02 .31 -.01
.23 -.03 .15
.19 .18 .04
1.00 .14 -.07
1.00 -.25
1.00
For n=133, Irl > .17 necessary for significance
at the 0.05 level.
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VI. COCKPIT ERRORSAND ERRORREDUCTION
A. INTRODUCTION
The impact of automation upon the production and the prevention
of human errors remains controversial. One of the justifications
of cockpit automation is that it simplifies the task, removes the
human from much of the labor, and therefore prevents at the
source the production of human errors. Undoubtedly there is much
truth to this. However, it may be equally true that automation
induces certain types of errors. There is reason to believe that
while reducing small errors, computer-based systems may invite
large blunders (Wiener, 1985a, 1988).
To date there has been no study that could adequately compare
error rates in traditional versus high technology cockpits, nor
will this study be able to do so. It appears that the modern
systems may be at the same time eliminating and producing errors;
that certain types of errors are reduced, and others are enabled.
The important point is not necessarily whether traditional versus
automated cockpits produce more errors, but understanding the
errors induced by advancing technology, and how these may be
eliminated or controlled. "Controlled" in this context means
that errors which are not eliminated may be trapped by the system
and not permitted to affect the system's output. More will be
said of this later.
The role of warning and alerting systems must also be considered,
as they are part of error control. Clearly the 757-era warning
and alerting systems (e°g. EICAS) are a great advance over the
hodgepodge collection of warnings and alerts found in traditional
aircraft. The advanced display systems in the new aircraft play
an important role in error control. For example, the map mode of
the HSI, intended primarily as a navigation display, stands also
as an invaluable sentinel by making errors more evident. If a
gross route error (e.g. incorrect VOR or waypoint) were entered
into the CDU during route construction, it would probably show up
dramatically on the map as a severe course change, and alert the
crew to the error. Detection of waypoint errors in conventional
autonavigators (e.g. INS, Omega) is far more difficult because
the waypoints are determined and displayed numerically, not
spatially.
The "plan" mode likewise allows the crew to step through the
route, view it on the HSI, and visually detect a gross error.
This ability, to visualize a course error, is a great advance in
safety over the crew's ability to detect keyboard entry errors in
automatic navigation systems where only numeric outputs can be
checked. It is foreseeable that future cockpits may also include
a vertical navigation "map" which will display present and target
altitude as a cross-sectional display, and hopefully reduce the
number of altitude deviations.
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We should distinguish here between simplification and automation.
The first line of defense against human error is system
simplification. An example would be fuel management in multi -°
tank, multi-engine aircraft. Traditional models have contained
complex relationships between fuel sources (tanks) and
destinations (engines or other tanks), with complex crossfeed and
pumping operations, all prone to human error. It has not
been unusual to have engines flame out due to fuel starvation
when there were ample fuel supplies on board, due to
mismanagement of the fuel systems. One approach to this might be
automation, but a far more effective beginning could come by
simplification of the routing systems. This is particularly
important since the task of fuel management has traditionally
been assigned to the flight engineer, and with the elimination of
that seat from modern cockpits, simplification has taken on new
urgency. Recent aircraft designs have done this, producing
tank-to-engine routing that requires little management, and hence
error reduction. For example, the A300-600 contains an
elaborate, fully automatic system of dynamic relocation of fuel
supplies during flight. In these cases, Airbus designers have
opted for automation rather than simplicity.
An example of both simplification and automation is the
management of cabin pressurization. This has benefited from both
simplified task demands, and automatic control and backup
15. We make fewer-errors in the _-757
than we did in the older mode s.
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systems. Previously, in aircraft with no automatic backup, the
failure of the primary system has imposed an extreme workload on
the first officer who must manually control pressurization during
descent.
Crews have expressed ambivalence about the benefits of automation
in error reduction, as one can see in the figure above. Many
praise the error-reducing qualities of automation and
particularly the backup benefits of the CRT displays, but an
equal number have expressed concern about the ease with which
they can enter errors into the system via the CDU or MCP,
particularly during periods of high workload. And many fear the
development of "complacency," a poorly defined term, yet one
heard often in discussing automation with flight crews. The fear
is essentially that the tasks have become over-simplified, and
with constant use of automation, and owing in part to the high
reliability of the advanced systems, pilots' alertness may at
times falter. Many crews are quite self-critical on this issue,
and admit to their own failures to "stay in the loop" during
automatic flight.
Almost none question the reliability of the systems; their
concern is with their own ability to manage them. As mentioned
above, some see the high reliability of the new aircraft systems
as a possible contributor to their own complacency.
Much has been written on the nature of human errors, and the
literature on the subject is replete with attempts to classify
errors° An excellent review of human error in aviation can be
found in Nagel, 1988. For our purposes, we are concerned about
essentially two types of errors:
i. Slips, such as keyboard errors, or incorrect settings in
the altitude alerter on the MCP.
. Conceptual, or cognitive errors, meaning errors of basic
understanding of the systems and the implication of one's
actions, e.g. confusion over autopilot/flight director
modes.
Errors of the first type are common in virtually any type of
system, from homes to automobiles to aircraft. The second type
are more typical of advanced systems, in which there are complex
modes to be understood, and a variety of means (modes) for
achieving a task (e.g. descending an aircraft). For example, in
response to the question below, several pilots reported that on
final approach they had dialed 00000 into the altitude alert
window during descent in Flight Level Change (FLCH) mode, which
they later realized was an extremely dangerous practice. (See
report No. 1033 under "Vertical navigation - FLCH mode" and
report No. 1015 under "Programming: MCP etc." below).
The self reports compiled below are a valuable database of
possible cockpit errors° The author has attempted to classify
them into various categories of actions; the categorization is
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obviously arbitrary. The question on errors committed or
observed was the only one repeated on both questionnaires, and
hence a large database of incidents ensues. Many of the
responses dealt with altitude deviations ("busts"), which was
also the subject of a question on Questionnaire No. 2, due in
part to the large number of such errors being reported from
advanced technology aircraft to NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting
System. Those responses dealing with altitude deviations from
all three questions are grouped together, following the other
responses.
B. REPORTS OF COCKPIT ERRORS
3. Describe in detail an error which you made, or observed, in
operating the automatic features of the 757 that could have led
to an incident or violation. How could it have been avoided?
(equipment design? training? crew coordination?) Please
describe specifically what was done.
The response s to this question were read and sorted into various
categories. Many of the responses were not categorizedi as they
dealt not with specific incidents, but general conditions or
problems which the respondent felt could lead to error.
Information from these responses were used elsewhere in this
report_ The frequency of occurrence of those that could be
classified is given below. In a few cases, incidents were
entered into two categories. Following this table are
representative examples in the pilots' own words.
TABLE VI-i
The table below displays the number of responses by error
categories. The categories themselves are arbitrary and often
over-lapping, and the assignment of responses to the categories
is also subjective. Due to the nature of the 757 flight guidance
system, any report is often the result of errors in the use of
several equipment features (e.g. autopiiot and autothrottle) in
combination. Therefore, the reader should not regard these
frequencies as statistical estimates. In a few cases, reports
were tabulated under two categories.
Error T_yp_@ Frequency
Steps out of sequence, or not in timely manner 14
Incorrect data inserted, or data not updated 24
Failure to remove data, or inadvertent removal 8
HSI mode, MCP, A/T, A/P, F/D setup or mode errors 28
Workload management problems, distraction, time for scan 19
i00
Autothrottle setup, wrong mode, not engaged etc.
LNAV setup, failure to engage, mode confusion etc.
Vertical nav.- crossing restrict., level off etc.
Vertical nay. - FLCH, speed deviations etc.
Presumed equipment failures, unexpected events,
need to monitor for the unexpected
Loss of situational awareness, over-reliance on
automation, failure to monitor
9
21
18
17
18
6
INCIDENTS REPORTED
Steg__ performed out of sequence, or not in a timely manner
Flying CIVET 2 arrival into LAX and cleared for an approach at
i0,000 feet and 250 kts., I selected APP mode and the airspeed
increased to 290 kts. trying to stay on the G/S. You must get
the aircraft slowed and flaps out early. This is one slick
airplane. 2041
After having built up initial confidence (about i00 hours) I
selected the proper route and performance data. Then, since I
was certain of the probable arrival runway at the destination, I
inserted the approach and appropriate hard altitudes. After
takeoff and departure, when VNAV was engaged, it refused to climb
above the selected hard altitude for the arrival selected. It
was very confusing for a while. Moral: don't get too far ahead.
Select approaches after reaching cruise altitude. 2001
Five miles from the ILS course on a 90-degree intercept, at Vma
cleared for visual to one of the parallel runways. APP mode was
selected with the expectation that the final would be intercepted
as in LNAV, only to have the A/C proceed through the final while
turning late to intercept. A/C approached the parallel runway
final course. Fortunately, no conflict. Training didn't prepare
me to understand that the A/C won't intercept an ILS final with
the same parameters as LNAV. 2090
Preselected VNAV prior to T/O, thus setting up the possibility
and likelihood of losing V-2 information to the command bars in
the event of a loss of engine and subsequent disengagement of
autothrottles. In this instance the pilot would have to "fly
through _' his command bar information to achieve a V-2 climb to
level off. Pilots should be advised in training of this hazard,
and instructed not to preselect VNAV before T/O. 1058
I01
On approach to PHX on a VFR day we received an amended approach
clearance to a different runway using the same nav facility
(VOR) about 2-3 miles from FAF. While we had the original
approach programmed into the FMC, we did not back up the approach
with manual tuning. Our lack of preparation to take over
manually caused us to overshoot our course and ended in a missed
approach. 4018
Forgot to set 29.92 in altimeter through FLI80. I recommend a
small white light on the altimeter, illuminating when climbing
or descending through 180. This would be a reminder, and would
be reset by pushing ito 4028
Incorrect data insertedj_ or data not updated
The aircraft is harder to slow down and get down than most. On
several occasions early on, I had to reject landings due to
over-concentration on low altitude programming when ATC requested
high speeds until close in. Also, I almost landed on 22R at EWR
because wrong runway programmed° We were cleared to land 22L in
low-vis with departures in progress on 22R. F/O saved the day at
the very last minute. Also several ALT-CAP incidents at T/O with
2000 foot climb restrictions° Speed mode cuts at low altitude,
catching us unawares. 1026
Holding radial rather than inbound course was inserted, which put
holding pattern in wrong place. More emphasis on holding in
training would be helpful. 1029
My first trip in 757 an experienced F/O (18 months on 757)
updated the IRS's at MSY by inserting the IAH lat and lon° The
FMC accepted the data and the map was displaced the distance
between the two locations. I had no idea as to what the problem
was. The situation was compounded by a complete loss of VHF com
and a thunderstorm that closed IAH and HOU (alternate). Regained
VHF com and went to AUS, low fuel. Next day I did all the FMC
programming myself. 1043
I misspelled a W/P, which the FMC accepted. I was rushed and
activated the route without stepping through the route to check
leg lengths and headings. The only warning I got that something
was wrong was the "insufficient fuel" message. 1057
Improper heading for ILS inserted in ILS head selector, causing
the A/P when set on the LOC to turn in the opposite direction to
intercept the LOC. On a parallel R/W this could cause lots of
problems. 1031
A Mach number (without a crossover airspeed) was manually entered
in the DES page. During what appeared to be a normal descent
from the top-of-descent point, while preparations were being made
for the approach, we received a Mach/speed warning. It was not
immediately obvious what had caused the overspeed, but it was an
immediate distraction° 1061
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Due to very poor ATC communications in the LAX areag controller
calling an intersection by the wrong name; he used the local
nickname if you can believe that! We were pressed for time and
the wrong ILS course was set in. In the 757, the wrong course
will not take you down the LOC path. This should be made to
operate like the 727, i.e. you will still follow the correct
path, but have the wrong heading displayed. This was an IOE
flight with a new captain. 2002
The load advise from a previous flight was used and loaded into
our FMC for departure. It was the same flight number and only
one "page" prior to our load advise on the ACARS display. The
situation could have been avoided by more carefully checking all
information on the ACARSmessage by both crew members - even
though you are taxiing the aircraft at the time. We departed
with the wrong information in the FMC, however the mistake was
not great enough to cause a problem, i.e. the GWand CG were
close to proper numbers. We corrected inputs in flight. 2068
Programmin_t Failure to remove data no longer a_griate, or
inadvertent removal of data
Some of our arrivals in the FMC have vector provisions. These
give the FMC a problem in calculating the descent profile.
Almost everyone removes them from the STAR. If one does not
remember that he has performed this deletion, and selects "HDG
SEL" at the proper time, the A/C will not follow the proper STAR
path. 2011
Flying SID out of EWR using the HDG SEL an8 VNAV, both of us
forgot to check the LEGS page for altitude restrictions. Very
busy terminal area, no time to be deleting altitudes or looking
for "Climb Direct" The autoflight system will never violate the
altitude set in the MCP. Let m_ee set in the altitudes in the MCP
and remove all hard SID altitudes in the database. 2051
We were descending with clearance to cross ZZ miles prior to YYY
VOR at FL AAA. We had been requested to start descent early for
traffic. I had put the descent restriction into the FMC because
the F/O was occupied with other duties (ATIS, gate, radio etc.).
I was descending at i000 fpm to intercept the VNAV glide path
from below. We were then cleared direct to YYY VOR. The F/O
programmed the FMC accordingly but neglected to reprogram the
descent information. I did not catch his error because I was
occupied with turning the A/C to the new heading. Finally I
realized the error and deployed the speed brakes and barely made
the crossing restriction. The problem could have been avoided by
each of us being more "in the loop" with each other and/or better
communication or an internal FMC programming change so that
descent restrictions are not lost when direct clearance is given.
2076
Forgot to put cruise altitude in FMC and at 600 feet on takeoff,
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autothrottles started back to idle. Also, climbing out of LGA,
flying by hand, autothrottles went toward idle going through 2500
because of restriction in SID which was not deleted°
Repro,ramming below I0,000 while on departures is difficult.
1068
Forgot to delete hold-down altitude in SID. Was hand flying and
as the aircraft passed through the restricted altitude (which had
been deleted by ATC) the throttles went to idle. 3044
See also Noo 2052 under altitude deviations°
Programming_t." MCPL Aut__il_ Flight Director, Autothrottle mode
errors and omissions
Had F/D displays on and at the same time thought I had autopilot
on. Didn't notice the small "F/D" in the ADI. Of course the
plane didn't respond to any of my "programming". Just happened
to catch it on a change of heading (instead of an altitude
capture) or would have been an altitude bust. This could be
easily avoided (besides me paying better attention to
annunciations) by color-coding the ADI annunciations differently
for F/D and A/P_ 2029
Copilot made an autoland approach to a landing and roll out°
During the latter part of the roll he gave me control of the
aircraft. Not realizing that the aircraft had not been
disconnected from the A/P, I attempted to exit the runway,
putting considerable stress on the landing gear. Finally
realized that the A/P was still trying to maintain center line.
Problem was lack of experience and crew coordination. 2045
A mechanic was removing the No. 2 altimeter and I was standing
out of the way watching° The F/O reached across the pedestal to
assist the mechanic as he was having difficulty installing the
altimeter. His arm must have touched a select button on the climb
page_ in this case we believe it was the S/E <single engine>
climb speeds etc. After completion of the mechanical work I got
into the seat and the F/O said that the route was in and needed
to be executed. By this time (I think I was on the RTE page) I
executed what I thought was a route activation. I looked at the
HSI to verify this, but the route did not activate so I went
through the steps again. This time it took. I said, "That's
strange" but forgot about it. Everything was normal until climb
power was called for and VNAV was selected. The power went to
max cont. and VNAV disengaged. This confused us both. So I
told the F/O to see if he could fix the problem and that I would
fly the aircraft. We pulled breakers etc. but finally went to
the DATA page, then the CLB page and found out we had selected
S/E climb performance inadvertently and then executed it. Not
sure how to prevent this error. Maybe the EXE light should not
light unless the corresponding page is in view. 1006
A typical visual approach: airplane is on a high downwind,
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throttles in idle (FLCH), and the MCP altitude twirled down to
zero to avoid warnings. Turning on final and now in the groove_
I expect to have A/Ts but do not - they never reached the MCP
altitude to come out of hold, and the airplane gets slower and
slower. By now I am remembering to punch SPD button to get A/T
back, or advancing manually, but this combination surprised me
three or four times. 1015
On approach to LAX 25R, ILS and glide slope captured. Runway
changed to 24L about I0 miles on final. Mentally I was expecting
this, so I just put in the new ILS frequency. The copilot
reprogrammed the FMC. The map told me I was left of the
localizer. The Loc display showed me to the right. For a minute
I was completely confused. The problem turned out to be that
after a capture, you cannot select a new ILS freq (automated
design). My ILS was still on 25R. 4029
While cleared for a Quiet Bridge visual approach to 28R at SFO,
the captain flew through the approach course. We entered the
approach path for the parallel r/w 28L before he realized the
error and corrected. We were on autopilot with F/D and heading
select and altitude hold. If approach mode had been armed, we'd
have remained on "our side." I was busy tuning and talking and
didn't back up the captain. 4025
I flew through the localizer (toward a parallel runway) on a Loc
back course because I was following the F/D (on heading select)__
with the Loc armed and the front course properly set in the
window, but I had failed to arm the back course feature. The
captain did not notice it because of heavy workload° 4035
I left the HSI in plan mode (oriented north) and took off on Rwy
36 at DCA. (Orientation was correct because of north departure).
I think I would have caught it had we taken off on another
runway. We turned up the river as cleared and entered low clouds
and severe turbulence at 1500 feet. (Wind on ground was 360 at
65 kts) o Continued left turn and my HSI still said 360 degrees.
HSI mode should be on T/O checklist. I suggested this to
company, but not adopted. Obviously I should have returned HSI
to map. ATC was very unhappy with me. 4045
Workload manaqement; distraction; time for scanninq
ATC changes below 5000 feet, i.e. runway changes at LAX. Both
pilots had head down and did not see light aircraft approximately
1500 feet away. 2010
I've had only one major problem and it could be dangerous. Going
into LAX for the first time, getting all set up to land on 25L
then at last minute they switch us to land 24R. We spent too
much time trying to program the computer and came in too high and
had to make a go-around. I believe that habit <excessive
programming in terminal area> is an accident waiting to happen.
It could have been avoided first of all by changing the ATC
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procedure. Another way is to give us more training on these
kinds of situations and learn to know exactly what buttons to
push when it happens. 2017
I feel that the aircraft should be totally monitored through
FL 180 during climbs so as not to miss the 29.92 alt. setting.
While climbing out of SEA I began my company time report over
radio out of i0,000, as per our SOPA <see Glossary, Appendix 3>.
I was involved in this while passing through FL 180. The captain
gave a short P.A. about the Cascade Mts. We both missed 29.92 at
180, creating a 400 foot deviation at level cruise_ Since in
contrast to our company SOPA, I wait until FL 180 before doing
any company call business° The emphasis on these calls should be
reduced. 2027
Nobody's looking out the window! The emphasis in all airline
training is precise instrument flying, not scanning during VMC
conditions. (Ever see anyone scan outside in the simulator
during VMC?) and those magenta lines and symbols are just
spellbinding to watch and everyone does° Visual scanning during
VMC is not stressed in training or anywhere else. We missed one
<other aircraft> by 500 feet going into LAX on the profile
descent. I didn't see it until it was pointed out by ATC. We
were in a high workload situation doing the "runway switch" in
LAX. 2084
In APP mode landing at LAX after LOC and G/S capture. Runway was
changed, new vector given by APC, new LOC frequency given. But
when you change the LOC frequency you are still on <the old>
frequency because you must come out of APP mode by turning A/Ps
and F/Ds off. The LOC of the old freq. is a tra m that many crews
fall into at least once. It leads to approach plate confusion,
lineups on the wrong runways. Parallel runway operation with
frequent changes at I_X is a problem. At early stages, head
tends to be in the cockpit much too much, concentrating on
computers and not outside. After 100-200 hours the situation
gets much better. Unfortunately_ at my company pilots come on
and off the 757 very quickly; seems there is always a "new" man
in the cockpit° Setting up departure routes when it is
airway-to-airway <see list of "dislikes", Question i-i_ Chapter
IV> is time-consuming and can lead to mistakes° My first
clearance from KEWR to KMCI was: SMST 9 SBJ SBJ265 J64 J78 J80
CAP LASS02 MCI. I said, "Wow, where is all my time-saving
automation?" Our preflight time is now less than 40 minutes (45
minutes prior to departure -- more cost savings). Sure, it can
be done, but it takes a lot of charts and time to punch it all
into the FMC. 1064
While being vectored for a runway change I was building the
approach backwards from the R/W to the MMg OMI IAF etc. Due to
the "hurry up"' environment, I misplaced one of the W/Ps. Doing a
double check with the approach charts, I realized what I had
done. 2033
While flying at 12,000 in the MSP terminal area_ using weather
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radar to vector around thunderstorm cells, which were
particularly active, we entered an area of moderate precip, some
15 miles north of MSP. Almost immediately Mode 2A of the ground
prox sounded "Whoop, whoop, pull up, pull up", and the weather
radar went to solid red on all range scales. Coincidentally, the
ACARS selcal aural sounded (indicating a message was waiting) and
a flight attendant signaled from the aft section requesting the
MSP arrival time. The cacophony of aural signals caused
substantial distraction and confusion, and resulted in difficult
communication with MSP APC. Our request for vectors was not
heard by APC, and a MSP altitude and heading change was missed by
us. After several minutes we were able to sort out the aural
warnings and calls, and disable the Mode 2 Warning while re-
establishing clear contact with MSP. When we emerged from the
precip, the weather radar regained its usefulness and we resumed
a more normal terminal arrival, using the radar to vector around
cumulus build-ups. It is obvious that a third crew member would
have been of substantial assistance here, however, a weather
radar which is not useful in precip is useless 25% of the time.
2044
Trying to copy takeoff load advice via company radio because
ACARS was inop. As a result one pilot was talking to and
receiving instructions from ground control while the other pilot
was off the air. Consequently there was a mix-up and we missed a
taxi clearance and taxied onto the wrong taxiway. Solution: the
automated stuff has to work or you are worse off than the early
two-pilot planes. 4054
See also No. 1026 above (wrong input) and No. 2067 below
(altitude deviations).
Autothrottle setu_ errors: wrong mode not armed or engaged etc.
Level off at low altitude (2000 feet) while still in throttle
hold. Power not reduced until nearly 300 kts. We're conditioned
to expect autothrottle to maintain speed. 2018
Took off with autothrottles ON/ARM. Is not on the "Before Start"
checklist. Could have taken off with less than full T/O power if
we had thought that the autothrottles were controlling T/O power°
2042
During level flight at 5000 ft. (manual) the autothrottles were
selected to climb EPR. Speed was 250 kts. We accelerated to 270
kts. before the pitch was changed enough to bring the speed back
to 250 kts. Lack of experience with the system was the problem.
2056
Landing was made at LGA with a short turn time. During descent
into LGA the autothrottle was selected to "off" on the MCP. When
the checklist was read subsequent to engine start at LGA the A/T
switch was missed (checklist does not cover this). During
takeoff roll the EPR was advanced to "near" T/O EPRo It was not
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discovered that the A/Ts did not go into throttle hold mode until
about 90 kts. At that time the mode control switch was placed to
"on" and EPR mode engaged. The "throttle held mode" was then
observed but the crew was not aware that the engine power did not
advance to proper T/O value, but stayed at "near" setting that
was obtained by initial manual advancement. Extra crew member in
cockpit alerted crew after T/O. 2094
On a simulator checkride with "hurry up and finish" on the minds
single engine hold and procedure turnsw autothrottles off° We
forgot the autothrottles were off and one of us setting up for
approach and other into the single engine checklist for shutdown,
we stalled and recovered OK. This could have been prevented by
one of us onl_ flying° 4036
LNAV set up. errors, failure to en agaq_e sff_stem_ mode errors
Was assigned a heading to intercept an airway; was distracted and
forgot to put the A/P to LNAV from Hdgo HOldo Flew through the
airway for a couple of minutes before realizing ito Was my
fault -- I was becoming complacent° 2005
Selected an FMC route and then failed to select LNAVo There
should be a better warning system if you haven't selected LNAV
after programming the FMC. 2050
Vectors by ATC off airway. Re-intercept heading issued but LNAV
not armed. I watched as the A/C approached original course and
saw that it was not turning to intercept and advised the captain,
who engaged LNAV, whereupon A/C immediately turned 25-degree bank
at FL 410 to catch up on intercept. This situation was solely a
matter of <lack of> crew awareness, and was cured by awareness of
non-flying pilot. 2067
I have occasionally programmed something and not executed it and
have frequently plotted a direct route and failed to engage LNAV.
1042
Executing new route and not engaging LNAV. Not monitoring the
ADI properly. Cross-checking the HSI and ADI after every
automated change is the answer° i063
During departure from PIT the departure controller instructed us
to hold 180 degree heading to intercept the AGC 221 degree
radial. The first officer was flying, and he programmed the
route expecting vectors to a down-line intersection. Upon
receiving the vector to intercept the radial, he programmed
direct to the intersection he had expected, which resulted in a
track different from what the controller expected us to fly. I
hadn't checked his preflight programming closely enough to
recognize the error. I check every F/O_s programming more
carefully now. The complacency which led to this could have been
a dangerous problem and was my fault, not the equipment. 3008
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I made a programming error on an intersection of two airways
which almost resulted in a violation. The captain did not check
the entries that I made. The new airways maps are getting harder
to read and the fact that you get to the point that you hardly
refer to the maps leads to the possibility that unfamiliarity
with the maps could lead to error. 3034
The most critical error I have seen related to automation was
selecting standard arrivals procedures and linking them to a
stored route and then finding out later that a fix was not stored
in the memory, so that the arrival that I flew was not correct.
(For example, I went from A to C, bypassing B because it was not
in the stored arrival and I didn't add it as I should have. 4063
Vertical navigation _ crossing restrictions and level off___ss_mode
confusions
Forgot to delete an altitude Xing restriction on the SID. This
resulted in the VNAV (no matter what altitude) seeking this
altitude. After i0 minutes of vertical speed/alt, hold, we
realized the problem and deleted the altitude. 2022
After takeoff and selecting climb EPR, the autothrottles were
left in EPR mode. VNAV was not selected. During climb at 250
kts. an intermediate level off was needed at 8000 ft. Speed
mode was not selected and airspeed started to build rapidly.
Autothrottles were disengaged and power pulled back to regain 250
kts. I think training is at fault because this capt. said he had
been taught this technique of selecting EPR instead of VNAV with
the F/D off. Many people I have flown with do not like to have
the F/D on in order to hand fly more. It would be desirable to
be able to engage VNAV with the A/P and F/D off, synch the salmon
bug <command speed> on the airspeed indicator and the FMC gives
the commanded VNAV speed and would still provide protection
against going too fast below i0,000. 2024
Called for climb power on climb out (with autothrottles on)
without selecting VNAV. Leveled off at assigned altitude (below
i0,000) and A/C continued to accelerate to about 280 kts. before
I disconnected everything. It seems like equipment could have
been designed to never let you exceed 250 kts. when below i0,000
(unless manually overridden). 2034
One of the biggest problems has been the VNAV system. In the
climb I have had restrictions on the departure (data base) and
not seen them. Subsequently the F/D levels off for no reason
seemingly. Also, in descent I get a crossing restriction late
and by the time it is entered and processed, no way can the A/C
make it. I believe most of this can be avoided by having faster
calculation time for T/D points and maybe a visual presentation
automatically displayed for a Dff data base restriction without
having to select WPT DATA. 1050
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Vertical navigation - FLCH model s_/]eed deviation__qD_S_ etc.
this category not clearly distinct from the one above.)
(Note:
Was in descent using VNAV with speed intervention of 330 kts_ as
requested by ATC. Traffic call diverted attention and at 9700
feet realized speed was still 330 ktso (MCP altitude window was
set at assigned descent altitude of 6000). Now I avoid this
problem by writing down altitude clearance and setting MCP
altitude to i0,000. 2031
FLCHed down through i0,000 above 250 knots - more training
<needed>_ 2062
Program in FMC indicating intermediate altitude level off on some
profile descents with a final altitude that is lower. If lower
altitude is set in mode panel and you use VNAV, all OK, but if
you select FLCH which is more realistic in ATC environment, you
lose the intermediate altitude protection. Avoid by selecting
limit altitude till past point, then select next lower. Crew
coordination -- both crew should know the mode and limits° 2066
The combination of excess speed, the improper setting of ALT SEL,
and the use of FLCH all resulted in A/C descending to an
altitude below FAF. Pilots need to pay close attention to speed
control. No A/C below FAF altitude should ever be set on ALT SEL
until FAF has been passed. FLCH should never be used to descend
when inside FAF (FLCH could fly A/C to ground prior to RWY if ALT
SEL improperly set -- ioe. 00000). 1033
On a flight from SAN to LAX the copilot was flying, using LNAV
and VNAV. We were at i0,000 feet and cleared to 70000 i0 miles
south of SLI. To speed our arrival, the copilot speed intervened
to 300 knots_ Around this time I was off the frequency getting
the ATIS and calling company radio. He was talking to Approach
Control and looking for traffic that was pointed out to us. As
we approached SLI i0 DME the A/C started down out of 10,000 still
at 300 kts. due to the speed intervention. I caught the error
about 150 below I0,000 and returned to I0,000 to slow before
continuing descent. 4008
See also 3032 under situational awareness below.
Radio communication error
I was making a cabin P.A. announcement while listening to ATC.
The controller gave us an altitude change that the first officer
misheard, read back the wrong altitude, and the controller missed
it! I cut the P.A. talk short and established the correct "new"
altitude. Cure? Another pair of ears. 2054
The type of incident or potential violation that comes to mind is
descending to cross a specific fix at an assigned altitude and/or
speed. On one occasion I heard the wrong distance (10 DME
instead of 20) and programmed the system for the wrong fix. The
ii0
error was not noticed by my copilot who heard the clearance
correctly. 1060
Presumed equipment failures or unexpected actions of automated
equipment; need to monitor
Departure from Central American airport which is located in
mountainous area, during marginal VFR conditions, resulted in
both pilots being head out of the cockpit (nose to windshield) at
lift off and initial turns to avoid terrain. "T/O power" had
been set using EPR mode and insufficient engine instrument
monitoring had allowed autothrottle to "lock in" EPR only.
Reliance on engine limiter to protect against engine overspeed
and EGT overtemp was a big mistake, since both were exceeded.
Discussion of event with maintenance, pilot/supervisor, and a
captain from Rolls Royce has convinced me that the engine limiter
doesn't <limit> when in T/O mode with A/T on. Ambient temp,
field elev., density alt. are all locked in when "T/O power" is
selected. During climb from airport, lockout or lockup of fuel
control could cause serious damage to engine unless EICAS is
carefully monitored and power reduced in timely manner, i001
We become so accustomed to all systems working correctly that
when one fails we don't always catch it immediately. Yesterday,
A/Ts failed -- situation: descending to a given altitude. I was
reviewing the STAR when ATC asked if we were slowing. I checked
the airspeed and sure enough, we had slowed. I manually pushed
the throttles up and got speed back to normal cruise. The A/C
had descended on VNAV and leveled off at correct altitude, but
A/Ts did not keep A/C at cruise speed. I probably could have
avoided this by not being distracted by my review of the STAR.
1009
Two times departing EWR west-bound on climb up to 6000 the
autothrottles did not retard for level off with a high rate of
climb and had to be manually pulled to idle as aircraft dumped
over to avoid altitude bust. Aircraft still busted altitude by
400 or 600 feet, even with rapid control forces. 1012
During departure from EWR the airplane would not level off at any
intermediate altitude or at cruise altitude in either VNAV or
FLCH. All level offs had to be done manually. After the first
altitude bust, we were alert and didn't significantly bust any
others; but that first one could have been dangerous as we soared
through 6000 at about 2000 ft/min. During descent and on
subsequent flights, everything worked perfectly and the only
annunciation or alert was the altitude alert as we busted our
selected altitude. 1035 (See also No. 1037 under altitude
deviations.)
During my IOE I made an approach to runway 33L at Boston.
Because of heavy rain and low visibility and my low time in the
aircraft, and because I still had eyes as big as dinner plates
when flying the 757, I decided to make an autoland. I had made
one other autoland at a Cat II runway at LAX and the aircraft had
performed exactly as advertised. Therefore I felt that the
ill
autoland capability of the 757 was pretty good. The aircraft
tracked the localizer and glide slope right down to flair, when
all of a sudden she pitched up and started to roll but
immediately settled down and landed on the runway "with a crash".
Unfortunately the autopilot landed the aircraft on the left side
of the runway and continued to track down the left side of the
runway with the left main wheels uncomfortably close to the
runway lights/edge. I thought she was headed for the ditch any
second. Training <department> seems to have the impression that
the 757 will do a perfect autoland every time on every runway due
to the "demanding certification" of the aircraft. I have heard
of other pilots having similar experiences with the 757, but what
i am doing to avoid a repeat experience is that I will not
autoland unless the runway is certified to be Cat II <BOS 33L is
Cat I> or better or it is a VFR practice autoland, visibility i0
miles or better. 2028
Loss of situational awareness, over_,reliance o_nn automation, lack
of understanding of s_ystemsL failure to monitor
When using FLCH on non-precision approaches it sometimes comes as
a shock to the person flying to see the airspeed go below the bug
<since he is> thinking that the autothrottle will hold the speed.
3026
Relying on VNAV to bug back the speed at i0,000 feet
automatically leads to complacency. When FLCH is used for
descent, I have been substantially below 10,000 before realizing
that I am still at 300 knots. 3032
l) Autothrottle was inoperative - I was given holding prior to a
fix, one pilot programming, the other pilot watching the
programming operation instead of the airplane° Airplane slowed
to 30 knots below pattern speed. Cause: lack of monitoring
properly by pilot flying the plane° 2) On ILS approach,
intercepting the glide slope at level flight from below, was fast
so bugged back to Vref + 5, airspeed decayed to limit on ADI (no
flaps)° Cause: misuse of airspeed bug and lack of monitoring.
In both cases airspeed problems probably the result of depending
too much on autothrottles in past experience. 3039
Captain flying late at night, FL 410 on top of severe weather.
EPR malfunction on right engine caused A/T to very slowly retard
throttle. Left engine very slowly went to max continuous, but
speed dropped off. I noticed speed 20-25 knots below bug speed
and advised captain° Too much dependence on automation negated
scan. Came very close to a stick shaker/stall over a
thunderstorm. Need to maintain scan even at cruise. 3042
My F/O was going to land threshold minus i0 kts. decreasing, nose
up 12 degrees increasing -- because it was a practice autoland.
We would not only have gotten the tails but probably would have
wiped out. When I told him to take it around he said it was an
auto!and. I took over and made it from about five feet. An EEC
i12
on the right had screwed up, which we found out at the gate. The
big factor was his attitude that some computer would do it all
and he didn't have to watch the company seven degree nose up and
threshold speed. The autosystem is great, but we <pilots> are
the "break glass" if all else fails and we must put out the fire°
I don't think his blistered ear made much difference. 4015
I have seen a recurring problem on approaches to airports with
multiple parallel runways, especially when the runway is changed
at the last minute by ATC, the prime example being LAX. The
normal approach is CIVIT profile descent to Runway 25L, which
usually changes to an ILS to 24R, then visual to 24L. Well, you
can only use RTE 2 for one additional approach (see Figure IV-l).
The possibility exists that i) the wrong approach will be
selected; 2) using LNAV the A/C would approach the wrong runway;
3) the automation leads the pilots to follow the magenta line
under heavy workloads without manually monitoring the ILS course
using raw data. Without the automation the pilot has no choice
but to use the manual LOC course. 4040
C. ALTITUDE DEVIATIONS ("BUSTS" )
Altitude deviations are a major source of errors in flying in the
ATC system in the U.S. About one-third of all incidents reported
to the Aviation Safety Reporting System are altitude deviations,
and in recent years there has been a rapid increase in reports
from the high technology aircraft. The reason for this is not
clear. Some pilots have report that the aircraft simply did not
execute its auto level off function even though programmed
correctly. But most deviations can be attributed to programming
errors, or a rather common error of "killing the capture" by
inadvertently actuating something, usually vertical speed
intervention, during capture mode, causing the aircraft to
continue climbing or diving at whatever vertical speed is set.
There are occasional errors reported where the incorrect altitude
was set into the window, but these are relatively rare. Most of
the deviations in advanced aircraft result from setup errors when
in automatic mode, or failing to level off when in manual modes.
Crews are particularly sensitive about altitude deviations since
the implementation of the Quality Assurance Program (QAP) by th_
FAA in 1984. This program automatically detects altitude
deviations of 300 feet or more in the presence of another
aircraft within five miles, resulting in an increased rate o_
enforcement actions against crews. One airline captain has
conducted his own analysis of altitude deviations (Noblitt,
1987) _ and ASRS has instituted a special call-back program for
altitude deviations in high technology aircraft (Orlady, 1989b).
As the figure below shows, the crews disagree far more than they
agree with the probe that states that automation enhances
altitude deviations. About 65% disagree with the statementr and
about 20% agree.
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50. It is easier to bust an altitude
in the B-757 than otlaer pianes.
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Marked disagreement as to the effect of hand-flying versus
autoflight can be seen in the reports below. Some respondents
argue that the bust occurred because they were distracted during
hand flying and simply failed to level off; others argue that the
bust occurred due to their lack of situational awareness during
autoflight, and would not have happened if they had been hand
flying. This is a difficult question, that could only be
answered by extensive simulator experimentation comparing errors
in manual versus auto flight modes. It is entirely possible that
both are correct. Clearly altitude deviations_ in traditional or
modern cockpits, represent a serious safety problem, and need to
be examined further by the research, design, and training
communities.
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Incidents Reported
Only errors of a critical nature I have seen were two busted
altitudes, both by captain flying manually! (3024)
Going to climb power after noise-abatement procedures when there
is a low-level clearance - i.e. 5000 feet. A new pilot isn't
ready for the climb rate <of the 757> and can bust an altitude.
2014
We had an autopilot which allowed the airplane to descend through
a required altitude on VNAV, even with the proper altitude
selected. There was no violation because I disconnected the
autopilot i00 feet below the required altitude. 2026
On departure when flying a SID which is in the data base and also
has a hold-down altitude, Several times I have been unable to get
rid of the altitude constraint with "climb direct" and VNAV mode.
It becomes necessary to go to FLCH. This creates problems at low
altitude in a busy area. The programming should be changed or
all pilots should be trained to put an "A" <cross at or above>
after climb constraints on the LEGS page° 1032
The Oakwood Two departure from JFK contains a 5000 restriction at
HUOo ATC always issues a higher altitude before HUO so the
restriction must be deleted to climb above 5000. Neither the
captain nor I were able to figure out why the F/Ds weren't
working correctly until about FL 250. In the meantime I did a
bit of flailing around. We both spent too much time "heads down"
trying to fix the problem. About the only thing I did right was
the turn off the F/Ds and fly it. There was still not enough
attention paid to everything else happenin_ outside the aircraft.
I believe that problems like this one represent a real hazard. A
minor oversight effectively stopped both pilots from performing
all of their job for a short time. I'm a little embarrassed
because I had heard of this particular problem happening to
others. I also felt that I had mentally prepared myself to
hand-fly the aircraft when "it" decided to do something strange.
In spite of this, I still fell into the trap. 2052
Altitude bust while hand flying in a terminal area. Captain was
talking to company about a maintenance problem. I was flying add
watching for traffic and talking with ATC. I think an alerting
tone when approaching a selected altitude would be beneficial.
2058
Observed a few altitude busts while being hand flown due to
distraction with company paperwork and radio calls, ATC radio
calls and routing, and A/C abnormalities. This aircraft needs
an altitude alerting system that signals the approach of an
altitude, not after you bust it. I realize that this is contrary
to the "quiet cockpit" philosophy touted by Boeing, but the
standard altitude alerting system in other aircraft is distinct
enough and recognized by all pilots to be immediately identified
and not confused as an EICAS alert message. The one extra
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cockpit sound is well worth the compromise of that philosophy.
No extra training or crew coordination would be the cure° 2067
The problem was busting an altitude due to a programming error
and ATC not realizing it either until we both suspected something
was wrong at the same time. We were given an altitude crossing
restriction and the other pilot entered it in the FMC prior to
the wronq point. This resulted in us flying over the point too
high and flying to another point prior to reversing course to
comply with the entered restriction. The entry was made when I
was off frequency talking to company and I was not in a position
to update the entry made. Sometimes workload does not permit the
"two person rule" to be exercised. No violation was generated
because ATC did not catch the error either because the controller
admitted that he was overloaded himself. 2077
After departure from LAX r/w 24L, ATC assigned 5000° Since we
were climbing over water, we elected to skip quiet EPR and reduced
to climb power. ATC assigned a left turn to hdg. 180. During
the turn (hand flying) I went through 5000 to 5300, then returned
to 5000. After analyzing the interrelationships of the flight
guidance systems, I realized that if I had turned on my F/D and
selected VNAV immediatel_ after selecting climb EPR, the ADI
would have announced ALT CAP, the F/D would have commanded a
level offf and the autothrottles would have observed the 250 kto
limit. This is now my habit. 2083
My flight was planned at 37,000 feet and this was entered into
the FMC. During climb, a clearance to 41,000 was received but
not programmed into the FMC. The aircraft leveled at 37,000 and
I was unaware of this not being the proper level off altitude for
several minutes. Proper crew coordination probably would solve
thisr but system could have mode warning built in (EICAS if FMC
ALT and MCP ALT are different.) 2094
Some time ago on a flight from PDX-ATL we were cleared to climb
to FL 410 by ATC and the A/P failed to capture the altitude even
though the lower portion of the ADI showed that the A/P had
capture the altitude. The alt alert flashed but by the time we
could correct the error, the A/C had gone up to FL 420. ATC
picked up our error and called. This incident was written up in
the maintenance log, but I was never informed what caused it.
1037
Busted altitude twice. It is easy to rely too much on auto
level-off feature and autopilot. 1038
On other aircraft I took pride in hand flying the complete trip°
One instrument scan exercise I used was to fly the last I000 feet
at 500 fpm, to a smooth level off, practicing the techniques of
attitude instrument flying. I bused an altitude in the 757 while
hand flying and avoiding a thunderstorm. The vertical
performance and my lack of preparation for the level off caused
me to pass my assigned altitude. That would never had occurred
to me in a DC-9, using my old techniques. 1047
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Once during climb out of DCA we were level at say 12000.
Advised of reported moderate to severe turbulence between 17000
and 19000 and cleared to climb and maintain FL 230. I selected
FL 230, FLCH, and set the A/S to 270 kts, along with climb power.
My objective was to climb quickly through the turbulence.
Approximately 300 feet below FL 230 with the A/P engaged, it was
obvious that we would overshoot the assigned altitude. We were
still climbing at some 1500 fpm. I disengaged the auto systems
and level the aircraft with an overshoot or 200-250 feet above
the assigned altitude. I don't know if this was a glitch or a
design limitation. 1055
On several occasions have had the VNAV break altitudes, but have
always caught it immediately. Like everyone else, you need to
make sure that A/C does what you have told it to do, whether you
tell it to do something by pushing a button, or by whatever
meanso A specific problem I have seen is the disregard of
minimum en route altitudes on low altitude charts because
altitudes are on the approaches. A specific example is the
airport at St. Johns, Antigua. The airport has only ADF
approacheso The pilots have requested VFR approaches to be
included in the airport arrival program. In this case, one was
set up for RWY7. It would show a fix so many miles out, say 7
or i0 miles, at 1500 feet and straight in to RWY 7. When the
weather is VFR at Antigua, usually 2000 scattered clouds, the
control will clear you to descend to 2500 and clear you for an
ADF approach or visual if R/W is sighted. To me this means
maintain 2500 until you see the field and surrounding area. I've
had a number of first officers select the VFR approach and start
to descend to the 1500 feet depicted on the (approach) LEGS page,
which would get them below the scattered clouds and view of the
runway° Only problem with this is that about i0 miles out just
to the right of runway center line is a 1450 foot hill. My only
statement is they should also consult maps and area and approach
charts as well as definition of visual approach and procedures.
Seeing it on the computer doesn't make it correct. 1056
We once busted an altitude because the F/O was hand flying the
aircraft. He was looking out the window and not cross-checking
his altimeter. I was preoccupied with paperwork. I think you
can become very complacent on the 757 because of all the
automation. I think the only way you can overcome complacency on
this aircraft is to be alert always. When automation is turned
off, be doubly alert. 3007
We busted an altitude when the altitude alerter system was
inoperative and carried as a C.I. <"carried item" - maintenance
deferred> to be corrected at a future time. We are all much more
dependent on this system than we realize. Flying without it
really requires retraining and the aircraft should not be allowed
to fly without it. 3013
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Note: many of the reports in the previous section on general
errors involve altitude deviations. See the following:
E__rror category
Vertical navigation - crossing restrictions
Vertical navigation - FLCH mode
Presumed equipment failure
Programming - failure to remove data
MCP, autopilot, flight director etc.
Report No.
1050
2066, 1033
1012, 1035
2011, 2051
2029
TABLE VI-I
Intercorrelation matrix for attitude probes in this chapter.
HIT refers to hours-in-type (B-757).
PHASE 1
HIT p13 p30
HIT 1.00 -.23 -.14
p13 1.00 -.35
p30 1.00
For n:166, Irl > .15 necessary for significance
at the 0.05 level°
PHASE 2
HIT p13 p30
HIT 1.00 -.22 -.01
p13 1.00 -.25
p30 1.00
For n=133, Irl > .17 necessary for significance
at the 0.05 level.
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VII. COCKPIT RESOURCEMANAGEMENT,CREWCOORDINATION
AND COMMUNICATION
A. INTRODUCTION
In recent years the airline industry, NASA, FAA, and NTSB has
placed a growing emphasis on crew coordination, intra-cockpit
communication, and in general the social process among the crew
members. Generically the term "cockpit resource management"
(CRM) refers to the manner in which the crew conducts a flight,
not as two or three highly trained individuals, but as one team.
Further definition and discussion of CRM and social processes in
the cockpit can be found in the review by Foushee and Helmreich,
1988.
CRM refers to the manner in which the individual crew members
support each other, the roles played by the captain as pilot in
command, and the role of the first officer, and flight engineer
if a three-pilot crew. It is an encompassing term which includes
crew coordination, communication, the use of human and inanimate
resources both within and without the cockpit (e.g. company
radio, ATC), role definition, the exercise of authority by the
captain, and assertiveness by the other crew member(s).
The interest in CRM grew out of a number of accidents and
incidents in which the investigations revealed that the crews had
failed to function as a crew. In most of these there was a
breakdown in role definition: either i) the captain had failed
to seek or to heed the advice of junior crew members, or had
created a social atmosphere that discouraged their participation;
or 2) the junior crew members failed to assert themselves in
pointing out deviations to the captain. These findings were
confirmed in an extensive simulator experiment by Ruffell Smith
(1979). In these experiments, an over-water LOFT mission was run
in a B-747 simulator, and a critical in-flight mechanical problem
was inserted. Ruffell Smith's results showed that the crews
often failed to work together as a team, or to take advantage of
resources, human and inanimate, readily available to them, often
resulting in a failure to solve the problem.
In response to these incidents and accidents, as well as Ruffell
Smith's experimental results (1979), and further research at
NASA-Ames Research Center, air carriers became interested in
training for effective CRM. As a result, a number of U.S. and
foreign carriers now have CRM instruction as part of recurrent
training, or as one-time courses. Often CRM is combined with
LOFT; situations are introduced into LOFT mission that require a
high degree of team effort, and at some carriers, videotapes are
made during the flight for later viewing by the crews. CRM is
not presently required by the FAA, but an Advisory Circular is
now in preparation, and many view this as the prelude to an FAR.
Twoconcurrent trends may combine to bring added importance to
crew coordination and teamwork:
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i. The movement toward exclusively two-pilot crews as carriers
modernize their fleets with two-pilot aircraft and eventually
retire their three-pilot aircraft.
2. The introduction of advanced cockpit automation_
While the benefits of CRM are yet to be demonstrated or even
examined experimentally, there is good reason to believe that in
the two pilot crew, effective teamwork is particularly critical.
It can further be argued that cockpit automation exerts an
influence on crew coordination and CRM. First, it may be that
crew coordination is more critical in the advanced technology
aircraft, since it is essential that both pilots maintain
"situational awareness" at all times, especially when one crew
member is "programming" either the CDU or the MCP. Also, there
seems to be some tendency toward a breakdown of the traditional
clear demarcation of "who does what." Although certain duties
are clearly assigned to the PF and PNF, there can be a relaxation
of this discipline: often one pilot will take over programming
duties from the other, particularly at times of high workload.
This flexibility to deviate from procedures, and to reallocate
duties as the situation dictates is not necessarily a bad thing,
as it is an adaptation to high peaks of workload. But it is
20. Crew coordination is more difficult
in the B-757.
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clearly a departure from the principles of standardization, which
is the foundation of flying safety. In short, it appears that
advanced cockpit technology tempts departures from standard
practices. At the same time, it seems equally clear that a
well-standardized, well-managed crew has little trouble in
working together as a team in the automated environment. From
the comments that follow one sees a great diversity of opinion.
BQ COCKPIT RESOURCE MANAGEMENT,
SUPERVISION, AND COORDINATION
Item No 20 on the previous page indicates that the crews
generally disagree with the negatively stated probe, with only
about 25 per cent agreeing that crew coordination is more
difficult in the 757. Most of those interviewed expressed the
view that crew coordination was no more difficult, but was more
essential in the automated cockpit. They often spoke of not
understanding what the other pilot was doing; of the problems of
two pilots entering data into their CDUs at the same time, with
neither looking out of the window. Captains complained of first
officers taking too many liberties by actually making decisions
that were the responsibility of the captain, by programming their
CDU (e.g. points at which to slow the aircraft during descent).
Numerous captains stated that it is somewhat more difficult to
supervise the work of the first officer in the automated cockpit.
This may be due to the fact that the CDU gives the first officer
more opportunities to make decisions than he had on traditional
aircraft. Some captains complained of usurpation of authority by
the F/Os ("he who controls the CDU controls the airplane"). This
is probably unintended, and due primarily to the fact that often
the first officers were faster on the CDU than the captains,
giving them an apparent "advantage".
Some mentioned that it was difficult for the captain to see what
the F/O was doing, and that it took time to digest what had been
entered in the CDU, whereas in the DC-9 or 727 one quick scan of
the panel revealed what modes had been selected, and hence what
one could expect. Although some airlines' procedures call for
the captain to approve changes put into the CDU before they are
executed, this supervisory step is often omitted.
The data presented in P36 shows a clearly divided group on the
question of the ease of supervision in the 757 compared to older
aircraft. The data contain more than the usual number of
_neutral" or "undecided" responses in the center of the scale,
and slightly more disagreement than agreement with the probe.
It would appear that if crew coordination and captains'
supervision in the advanced aircraft can be identified as a
problem, it could be attacked through CRM training and LOFT
exercises. It may be that CRM programs, which have always been
taught as if they were aircraft model-independent, should be
tailored somewhat for the advanced technology aircraft.
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56. In the B-757, it is easier for-the
captain to supervise the -first officer
than in other planes°
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P36 was one that produced a statistically significant difference
in Phase 1 between captains and first officers, but the
interpretation of the results is not clear, particularly since so
many F/Os responded "neutral" on this question. The results are
displayed in P36A on the previous page.
In spite of the preoccupation with workload and crew size, many
respondents provided valuable insights into crew coordination per
se. One can see from the comments that follow a rather divided
opinion on the question of two versus three pilots, with strong
advocates of each position.
Crew Comments
1-4. What would you say about crew coordination on the 757
(compared to other aircraft)?
There was a tendency of the respondents to view this question in
terms of workload; many wrote only on the workload issue, and
particularly on the two versus three pilot cockpit. For reasons
discussed previously, crews from Airline-2 tended to focus on the
crew size issue, comparing the 757 to 3-pilot aircraft
(particularly the 727). Airline-i pilots, many of whom had
experienced two-pilot operations in the DC-9, tended to focus on
the automation and the differences between the 757 and the DC-9.
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TABLE VII- 1
This table displays the frequency of responses to Question 1-4 by
general categories. The reader is again cautioned regarding the
arbitrariness of categories in the tables. The first part of the
table regards the crews' overall evaluation, where they used such
words as '0excellent", "good", "poor", "less difficult" etc. The
author has combined seemingly similar answers such as "good" and
,,better '_ into a single category. Comparative adjectives such as
"better" or "worse" can be interpreted as comparisons to other
aircraft, as suggested in the question.
Response
Number
Responding
Overall Evaluation
Excellent, much better
Good, better, easier
Same, adequate, OK
Fair, more difficult
Poor, much more difficult
16
55
17
13
4
Specific Comments
Workload excessive in non-normal conditions
Workload excessive, requires 3-pilot crew
2-pilot operation superior to 3-pilots
Workload lower than other aircraft
Workload high unless proficient; takes time
to acquire skill to manage workload
ACARS needed to reduce workload
Requires more crew coordination
Uncertainty about '_who does what"; need for
improved procedures and crew duty delineation
More training for coordination needed; CRM needed
Proficiency critical; weak pilot critical
Over-utilization; enter too much data
"Do it yourself" tendencies, not coordination
"No problems" (so stated) [i]
I0
7
8
3
3
2
28
I0
3
7
9
3
8
[I] This could probably be interpreted as a "Good" response in
terms of the first part of the table.
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Crew Comments
(The following representative comments cover most of what was
written about crew coordination. Again, it should be noted that
the comments quoted here often involve not only crew
coordination, but related issues such as workload, checklists,
distractions, procedures, and crew complement).
When hand flying, the PNF must do all programming on FMCs and
F/Ds, and both pilots agree on what is selected. During
autoflight, PF should program or ask PNF to do it. This airplane
requires constant awareness as to who is doing what and this is
easily broken down. The 757 requires as much, if not more, crew
coordination than other aircraft. 2001
I feel that crew coordination for the most part is good. The
company has divided the duties so that neither pilot is over-
burdened. 2006
Crew coordination is easier on a 2-man aircraft, as both pilots
are in the loop and aware of the environment the aircraft is in.
This was sometimes not the case in the 727, as captains were
drawn occasionally into matters regarding passengers,
connections, etc. with the S/O. Having said that crew
coordination is better, the ability of two pilots is less apt to
take place. While management of two is easier than management
of three, the 757 makes it imperative that both pilots be
knowledgeable and ahead of the aircraft, as often the PF is a
solo act. The workload on a pilot when the other pilot is under
the weather or double qualified on other equipment and not
recently experienced in the 757 is considerable. 2013
Things work very smoothly if both pilots are sharp. Workload can
be very heavy down low in bad weather at a busy terminal. I love
this airplane and am proud of my ability to fly it well; but all
things considered, a three-person crew is far better. We have
lost 90% of the cross monitoring in abnormal situations. 2018
My background is two-man crew. I prefer the two-man crew
(smaller loop of communication). I feel that there are times
when the captain does not have the time to verify what the F/O is
doing (i.e. programming new runways or approaches in the FMC).
The F/O must be as qualified as the captain. Therefore I feel
that IOE experience is extremely important for F/Os. 2022
The coordination (crew) has to be fully understood, precise, and
diligent for the roles of the PNF and PF. This may be attributed
more to the fact that the 757 is a two-man A/C than to
automation. However, automation does play a large role iX both
PF and PNF are trying to do the same job. Also there is the need
for more verbal communication, i.e. one pilot is on one frequency
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and one is on another. Each needs to know what was said and
fully understand the intent of the communication. There needs to
be trust is your fellew pilot. 2023
There is certainly more trust and reliability on the pilot. When
both are sharp, this works fine, but if either pilot is weak, the
other pilot is one tired person by the end of the day. This is
especially true when something goes wrong, because you very
quickly get out of the loop of either managing the system that
has failed, or flying the aircraft, whichever your job. 2027
Compared with the 727, the extra pair of eyes is indeed missed.
I find on short legs that the PNF is very busy, but not to the
point that safety is compromised. SOPA has specifically assigned
crew duties and I have yet to see any deviations. There is an
atmosphere in this carrier that in our first two-man aircraft,
there has got to be a lot of cooperation among crews while
adhering to SOPA. 2031
Vastly inferior to a three-man crew. Both crewmen have to be at
peak efficiency to begin to operate the B757 at a safety level
compared to 3-man. Any deterioration of performance due to time
zones, lack of rest, hunger, etc. must be avoided. Automation,
at any level, will simply not replace alert pilots. Major
efforts should be made to ensure proper meals, rest, and avoid
scheduling pilots to fly vastly different times in successive
duty periods. The tradeoff of two-man crew with high automation
has thus far ignored the human factors involved with long duty
periods involving high-altitude, long-range flights. This must
no longer be ignored. 2038
Two problem areas I see with respect to crew coordination on the
757 are (1) short en route time operationr and (2) malfunction
analysis and handling. An insight into problem (i) can best be
gained by recounting the 28 minutes, off-to-on, of a flight
between LAX and SAN. The following scenario, while typical, is
not exact, and is for illustrative purposes_ Times are given in
minutes after takeoff in the first column:
01 Flight
01 LAX CTR
03 LAX CTR
03 LAX CTR
04 LAX CTR
O4 Flight
05 Flight
05-06 Flight
07 Flt Att
08-09 Flight
09-11 Flight
12 LAX CTR
13 LAX CTR
14-15 Flight
16 Flight
Establish contact with LAX departure
Take heading ---, expect climb in 5 miles
Take heading ---, climb to ll,000 feet
Traffic 2 o'clock, i0 miles
Contact LAX CTR; frequency ---
Establish contact with LAX CTR
Climb check
Contact company LAX gate radio, give departure
report
Coffee?
Contact MSP company radio, give dep. report
Give P.A. announcement to passengers
Proceed direct ---, contact Center freq. ---
Take heading ---, descend to 5,000 feet
Tune SAN ATIS, copy SAN weather and runway
Descent check
126
16-17 Flight
17-19 Flight
20 LAX CTR
2O Flight
21 SAN APC
22 Flight
23 Flight
24 SAN APC
24 SAN APC
24 Flight
25 SAN TWR
25 Flight
26 Flight
27 SAN TWR
28 Flight
Select arrival page of CDU. Program SAN
arrival
Check landing weights, select LOC freq. and
course. Select minimum altitude bug and
set airspeed bugs. Readjust altimeters,
announce flight attendants, approach check
Contact SAN APC, frequency ---
Establish contact SAN APC
Take heading ---, descend to and maintain 3000
Approach check, challenge and response
Contact SAN gate radio for arrival gate, give
inbound time
Descend to 2000 feet, direct REEBO, maintain
2000 feet until intercepting LOC, cleared for
localizer 27 approach, maintain 170 kts. to
REEBO
Contact SAN tower 118.3
Establish contact with SAN tower
You are high. Can you make the runway from
your present position?
Request 360 degree turn
Landing check
Cleared to land
Touchdown
2044
Crew coordination is easier than on a three-person aircraft
during normal operations. When traffic gets heavy, the weather
bad, or there's a mechanical problem, you miss that third person.
Two people then have to do the work of three when you feel like
you need four to get everything done. There are many possible
errors with only two: missed altitude, missed or improperly
performed checklist, no one to look outside long enough, only one
other set of ideas. With two pilots it's so easy for one to get
involved in his own work that there is reduced or no backup for
each other. There is a potential for disaster with one pilot out
of the loop. 2052
I give my F/O a briefing before each trip begins on what I
expect. My biggest concern is the F/O being in too big a hurry
to push buttons, especially when in autopilot mode. A major
problem is close to the ground, especially on T/O with an engine
failure or fire. I'm a strong believer in "sit on the problem."
In this case, more harm can be done with a wrong decision than no
decision. I wait till both pilots know the problem and agree on
the solution. The FAA wants you pulling and pushing switches if
a fire light comes on, instead of waiting. Aircraft control is
what you want and what needs to be maintained° Slow and careful
is the choice. 2066
I think this question is an easy target for almost everyone to
say that it is harder. But I think it is only a matter of
different considerations that come into play, not an increase in
difficulty of task. Greater awareness must be had of your own
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actions and their effect on the other pilot. I feel that the
extra burden <two-man crew> is something that all 757 pilots are
aware oft and are tuned in to, expecting and accepting. It is
ver_ much within the abilities of a well trained and professional
pilot for normal operations and minor abnormals. Major
emergencies and failures or compounded problems are another
story, and a major shortcoming of two-man crews. 2067
Crew coordination is everythin_n_q on the 757. Personality
differences, effective communication skills, resources
management, setting priorities, proper habit patterns, and clear
delineation of duties are immensely magnified in importance on
this aircraft. It does not overload you as long as you plan,
coordinate, communicate, and execute according to precise
operating habit patterns. 2076
The atmosphere I have found to be the most democratic of any
airline cockpit. Both individuals inherently know they need one
another due to the lack of the 'Wluxury of a third person".
Individually each pilot places more faith in the other due to
having to work alone on something due to the workload
requirements_ In addition, I do not think the S/O has been
eliminated per se. What has happened is the captain and the F/O
have split the S/O's responsibilities and carried them out. 2077
(i) Some captains are reluctant to engage in activities
previously handled by S/Os and the F/Os on a three-man aircraft
(company reports, maintenance write-ups, etco) o Thus
coordination suffers. (2) During emergencies, there is much
less coordination in the two-man vs. the three-man crew. (3) I
know of one captain who does not allow his copilots to even touch
their CDU! 2088
Not as good sometimes° We spend time figuring out or monitoring
the A/P and not really announcing our intentions to the other
pilot. Sometimes we get out of the loop. Complacency and lack
of discipline seem to be common problems when the automation is
used° 2090
The cockpit can be the most boring with the least to do, or the
most hectic and overworked. 2096
It is generally good and the automation makes the reduced
checklists work nicely. But the bottom line is a third crew
member in an aircraft without the advanced automation is a far
safer system. The extra eyes and mind is a better deal,
especially in terminal areas, than all the automation I've seen
on the 757. The automation doesn't see other A/C or provide
backup for ATC instructions. 102'7
Being requested by ATC to descend at a faster rate, I used speed
intervention to make a more rapid descent, got distracted, and
almost went through i0,000 feet at 330 kts. Crew coordination
<was the problem> -- I should have let the F/O handle the problem
until back to normal descent. Crew coordination can be a little
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more difficult, due to the need to monitor what F/O is putting
into the computer, especially airway intersections. 1030
I think this area needs more emphasis. Many times while hand
flying, I am expecting the captain to perform some duty for me
such as a change in the heading bug and altitude selector as
changes are received from ATC. When he doesn't do it, I have to
take time to decide whether to ask for it or just do it myself.
This is sometimes, but not always, related to the fact that in
the terminal area, the PNF can be very busy with ATC, company
communications, FMS programming, MCP programming, etc. 1032
Crew coordination is perhaps the most difficult thing to attain.
Most pilots come to A/C from first generation A/C where the one-
man act could be accomplished. The 757 requires more discipline
on the part of the pilot. He must read and evaluate information
and proposed changes to the flight path. A pilot gets a "free
look" at a change if he will only look. 1033
Crew coordination is really not necessary. One person could fly
this A/C safely. I have seen either crew member sort of "take
over" the operation of the 757. The only problem I see is
boredom, especially on long flights! There is not enough to keep
busy. I have seen crew members compete for the few duties_ 1038
If both pilots understand the automation functions, it's great!
If one or both pilots do not, then it is bad - very bad. 1046
Crew coordination is excellent. However, the "over-enthusiastic"
pilot can often get carried away trying to do too much, too fast,
too soon. That can jam up the CDU, confuse the other pilot etc.
It's usually good to verify at the start of the trip how inputs
of data and ATC changes will be made. 1052
Crew coordination is basically the same as the DC-9 until it
comes to the computer. On our airline we alternate actually
flying the A/C. On the 757, we have said the PNF will operate
the computer as far as route changes are concerned. With the
advent of the full-up VNAV, I have found it necessary to say that
the VNAV portion must be left to the PF. Why? Because I find
that so many pilots want to put in too much information in the
computer, such as airspeeds and altitudes. I know what's in the
computer as to altitudes and airspeeds, so when I push VNAV I
know what airspeed the computer will go to. Yet when some one
else changes these to 130 kts. over threshold 50 feet, I find I
have to not only fly the plane when it is my turn, and also look
out the window for aircraft, but I also have to watch him (F/O)
to see what he's putting in the computer. 1056
Crew coordination is excellent! A bit better than the DC-9.
Since both pilots have to be familiar with the computer, the F/O
is more a part of what is going on than in the DC-9. I think the
higher level of training produces a first officer who is really a
part of the crew as opposed to feeling like excess baggage in
some three-man crews. 1066
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Crew coordination? It's very difficult for a pilot to ask the
F/O or captain to push all the buttons when called for. The
tendency is to do this by yourself. Programming in the terminal
area is a problem. Most pilots do not have their terminal charts
readily accessible The aircraft capabilities make us lazy. The
tendency is to get complacent, although one scare as a result of
being unprepared is usually enough to make you less unprepared.
1067
(Note: other comments on crew coordination and communication can
be found in the chapters on workload, and cockpit errors.)
TABLE VII-I
Intercorrelation matrix for attitude probes in this chapter.
HIT refers to hours-in-type (B-757).
PHASE 1
HIT P20 P36
HIT 1.00 .20 -.17
p20 1.00 -.35
p36 1.00
For n=166, Irl > .15 necessary for significance
at the 0.05 level.
PHASE 2
HIT p20 p36
HIT 1.00 .02 -.21
p20 1.00 -.33
p36 1.00
For n=133, Irl > .17 necessary for significance
at the 0.05 level.
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VIII. WORKLOAD
A. INTRODUCTION
Cockpit workload is central to the question of automation, as the
rationale and justification for automatic devices has always been
that they would effect a reduction in pilot workload. The
ability of automation to reduce workload was largely the basis
for the decision of the President's Task Force on Aircraft Crew
Complement (1981) to support the development of two-pilot
cockpits for future transports. Finally, workload is a subject
evoking strong opinions on the part of most pilots.
The very definition of pilot workload is troublesome, and its
measurement has occupied human factors engineers and design
engineers for several decades. Much has been written on the
subject, and periodically a new workload measure is proposed,
experimentally tested and debated, but the search goes on.
Designers and FAA certification personnel inevitably fall back on
subjective measures, such as the time-honored Cooper-Harper
scale° For a recent review of pilot workload and workload
measurements see Kantowitz and Casper, 1988.
One feature of workload measurement that is particularly vexing,
and especially important in the advanced technology cockpits, is
mental workload. Mental workload defies measurement, possibly
even definition, because it is largely unobservable. But there
is no denying that mental or cognitive activity is a large and
important component of total workload, and further that it
becomes a larger and more significant component as automatic
features are added to the cockpit. To some degree, manual
workload is replaced by mental workload in the advanced aircraft.
On the other hand, it may be argued that automation can reduce
mental workload, as for example, in computing top of descent
(TOD) points, and computing VNAV paths to make good on a crossing
restriction, a maneuver which creates high cognitive demands in
traditional cockpits.
The advanced displays present in the 757 are very effective in
reducing mental workload. The two features of the EFIS cockpit
most frequently and favorably mentioned are the HSI map display
in general, and in particular its green altitude predictor arc.
Both are clearly instrumental in reducing mental workload.
Likewise the EICAS displays reduce much of the requirement for
systems monitoring. The author heard only favorable comments
about the EICAS, and most pilots spoke favorably about the
automation of the general airplane systems and their ease of
operation. Automation is usually discussed in connection with
flight path control, but in a pilot's mind, systems operation and
monitoring looms large as a workload issue. They view most
favorably functional system automation, which seldom fails and
generally is not vulnerable to crew error.
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One cannot discuss cockpit workload with pilots without
confronting the question of the two-versus-three pilot cockpit.
This is seen by crews as part and parcel of the workload picture,
and for good reason. There are a large number of pilots who have
spent most of their career in three-crew aircraft, and who feel
strongly that for a variety of reasons, most but not all related
to cockpit workload, and that the reduction to two pilots is a
compromise with safety. Others feel equally strongly that two
pilots can do the job, and that crew coordination and CRM works
better in this environment. As mentioned previously, most of the
Airline-2 pilots in the study had never flown two-pilot
airliners, and they were particularly resistant to concept of the
two-pilot cockpit. This opinion was shared by some of the
Airline-i pilots_ but in general those with DC-9 experience seemed
to favor the two-pilot design.
The data displayed on the previous page in PI8 and P26 reflect
two rather fundamental questions, and they could hardly be more
symmetrical_ indicating a deep division on the question of
workload in the 757, and the importance of the flight engineer.
The data in probe No. 18 indicates that the 757 pilots were about
evenly divided on whether or not this increases the totality of
workload.
Those who still advocate the three-pilot cockpit advance not only
workload as their argument, but several other factors as well.
They speak frequently of the "third pair of eyes" for collision
avoidance (which also may be regarded as a workload question),
the role of the S/O in monitoring and backing up the pilots, and
the frequent use of the S/O as the interface between cockpit and
cabin. With no S/O to perform these functions, they fall o11 the
two-pilot crew. Many state that if the a problem requires a
pilot entering the cabin, "we are left with a one-pilot crew."
It is often stated that the S/O may not be essential during
normal flight, but is essential when mechanical problems occur.
Numerous responses mentioned the role of the S/O in handling
company radio communications, which is frequently mentioned as a
burdensome demand in 757 operations.
The most frequent arguments in favor of the two-pilot crew state
that two pilots plus an EICAS can do a better job of monitoring
than three pilots; that it is easier for the captain to perform
his supervisory function with two pilots (the S/O being seen as
beyond his effect range of supervision); and the generally better
coordination with two pilots being able to monitor each other.
Even the advocates of the two-pilot crew mentioned the "third
pair of eyes," but recognized the coming of TCAS, which they felt
will be more effective than an S/O for collision avoidance.
The most frequent comments in both the questionnaires and the
interviews dealt with the demands for programming the CDU,
especially in the terminal areas, and the effect on "heads up"
time. For further information on this subject_ see also Chapter
IV (Equipment, especially the section on the CDU), Chapter VII
(Crew Coordination) and Chapter IX (ATC).
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The comments that follow reflect pilots' concern over the lack of
time for head-up scanning, and the concern over the amount of
time that both pilots are head-down, due largely to the demands
of the CDU. Part of this problem is due to frequent ATC changes°
As many pilots complain, if they could only count on flying the
course and vertical path that they program, their task would be
simpler, there would be less CDU demand, and more head-up
operation. This problem is clearly most critical below i0,000
feet, particularly on arrivals, when ATC demands route changes,
off-course vectors, and speed and crossing restrictions, making
LNAV and VNAV utilization difficult if not impossible, and
requires speed changes, and frequently runway changes. More will
be said of this in the next chapter (IX) on the influence of ATC
in advanced cockpit operations. It is noteworthy that about 25
per cent of the pilots responded with agreement to Item No. 28
(next page), indicating that they felt that the 757 allowed more
time to look out compared to other models.
The subject of fatigue has not been explored in this study, and
was seldom mentioned by the crews in interviews, questionnaires,
or during jumpseat observations. Where it was mentioned, most
commented favorably on what they perceived as a reduction in
fatigue attributable to automation. See Item No. 27, previous
page.
B. COPING STRATEGIES
Frequent comments were made in both the questionnaires and
interviews about the management of the automation_ and means of
avoiding or coping with high levels of workload. Some of these
are discussed below.
Workload Management and Advanced Planning
Numerous pilots stressed the importance of management of
workload, and of planning ahead. They recognized the importance
of management by doing as much planning and data entry as
possible during phases of lower demand. Many stressed pre-flight
programming at the gate whenever possible, and likewise for
planning and programming during cruise in preparation for
descent. For example, during cruise would seem the time to enter
winds on the LEGS page; this is routine data entry which could
affect the VNAV path, and can easily be done in non-critical
phases of flight, before TOD.
A good case for the workload-reducing capability of this aircraft
is flying a complex SID, for example the San Francisco PORTE
SEVEN depicted on the next page. In a traditional aircraft,
where reference must be made to VOR radials and DME distances and
frequent tuning of VORs is required, this is an extremely high
workload procedure, even for a three-pilot crew. In the 757,
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J_-PPES_-N SE_2.88_ SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF
BAvo,p,rtu_, (R) 135o I I SAN FRANCISCO INTL
PORTE SEVEN DEPARTURE (PORTEToWAGES) (PILOT NAV)
MT SAN BRUNOWEATHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON 118.05
(RADAR REQUIRED FOR RWYS 1 L/R DEPARTURES) (DME REQUIRED)
For obstacle clearance this SID requires the
following mininqum climb gradients:
Rwy 19L: 480' per nm to 1400',
Rwy 19R: CAT A & B, 480' per nm to 1400';
CAT C & D, 530' per nm to 18OO'.
Rwy 28L/R: 300' per nm to 2000'.
Gnd speed-Kts 75 100! 150 200 250 300
300' per nm 375 500! 750 1000 1250 1500
480' per nm 600 800 1200 1600 2000 2400
530' per nm 663 883 j132511767J2208 2650
TAKE -OFF
Rwys 1LtR:lntercept and proceed via San
Francisco R-350, cross the 4 {3ME fix at or
above 1600'. then turn LEFT to a 200 ° head-
ing to intercept and proceed via Point Reyes
R-135 to cross Port_ lnt at or above go00'
and Pesca lnt at or above 130(10' Then turn
LEFT to a 090 ° heading to intercept and pro-
rising terr3in to 2000' immediately south of
airport } . Intercept and proceed via San Francisco
R-095 to intercept Oakland R-13S at or above
SO00'. Proceed via Oakland Rol35 to cross Oak-
land 25 DME fix at or above go00', Cross Wages
[nt at or above FL 200 or at assigned LOWER
altitude/flight level, Thence via (transition) or
(assigned route).
Rwya 28L/R: Intercept end proceed via San Fran-
cisco R-281, cross the 6 DME fix at or above
2500' then turn LEFT to a 180 ° heading to inter-
cept and proceed via Point Reyes Ro135 to cress
Porte lnt at or above 9000' and Pesca lnt at or
above 13000'. Then turn LEFT to a 090 ° heading
to intercept and proceed via Woodside R-116 to
cross Wages tnt at or above FL 200 or at assign-
ed LOWER altitude/flight level, Thence via
(transition) o_ (assignedrouie) When San Fran-
cisco VORDME is inoperative, Rwy 28 departures
EXPECT radar vectors to Point Reyes R. 135
ceed via Woodslde R-116 to cross Wages Int t-_ resume SID.
at or above FL 200 o_ at assigned LOWER alti- TRANSITIONS
rude/flight level, Thence via (transition) or Avenal (PORTE7,AVE): From Wage,= Int to
(assigned route). Avenal VORTAC (117 rim): Via Woodsida
Rwy= 10L/R and 19L/R:(Rwys 19L/R depart- R-il6andAvenal R-298. Cross Woodside
ures, turn LEFT as soon as praciicable due to R-1 t6/60 DME fix at or above FI 240 o_ at assign-
steeply I--POINT REYES--_ [--_-D"OAKLANO---_ ed LOWER altitude/flight level
.,_(.°1" 13 7 PYE_ I('_L] t6o80AK_ ClovI_PORTE7oCZQ): FromWages Int to
_'_'= " 0"-" - ..... _ N_ -_,..... 2-13._ Clovis VORTAC (93 ,',m) : Via Clovis R-2sg.JC N38 048 W122 520 ._7 36 W 2z ._
' " _4. " Fellows (PORTE7.FLW);FromWagea Int to
o _ N37 40.0 _ Fellows VORTAC (145 nm); ViaFeilows
W122 29.0 ('Y o _ R-306 Cross Fellows R.306/126 DME fix at or
At0_r b_ _k.___ above FL 240 o_ at assigned LOWER altitude/'
\ 2500'1 / ..%qb./ _ W122 2i8 Panoche (PORT'E7.PXH): From Wage{= Int
_ . .P'_Od'V/ _J_o_- , to Panoche VORTAC (49 nm): Vta Panoche
. r', 4,."i/ \
\ /.¢_ '/_,..._ /._c;_' 1|6go' __._==,..=-SAN FRANCISCO-_
\/_ .,t/28_o_v/__,_----T_--_ J (L°)1158 SFO| Drectdistancefrom
"_ / San k_7_Z_"-_-(_-(")_ o _ I ...... _ --- 8 San Francisco Intl
Frc<nct=co"._..._,_- - u_o N37 37.2 W122 224\/ _ (Rwys IOL/R and 19L/R)to:PORTE lntl [ _-'T_
N37 29,4_ <) tl _._,,_._'_ _, _ N37 31.;' W122 05.4 [nt of San Franclsco
W122 28 4 \\'_ ]_" ...,e-- .._"T-_------T_, -- R-095 and Oakland
--_-}.._ _\o ,4:;' _ u",, or aoo',,e .-At or above F"._, L_"_ ' J 5000: R-135 lb nm
,--wooosm_--_ --_..t_ _ .V_
l(°)I }3 90S1 _,,"""_G _ . _.,_ N3721.4W12158.6
_ ---" ..... _._ ,\ o_ \ _"_ _ ._f--T-----T'-_ r---'--CLOVIS------_
N37 23.6 W122 16.8 O'\_ _ "/, X /At or aDore I o ....... !
-%k'_? "ere L., / '_o0o' I _2ZLz-Z -%_ |
PE$CA # _JTU _ ha.. _ '_ _ _ "
--.------( \_k __o C_OVlS ....-_.
AI or above I ,O."-_\,._ (PORTE7 CZQ) /'r_ h,
" oo' I WAGES _'¢ -/_.-079 '_- _-R259
_3,, sm_,,v121,4 o __ :,\#]09_omAL4,_ _-'}Y
..... " (5" ... 7,p
...... or al assigned lower 1 '_o1.> "_W'_¢O _9#2Y_o/_,-L\
_:pY:r t'J:;: turn LEFT ahitude/fl,ght level | \:0_;<'_._ " _[fo "_-3
as soon as practicable N36 42.4 W121 22.2 _._.J N/_/ _,___,_/_('_
due to s_eeply rising -AT_-_ FT-_-6_-- "_ ¢0_/'_ ..... _r.r--
,:. ' ----- --": ....... X % ".>_.2 .......
,.,ra,n ,o_000 o,-atass,_n_dI.... I . ,, ':°.,"_\L°_ _ ........ 1
_ ._ _ o L i ]£.u rAl_
immed_alely south ah_tude/lhght level I / 0 ,__ __" "I," _k I(L" ......... |
of airport. J N36 44 4 W 2 8 4 / _o_ \ _ ">4_# % N36 42.9 W]20 46.7
I % oraboveFL_-:_01 _.%\ - fz-\X
! o,-at assigned I.... / -_-\ t-k ° _L)
L altitude/fllghtlevel/ "_"'_ ,,._____.x"_,_
%_-- FELLOWS----_ - "_o r--AVENAL-------_
c_Ii_lll7S FLWk o /t_,)117.].AVEI
,.._, ,_...... :. _".-.%_:_ .......NOT TO SCALE N3S 05.6 W119 51.9 N35 38.8 W119 58.7
CHANGES: Communications. C(_JEPPESEN SANDERSON,INC., 1988.
ALL RIGHTSRESERVED
Figure VIII-lo PORTE SEVEN departure from KSFO
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OF POOR QUALITY
where manual tuning of VORs is usually not required, flying a SlD
is quite simple if the fixes and altitudes are preprogrammed,
providing that Departure Control allows the crew to fly it as
published. Departing KSFO via the PORTE SEVEN SID would be LNAV,
VNAV, and autopilot/autothrottle operation at its best. The
reader may find it instructive to step through the SID and
calculate the number of times a VOR must be tuned and a course
selected in this departure.
Route-2 Capability°
Only a few pilots mentioned the use of the Route 2 capability as
a means of anticipating changes and avoiding programming during
critical phases. Most frequently this was employed in
anticipation of landing runway changes, although some expressed
the frustration that even two-route CDU capability was not enough
to prepare for "musical runways" at LAX (see next chapter).
Experience
There was general agreement that as one becomes more experienced
in the 757, the workload appears to diminish. Several adaptive
mechanisms were attributed to experience: i) the ability to
quickly enter changes into the CDU; 2) the ability to plan ahead
and anticipate the need for CDU or MCP interventions; 3) a
change in tactics, namely using the automation less, particularly
below i0,000 feet. Many captains expressed the feeling that the
more they flew, the more they tended to "click it off" [i] when
workload increased, especially when encountering rapid ATC route
changes, crossing restrictions, and runway changes. Captains
frequently mentioned the need to restrain F/Os from excessive
programming, and to intervene when inexperienced F/Os spent
excessive time trying to solve problems with CDU programming
rather than "flying the plane." It is something of a paradox
that about half of pilots reported that when workload increased,
they turned the automatic features off. (See footnote below).
One is mindful of the suggestion of Curry (1985) that pilots of
advanced technology aircraft be given what he called "turn it off
training." This view was voiced by numerous crews in discussing
training. They stated that ground school and simulator
instructors should "teach us hownot to use automation."
Altitudes and Direct Routinq
Pilots were unanimous in their praise of two features of the 757
which allowed ATC to give them more favorable treatment, and
therefore workload reduction: high altitude capability, and
[i] The term "click it off" is frequently used pilot slang for
turning off or deselecting one or more automatic devices,
reverting to more manual modes of operation, particularly during
times of heavy workload. It usually refers to deselecting the
LNAV, VNAV, or autothrottle and autopilot modes.
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long-distance direct routing due to the inertial capability of
the FGS. High altitudes allows requests for direct routings to
be granted, and also reduces radio communications with ATC. IRS
navigation allow long-range navigation to a VOR location as a fix
with no need to receive a signal from the VOR.
Crew Comments
2-4. What can you say about overall workload of the 757
compared to the other aircraft you have flown? Include mental
workload, monitoring etc. What about outside scan?
Tabled below are the responses where a clear cut answer of
relative workload was discernible. The symmetry of responses in
this table is consistent with the data displayed in response to
Item No. 18 earlier in this chapter.
TABLE VIII-I
Response Number
Much more workload 1
More 20
Same or more 7
About the same 8
Same or less 2
Less 24
Much less 8
Note: many of the responses tabled above were somewhat
qualified. Some of those responding in the "more" categories
qualified their answer by saying that the excessive workload was
only below I0,000 feet (see Table VIII-2). A large number also
cited the two-pilot cockpit, not automation per se, as the source
of the workload problem°
There was general agreement that workload was higher below i0,000
feet either departing or arriving, and was less above those
altitudes, and much less at cruise. Several commented that a
considerable amount of workload was relocated from flight phases
to pre-start and pre-takeoff phases of flight. This point was
also made by MD-80 pilots in a previous study (Wiener, 1985b).
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Some of those responding in the "less" categories qualified their
answer by stating that the workload was less "as long as
everything is working."
TABLE VIII-2
Specific comments made in response to question 2-4.
Comment Number
Excessive workload below i0,000 feet [i] 18
Increased workload due to only two pilots ii
Workload increased by ATC changes and uncertainty [2] 16
Increased mental workload [3] 8
Must resist excessive programming below i0,000 feet 14
Workload increased by company procedures 4
Difficult for new pilot, but improves with experience ii
Excessive workload during abnormal conditions 4
Importance of pre-planning in workload reduction 4
Crew coordination critical to workload 4
Complacency arises due to low workload 3
Less workload as long as everything normal 2
Excessive workload on short legs 2
You should "click it off" below I0,000 feet 2
Workload high if one of the pilots not proficient 2
Preflight activities more demanding 2
Automation allows better management of flight 1
Crew can spend less time monitoring non-essential systems 1
Excessive workload in bad weather 1
Complacency due to high reliability of systems 1
ACARS very helpful in reducing workload 2
[i]
[2]
[3]
Many respondents reported that workload was manageable or
light in phases of flight above i0,000 feet.
Runway changes particularly; LAX mentioned in most cases.
Several respondents remarked that high mental workload is
not necessarily bad, in that it keeps them active and alert.
This point has not been examined in workload research.
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TABLE VIII-3
Intercorrelation matrix for attitude probes in this chapter.
HIT refers to hours-in-type (B-757)o
PHASE 1
HIT p18 p26 p27 p28
HIT 1.00 .15 -.22 -.14 -o31
p18 1.00 -.31 -.36 ,.55
p26 1.00 .43 .41
p27 1.00 .37
p28 1.00
For n=166, Irl > .15 necessary for significance
at the 0.05 level
PHASE 2
HIT p18 p26 p27 p28
HIT 1.00 .13 -.30 -.ii -.28
p18 1.00 -.29 -.36 -.50
p26 1.00 .35 .29
p27 1.00 .48
p28 1.00
For n=133g Irl > .17 necessary for significance
at the 0.05 level
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Crew Comments
Workload is about the same or even less than A/C with three-man
crew, provided checklists are completed far enough ahead so that
they do not interfere with flying the A/C or receiving
instructions from ATC. There are no operational procedures that
need interfere with outside scan below i0,000 feet, except in an
emergency. Good flight management is the key. 4001
The 757 is a mental cockpit.
managing. 4002
It does leave more time for
Workload is the same or heavier due to the two-man cockpit. Part
of the load is mental. Time after time an approach has to be
changed below 5000 feet. Also a_D_y time the aircraft is in a
transitory condition, you have to monitor everything because you
might get a surprise. A lot of times we would just click it off
and go back to manual if the load became heavy. 4003
Workload below i0,000 is. higher than other A/C.
perfect plane for a mid-air collision. 4004
This is a
It is easy to get pushed and make minor errors on the ground
before takeoff if you try to move at the pace that external
pressure required (making schedule, radio communication, FMC
programming etc.). Planning ahead is definitely required for
approaches. All the A/C I have flown have peaks and valleys of
workload. However, the peaks and valleys are more accentuated on
the 757. 4007
Overall workload is greater on the 757. Mental workload is
higher because you have one less person to help you remember to
do things. The automation is nice, but the environment is not
ready for it, and it will never replace the three-man crew.
4008
The cockpit is busy for a new pilot (3-4 months). If the pilot
keeps in mind that he can still fly the airplane like very other
aircraft he's flown, and not become fixated with the computer, he
will not experience excessive workloads. Once I became
comfortable and adept with the system, I found workloads lower
than other aircraft. 4009
Below 18,000 the workload is greater. When one pilot is
programming or talking to the company, he is completely out of
the loop for helping the other pilot. 4014
It is the most fun fixed-wing aircraft I've flown (old helicopter
pilot). I have a bid in for the DC-10, but I don't look forward
to going back to needle, ball and airspeed. From the cockpit
door forward, there's nothing I would be happy to leave behind.
I love the airplane. 4015
If the flight profile were known before departure, the workload
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in the 757 would be considerably less than other A/C. However,
with today's ATC system and constant rerouting and vectoring
below i0,000, I would say the workload is as great or greater
than other A/C. 4018
During short legs, the workload is excessive. Coordination with
flight attendants, ATC, and company radio puts a substantial
stress on both pilots during outside scan and programming. Any
malfunctions during these short legs exceeds the capability of
both pilots to perform safely. Communications with the flight
attendants and the company cannot be ignored. 4019
I must deliberately refrain from extensive programming below
i0,000. This is something that was not emphasized enough in
training. If you fight the urge to program, there is adequate
time for outside scan. 4021
Keeping busy and more mentally alert because of a two-man
environment is not necessarily a detriment. I feel that I was
more "in tune" with the entire flight management program in the
757 than other aircraft. Bottom line: there's no substitute for
another pair of eyes. 4027
The ease of navigating with all FMC vs. an INS is a tremendous
boostg ioe. going some place in the 757 uses a three-letter
identifier, instead of coordinates. Less chance for error.
4030.
Workload is increased during a systems problem° One pilot works
the checklist while the other is "minding the store." At this
point no one is really backing up the checklist procedure, and no
one is backing up the flying operation° For the PF during such a
situation, there's a tendency to watch the other guy, so there's
a distraction from flying the airplane. I would feel more
comfortable with someone else <flight engineer> following the
operation. 4031
The overall workload is higher due to mental workload, but I
think this causes a more disciplined cockpit because you don't
want to "look away" and end up missing something that happened.
4033
In the new, deregulated environment, I miss the S/O to take care
of passenger requests, comforts, and other demands as we continue
a delayed operation. Since he isn't there, you or the other
pilot have to take the time. Since you want to please as many
passengers as possible, the workload is higher, which can take
time away from monitoring or scanning. 4043
Normally the workload is about the same or a little less. In a
busy terminal area such as DCA or LAX, it is much greater and can
be very dangerous, esp. in VMC conditions° The runway changes at
LAX and speeds that are not compatible (e.g. 210 to the OM) make
things very busy at times° It is hard for me to understand why
there are not many mid-airs and near-misses in the LAX area. The
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757 definitely requires a conscious effort to look outside,
because it can become a "heads down" operation if you let it.
4045
Some times the monitoring can be hard because the systems are so
reliable, and there is a tendency for complacency. 4047
I had two occasions when a S/O would have been useful wheD
systems failed. On one occasion, the F/O was out of his seat
pulling circuit breakers to reset a system. ATC called with a
new frequency, the flight attendants called to say it was hot in
the cabin, and company dispatch called to get a position report,
and I was trying to make a PA <announcement> to tell the
passengers why it was so hot. Then the F/O asked me to repeat
the C/B numbers. My "fun meter" almost pegged out. This kind of
thing could have been very hazardous at 3000 feet. Overall I
feel that the 757 is 99.5% as safe as a three-pilot operation.
The 0.5% loss is probably a reasonable tradeoff in today's
airline environment. 4048
As for mental workload, the 757 generally causes an increase,
especially in terms FMC programming. Airplane systems are well
designed and do not add to workload. Monitoring is increased
somewhat. Outside scan suffers tremendously. There is such a
tendency to use full navigational capabilities of the FMC that a
great deal of programming occurs at critical times, when all eyes
should be outside. Often there are n_ooeyes outside. There is
time for outside scan, but it is easy to get distracted. 4057
Total workload appears to be reduced, but monitoring of systems
is increased, making long trips more tedious. Outside scan time
definitely reduced. 4058
Overall workload is less, but workload in terminal areas where
runway changes are common (esp. LAX) is increased to the point of
jeopardizing safety. Even one head in the cockpit is too many.
4059
The 757 is wonderful unless you are recleared in a terminal
area, or something malfunctions. Then you are overloaded. There
is no middle ground. Automation becomes a tyrant in any kind of
anomalous operation. Outside scan suffers all the time. 4061
No workload at cruise, double workload below i0,000. Flying the
old airplanes was much easier and safer in the rapid-fire
environment° 4062
The success of this aircraft is based on all the automatic stuff,
so it pains me to see the MEL <minimum equipment list> keep
growing. We fly without an APU. A couple of months ago we
sheared a generator shaft and had no APU backup. If we fly these
aircraft (and bigger ones) with two-man crew, they must be
meticulously maintained. 4070
Generally speaking, VNAV is useless in today's ATC environment.
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Too many changes to be made in terminal areas. I have made fewer
than ten VNAV descents that were not modified by ATC. Constant
reprogramming. 3001
Workload diminishes greatly with familiarity. Thus does outside
scan improve. However, one must scan more in visual conditions
at the expenses of serving the FMC which is (now) less important.
3006
Workload on 757 is about half of what it was on DC-9. Also,
because the 757 is such a nice A/C to fly, the mental workload is
also less, due to automation. I think outside scan is also
improved. 3007
Workload is about the same, just timed differently. Simplified
checklist and automated systems aid in reducing "before engine
start" activity, but LNAV and VNAV programming requires attention
and rechecking at a time earlier than is necessary with antique
instruments. This earlier planning allows greater opportunity to
scan outside the cockpit en route. Some pilots have a tendency
to program VNAV by going head down into the cockpit and
reprogramming, rather than using basic autopilot functions. I
feel safety would be enhanced by using FLCH, Heading Sel., and
altitude sel. window during descent and approach. 3008
Every jet should have three-man crews. The company is always
increasing workload° The <ATC> system now has one continual
stream of radio communications which we can no longer absorb and
act Ono We have lost an important factor in the safety equation
because we don't pick up the errors made by others. Bring back
the third man. 3013
Better, quicker, safer than any other aircraft with the exception
of terminal areas. If weather is good, ATC vectors, altitude
changes etc. are too fast to program and keep an eye outside.
3018
757 does not provide enough time for scanning in the terminal
area. This is the only two-man aircraft I've flown, and I
believe the automation vs. third crew member is a poor tradeoff.
The economics only make sense as long as nothing goes wrong. A
third set of eyes, both inside and outside the cockpit, is far
more valuable than the 757's automation. 3021
Arop__ trained crew, using state-of-the-art automation
correctl_ will have a much lighter workload (monitoring only, vs.
monitoring plus physically doing). Because of this fact, it is
obvious to me that with this lighter workload the crew has much
more time to be outside. I, as captain, have only to glance at
the mode and request settings to know the F/O was on the ball,
and we are both back outside. How easy and simple and safe it
was -- the good people and the B-757 -- these I miss <respondent
recently retired>. 3025
The B-757 automation is so interesting and fascinating -- there
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doesn't seem to be a heavy workload. The outside scan is
affected at first, but as experience increases, so does time for
scan and monitoring. 3037
Of all the airplanes I've flown, the 757 is the easiest, and this
is good. Much said these days about complacency, meaning
carelessness, but this is not a necessary result. Relaxed does
not equal sloppy. Being relaxed plus alert are what the cockpit
needs and the 757 permits, but ever-present judgment. 3038
All two-man planes should have ACARS or a similar reporting
system. Generally 757 workload is excellent and allows time for
outside scan, but communication with ramp and station for in-
range items and flight attendant requests negates this. 3045
The automation of the A/C systems (fuel, elect., hyd.) make the
machine easier to operate, but the demands of the autoflight
systems take up much more time, and leave little or no time for
outside scan in terminal areas. 3049
The workload is nearly identical <to earlier models>. The 75"7
has the advantage of shifting a significant portion of the
workload to before engine start. 3053
Depends on phases of flight. Before departure: workload higher
due to two-man crew, computer programming, preflight,
understanding EICAS messages and their affect on mechanical
reliability of your aircraft. Climb: workload reduced due to
autopilot and LNAV, VNAV climb, and performance of A/C which
allows direct routing. Cruise: Workload definitely reduced due
to direct routing and higher cruise altitude. Terminal arrival:
high workload due to programming. 3055
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IX. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLAND COCKPIT AUTOMATION
A. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we shall consider briefly the influence of the
air traffic control (ATC) environment on the task of flying
advanced technology aircraft. This matter has been discussed
previously, in Chapter IV on cockpit equipment and Chapter VIII
on workload, and many of the comments of the crew members in
these chapters overlap. The purpose of this chapter is not to
critique the ATC system, but to assess the extent to which it
impacts in a special way on high technology cockpits.
One cannot help but be impressed when first encountering the
fight guidance systems and displays of the modern aircraft. The
VNAV and LNAV capability, the advanced autothrottle, IRS
navigation, and the navigational displays seem to be ideal for
operating in a complex environment. Furthermore, some of the
advanced displays, such as the HSI map mode, the green altitude
predictor arc, and the flight path predictor display, represent a
giant leap beyond the displays available in traditional cockpits°
One captain remarked_ "you can take all of this other stuff away,
but just leave me with the map and the green arc."
ATC Capabilities
While the cockpit equipment is intended to assist crews in
conforming with ATC clearances, there are problemsn not with the
cockpit equipment per se, but with the ability of ATC to allow
the crews to exploit it. The basis of the problem is that the
ATC system must be able to accommodate all types of aircraft,
with extreme variations in on-board equipment, mission profile,
flight characteristics, and pilot proficiency, so todayOs system
is a by necessity compromise. As a number of the crews put it,
Hi, we (757-generation aircraft) were the only ones up there, the
system would work great."
The ATC system of today has not kept pace with advances in
cockpit capability, and is badly in need of modernization. This
is under way presently, but will probably not produce a
noticeable effect until the end of the century. The system
simply is not cordial to the advanced capabilities of the new
aircraft; it is essentially geared to 727-era cockpits and
capabilities.
Controller Familiaritz
Many of the crews discussed also the lack of understanding of the
ATC personnel of the capabilities of the aircraft. This may or
may not be the case, as the pilots may be interpreting the
clearances they receive as reflecting lack of understanding when
the problem is actually a lack of ground-based system capability°
Many of the crews, while critical of the system, had praise for
the controllers and their efforts to cooperate, and there were
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frequent comments that their service was improving as ATC became
more accustomed to the 757-generation capabilities. (See crew
comments that follow). Numerous crew members mentioned that they
had never had a controller on the jumpseat of a 757 on a "fam
trip" (familiarization), and they thought that this was a missed
opportunity to instruct ATC personnel in the capabilities of the
modern cockpits. A few mentioned that they felt that pilots
should also visit ATC facilities for their familiarization.
B. ATC INFLUENCES
Workload Induced bv ATC
The most frequent complaint was changes in clearance resulting in
the following effects:
i. Pre-planning and programming went for naught.
2. VNAV and LNAV capabilities could not be exploited.
3. Workload increased in order to cope with the changes,
especially changes below I0,000 feet, including runway
reassignments, departures from STARs and SIDs, speed
changes, and crossing restrictions.
5. The B-757 automation works great
in today's ATC er_vironment.
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ATC changes would exert similar effects (Item No. 3 above) on the
crew of any type of aircraft. The question here is whether the
instructions are particularly difficult for advanced cockpit
operation, and this is presently impossible to say. There is
serious concern on the part of crews with respect to Item No. 3,
and the feeling that ATC changes can induce a high level of
workload if the crews attempt to program the changes during
critical periods of flight. Many pilots arereporting that they
tend to abandon FMC programming and revert to basic
autopilot/flight director modes during critical times, including
runway changes close to the airport (see previous chapter on
workload).
More and more the author has heard from captains that they felt
they had to restrain the first officers from attempting to
program every change, to the detriment of extra-cockpit scanning_
and many were critical of their training programs for not placing
more emphasis on this, as well as programming solutions. In a
previous field study, Curry (1985) had recommended that crews be
given what he termed '_turn-it-off training°"
Despite some of the criticisms, Item No. 3 on the previous page
reflects a generally favorable view of the management of flight
in the ATC environment°
There was considerable difference of opinion on this topic_ as
numerous pilots reported that they had no trouble reprogramming
when necessary, and they praised the ability of the automation to
reduce their workload in performing complex procedures, including
runway changes and unexpected crossing restrictions (see Table
IX-I which follows).
Altitude and Performance Cagabilities
It was felt by all that the high altitude capabilities of the
757, coupled with the long-range navigational capabilities of the
IRS/FMC were a definite asset in flying the ATC system° The
ability of the 757 to fly above FL 370, which in turn allowed the
crews to request and obtain long-range direct clearances_ was
highly valued° Some mentioned that many controllers did not
understand that the 757 did not have to receive a VOR_ and could
navigate to a VOR location even if it were off the air. It was
not unusual during the first year of this study to hear a
controller clear a 757 on an assigned heading to a distant VOR,
"cleared direct when receiving."
The climb and descent capabilities reflect another interface
problem with ATC. Due to the ].imitations of today's systems in
dealing with aircraft of widely differing performance
capabi].ities, the rapid climb of the "757 cannot be exploited°
Pilots complained of the fact that since the 757 tended to
descend slowly, ATC was keeping them too high, too long, often
necessitating the use of drag devices in order to make good a
crossing restriction on descent, or remain on their VNAV path.
Some crews have shown considerably ingenuity in "fooling the
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computer" to achieve their purposes. For example, they
discovered that they could manipulate the TOD point so as to
start down earlier than the correct VNAV calculation by either
scheduling thermal anti-ice (TAI) in the CDU (but not actually
using it), or by inserting fictitious tail winds.
The following incident was submitted to the regional chief pilot
of a carrier not associated with this study. Shortly after this
another pilot reported an identical incident. It was the feeling
of the reporting pilots, as well as the chief pilot, that this
could have happened in any aircraft, but that the glass cockpit
aircraft are particularly vulnerable due to the tendency to
follow the magenta line once displayed on the HSI. This was
brought to the attention of ATC, who took remedial action.
On XXXX, 1987 I was the captain of flight XXX. We received
a clearance to depart KSEA via the SUMMA TWO departure with
a Pendleton transition. At about the 5 DME we were
instructed to turn to a 130 degree heading and intercept the
departure. The only part of the SUMMA TWO that shows on the
<HSI> map of 757 type equipment is the assigned route (see
attached Jeppesen plate, Figure IX-l). This turn to 130
degrees appears to be a good heading to intercept the
Pendleton transition.
I did have a discussion with the first officer as to whether
this was the controller's intention. About the time I was
going to get a clarification we were turned over to another
controller who gave us a turn to the right to intercept the
143 degree radial. He stated that we were heading for Mt.
Ranier. During a discussion with the controller, he stated
he had observed other 757 aircraft heading for Mt. Ranier.
I feel that a human factors type of situation exists that
causes 757 type aircraft pilots to feel that the 130 degree
heading short of the Ii DME is a heading to the Pendleton
transition. It could be eliminated with a clearance to
intercept the ]43 radial, or a clearance to SUMMA.
In summary, a mismatch exists between the capabilities of the
modern aircraft and today's ATC system. It bears repeating that
the pilots in this study generally recognized this and while
critical of the system, expressed gratitude for the quality of
service the controllers were attempting to render. It is
difficult to predict what will lie ahead. There will be some
short-term gains as an increasing number of advanced technology
aircraft enter airline fleets, and controllers become more
familiar with their capabilities, but these gains may not be
sufficient to offset the effects of forecast increases in traffic
into the next century. Real relief may have to await the
installation in the late 1990s of the National Air Space Plan
(NASP), whose automatic systems should allow more pre-planning
and adherence to lateral and vertical routes which will be in
harmony with the capability of the advanced cockpit technology.
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Direct distance from Seattle-Tacoma Intl to:
Summa lnt 46 nm
.SUMMA TWO DEPARTURE (PILOT NAV)
(DME REQUIRED)
TAKE-OFF , •
Rwy_ 16L/R:lntercept and proceed via the
Snaille R-158, at the Seattle I1 DME fix turn
LEFT to a 130 ° heading to Intercept and proceed
via the Seattle R-143 to Summa Int.
Rwya 34L/R:Intercept and proceed via the
Seattle R-338, cross Seattle 8 DME fix at or
above 4000', then turn RIGHT to a 070 ° heading,
cross the Paine R-143, then turn RIGHT to a 175 °
heading to intercept and proceed via the Seattle
R-143 to Sutures int.
TRANSITIONS
Lakevlew: From Summa Int t.o Lakevlew VOR-
TAC (261 nm):Vla Seattle R-143 and Lakeview
R-327 (J-5).
Pendleton: From Summa Int to Pendlelo. VOh-
TAC (142 nm):Vla Olympia R-091 and Pendleton
R-276 (J-54).
m
SEATTLE, WASH
-TACOMA ]NTL
CHANGES: See other side. (I_JEPPESENSANDERSON,INC., 1984.ALL RIGHT_t_tE_ERVED
Figure IX-1. SUMMA TWO departure from KSEA. Note that the
clearance, the intercept vector, and Mt. Ranier are not on the
original approach plate, but were added by the reporting pilot.
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1-6. Do yOU like the way the 757 automation interfaces to the
ATC environment? Please mention things you have trouble with,
and things that work well, in working with ATC.
Response
TABLE IX-i
Number
Respondinq
NEGATIVE
Works poorly; overall negative view
Too much programming; too much head down time;
too many vectors in terminal area
Too much runway switching
ATC doesn't understand our capabilities; tries to
control 757 like a 727; can't interface to 757
automation
Problems in terminal areas; VNAV ineffective;
Descent problems; keep us high too long; don't
allow for longer glide; too many "drag
required" messages
26
37
12
35
16
27
POSITIVE
Generally works well
High altitude and "direct to" capability an asset
Works well except on descent
ATC's understanding of 757 capabilities improving
HSI map big aid, esp. in "direct" clearances,
avoidance of lateral errors
60
8
2O
8
6
Note: other negative comments frequently given involve FMC being
too slow in updating (see Chapter IV), ATC not adhering to STARs
and SIDs, inability to capture glide slope from above, and ATC
unaware of ability to navigate to out-of-service facilities.
Other positive comments: ability to navigate to out-of-service
facilities (e.g. VORs off the air), able to give ATC precise
headings and speeds when requested, ETA computation, and green
altitude arc eases work in making altitude restrictions.
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Crew Comments
No. The whole FMC program is set up for a letter-perfect ATC
system with no other airplanes in the sky. 2004
Generally yes. ATC is reluctant to let us start down and stay on
the optimum descent profile. ATC is getting better as more and
more 757/767s arrive. 2011
When you get used to itu it's great° You can go direct after you
get out of the Washington or S.E. Cleveland sectors_ You can
call up those holding fixes or odd items they drop on you that
you've never heard oft and see them on the map <HSI map mode>.
2012
We seem to spend a lot of time programming the FMCs with forecast
winds aloft, descent winds, pre-planned flight paths etc, so that
the FMC can compute an accurate T/D point only to find that 95%
of the time ATC modifies our descent path by causing us to level
off or turn off our pre-planning route during descent. Maybe
weVre wasting our time programming final approach speeds down to
50 feet above touchdown zone on the LEGS page. Maybe much less
programming would be appropriate. 2015
No! I get the impression that ATC has no idea how the 757
operates. They have no concept (or don't care) concerning our
efforts to give the passengers a comfortable ride (steep
descents, mandatory use of speed brakes, or excessive flaps to
get down, etc.). They don't seem to consider fuel economyf
scheduled arrivals etc. But they do an outstanding job in the
most important area, safety. My hat is off to them, but
improvements could be made. Controllers have to ride around in
the planes more often, and we pilots have to get over to the ATC
facilities more often. 2017
ATC seems to be "getting to know us." It seems that a year ago
there were no problems with INS clearances and less understanding
of our need to start down a little earlier. Also as our
experience builds, we know what the plane will do, and I find the
atmosphere is more relaxed as time goes on. 2035
It would seem that automatic flight guidance has attempted to
replicate the instinctive reactions of the pilot, with more rapid
and precise response to flight path error stimuli. It succeeds to
the extent that preprogrammed criteria are followed, and fails
where changing aircraft configurations, ATC requirements, weather
conditions etco require extensive readjustment of the flight
path, at the very time when the pilot must examine approach
guidelines, make visual observations of instruments inside, and
obstruction related observations, participate in intra-cockpit
coordination, and required check list items. The autopilot,
flight director computer does not, and cannot, anticipate ATC
vectors, speed changes, or altitude requirements, so that as the
pilots' workload changes inversely to his distance from the
ground, his opportunity to program changes proportionately. 2044
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It interfaces well for the most part. Problems occur when
extensive reprogramming is required at low altitude.
Unfortunately, this always happens at busy airports when you can
least afford the distraction. LAX is the best example. I think
of LAX as "musical runways." The runways on the ATIS and the
arrival you filed are the least likely ones you'll fly. Setting
up for two runways usually avoids too many problems. While it's
not an automation problem, ATC's tendency to keep aircraft high
and slow until close to the airport causes difficulty in descents
for landing. 2052
Generally speaking, we interface well with ATC. There are a few
places they give clearances that are actually more difficult to
set up in the 757 than in the 727. For example_ in the 727 you
can simply tune your VORs and check the DME to make a crossing
restriction. In the 757, it takes a lot more entries to set up
crossing restrictions. ATC is trying to help us save time and
fuel, but in so doing they create more work for us to a certain
degree. For example, they cut a corner on an airway with an
altitude restriction later on, and a lot of pre-planned stuff we
put in the FMC gets dumped and has to be reinserted. Mind you, I
am not complaining, because it's a fun plane to fly, but the time
spent programming could be spent looking for other traffic.
Also, the reprogramming gives more room to insert an error. ATC
folks mean well, but aren't familiar with our "magic." The 757
has fantastic climb performance and many of the ATC facilities
have not learned to keep up with us and therefore we have to do a
lot of leveling off every few thousand feet as we climb. This
may lead to an altitude bust or speeding ticket some day. The
FMC capabilities of going direct anyplace work very well with
ATC. Also, the FIX page is very handy when working with ATC.
2053
I feel that the 757 automation is very helpful and reduces pilot
workload in the takeoff, climb, cruise, and descent phases of
flight. The 757 automation can increase pilot workload and
become a liability below i0,000 feet on approach when (i) ATC
changes runways, (2) the map shifts, or (3) the route or runway
information dumps out of the FMC. These three conditions have
happened to me, and I feel the programming required for
automation is a liability during the approach phase of flight.
2055
No. At the present it is not uncommon to be caught high or
really trapped in a very clean aircraft that is not allowed to
descend because of lower traffic which is not yet to its optimum
descent point. At lower altitudes, it is rare to be able to fly
an arrival and an approach without vectors for spacing, which
requires either reprogramming or flying heading and/or airspeed
changes. I feel the loss of "another pair of eyes" when engaged
in these activities with an already high cockpit workload with
checklists, frequency changes etc. For example, a short segment
(TPA-ORL - 35 minutes) can be a wonder of efficiency or a
complete disaster, with continuous high workload, start to stop.
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I would expect, with the arrival of more efficient aircraft, that
the ATC itself will change. Perhaps the computer-capable and
efficient aircraft will be allowed to utilize their capabilities
and the older, less efficient aircraft will be made to conform,
perhaps by having to make power-on descents, and by flying
published arrivals and approaches. 2062.
No[ No[ No[ ATC can't seem to understand that this airplane
does not want to come down[ They treat us like older A/C with a
3:1 glide <3 miles longitudinally for i000 feet vertically>, and
this thing with its 4:1 is very difficult to get down without
"cheating" all the automation. This just negates the fuel
efficiency advantages of the aircraft and its automation. The
757 is also much slower on approach, which causes all kinds of
problems with automation° 2064
VNAV descent is not realistic unless you are going into Great
Falls_ Montana at 3:00 a.m. I have seen improvements with ATC --
they realize what we can do with a 757° They could eliminate a
lot of vectors and speed control if they'd tell you when to be
over a point. 2066
It isn't going to interface well until there are more 757s than
727s. 2074
Generally the automation interface works well with ATC. There
are times, however, in heavy traffic or weather where, unless you
are completely up to speed with all the auto functions, it could
become burdensome. I feel comfortable with my knowledge of the
use of the auto functions° I can input whatever ATC gives me
with little distraction from the overall flight. 2078
The 757 descent doesn't fit in with ATCo It has to start down
much earlier than other aircraft. Also, when we have a crossing
restriction off a certain navaid (e.go cross 20 west of MKE at
240), we sometimes get radar vectors and then recleared to our
original nav aid (MKE) o The only way we can do it without losing
our waypoint (20 west of MKE) and computer descent is to use
heading select and put the track line over MKE. If we plug in
direct MKE in the CDU we lose our descent path_ 2082
I believe that the 757 automation in the terminal area/approach
phase is somewhat unrealistic, due to the extensive vectoring and
runway or specific approach changes required by the density of
today's traffic. Some pilots seem to be reluctant to fly without
a magenta line <executed programmed course> even though
establishing one requires heads-down programming below I0,000
feet. This reluctance seems more prevalent in pilots new to the
aircraft. All in all, the interface is satisfactory. My biggest
concern is a runway or approach change close to the airport which
requires one pilot to get "out of the loop" as he reprograms the
computer. 2088
I think it's a great system. As my familiarity and competency
with the system increases, I appreciate more and more the
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automation and its usefulness with the ATC system. 2089
The 757 automation is nice. It is the ATC system that needs to
catch up with technology. Much of the advantage of our
automation is lost because ATC is 20 years behind. The 747-400
will have an even greater problem with an inflexible
international airspace system. 2095
I don't feel there is much of an interface. We still must come
out of LNAV for vectors for traffic frequently, and there are
frequent altitude restrictions or changes in altitude for
traffic. We let our VNAV figure out a good top of descent point
for us, and then after our descent is begun, we receive crossing
restrictions, speed changes, vectors, etc. that completely alter
the path that our FMC had calculated. Until such time that the
ATC computer and the FMC are connected through a data link system
and we humans just monitor at both ends, there is no true
interface. I don't particularly look forward to that day, but I
guess it's got to come. i001
The only thing that gets me is the high frequency of ATC changes
in the approach plan. A place like ATL is extremely vulnerable.
Last year I flew one trip where we scheduled to land on no less
than four different runways before we got on the ground. Each
change entails researching the new approach, feeding data into
the avionics and correcting flight path when we should be looking
out the window. Four runway assignments is unusual, but two is
quite common in ATL. I prefer not to reprogram each change other
than to tune in frequency and go manually. I say that ATL is
vulnerable because I've gotten the _mpression over the years that
ATC operates the system so as to accommodate the system rather
than the traffic. ATC flexibility to pilot requests for closer
runways is almost nil, but on the other hand A/C operating i1_to
ATL must be completely flexible to ATC instructions. And to what
end? They have about four times the runway capability as a place
like LGA, but the delays at ATL are more often and longer than
LGA, not to mention the 20 mile finals ATC prefers. 1002
The automated navigation makes cross reference between map and
instrument much quicker and error free. The autopilot requires
very close scrutiny, especially on localizer capture. Autopilot
has failed to capture localizer on many occasions. The VNAV is
not very well utilized when ATC dominates the descent. This
happens when centers refuse to coordinate and arbitrary descents
are required. 1007
Unfortunately new controllers don't understand the capability of
this A/C. When given a descent for traffic, give us a point to
cross and an altitude. We'll do it! "Cruise descent" or
"Descend now" may not meet their criteria. They should tell us
what they need. Same on climb restrictions -- tell us what you
need. We get needless reroutings when VORs are out of service.
We navigate from position to position, not by radio. When they
do know, it's beautiful. I have once, working with a
knowledgeable controller, slowed down, crossed a fix at his
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assigned time, did not have to hold, saved fuel, and was less of
a problem to him! i010
Works very well outside of heavy traffic areas such as ATL, DCA,
New York, ORD, etc. Not infrequently, last minute changes in
clearances/routing make for scrambling to reprogram the computer,
particularly when "cleared for takeoff." Some areas of ATC seem
to be unaware of the capabilities of the B-757, i.e. "receiving
¥YY VOR, go direct...", not realizing that we can navigate to
that VOR immediately whether or not it's on the air° 1029
In general, yes. Rarely have I had the opportunity to fly a SID
or STAR as published (or in the FMC). Trying to program ATC
changes in routes/altitudes is a distraction. I like the green
arc on the HSl -- easy to advise ATC of ability to make a
crossing restriction. Also like ability to go-direct-too 1045
If the clearance were adhered to it would be nice. The emphasis
is on a proper T/D point for fuel conservation, however when ATC
constantly changes it, it increases workload. The problem
seems to be with vertical and not with lateral. Of course the
many changes at low altitude in the terminal area create a
problem, particularly with traffic watch. 1047
Yes. In general I see no significant problems in working within
the ATC environment, other than remaining alert at 3:30 a.m. on a
six-hour leg. 105!
(i) The 757 is way ahead of ATCVs capabilities. Last minute
runway changes -- not only do you have to change the ILS freq_
but you also need to reselect the runway on the computer. This
all usually at 1500 feet altitude, five miles from runway, with
VFR traffic. (2) I believe that if one tries not to put
everything into the computer, including his grandmother's
telephone number, the system is excellent for looking out the
window for other traffic, and still change altitudes and
airspeeds as needed. If I am told to descend to 5000, and/or
slow to 200 kts°, I can accomplish this immediately on the MCP
and push FLCH, and then be back looking out the window° Yet when
you have someone in the other seat who puts the information in
the window first, not only do you have another head-down in the
cockpit for a considerably longer time, but this doesn't consider
the additional time it takes the aircraft to react to computer
information after you have entered it. 2056
It works OK, but I don't think we need any more automation at
this time. Changes in the approach or departure take too much
time below I0,000. 1059
In a see-and-be-seen visual approach, I feel it is best to make
limited use of the automated systems unless they can be set up
ahead of time. The automated systems do not interface with ATC
very well because of the unpredictable changes during descents
and approaches. 1063
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X. OVERALL ATTITUDE TOWARDAUTOMATION
A. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we shall attempt to examine the overall attitude
of the crews toward cockpit automation and its influence on their
perceptions of their jobs.
It must be recognized that the pilot's view of automation was
inseparable from other factors, including among others:
performance of the aircraft itself, the two vs. three pilot
issue, and the environment in which they fly. It was very clear
in the face-to-face interviews with the pilots that it was not
always possible for them to deal with what were intended to be
abstract questions about automation independently of the aircraft
itself. That is, abstract questions about automation were asked,
but they were often answered in very concrete terms, with
references to various aspects of the cockpit equipment, flying
tasks, training programs, ATC environment, regulations, and
company policies, etc.
B. SPECIFIC ISSUES
The 757 Aircraft Itself
The flight crews were universal in their praise of the aircraft
per se. They felt most favorably toward the power and
performance of the 757, its ability to climb rapidly and to fly
at and above FL 390 which in turn made it easier to obtain direct
clearances, and the general layout of the cockpit. Many
favorable statements were made about the ease of operating the
basic airplane systems: part of this could be attributed to
automation of the systems, but much was due to fundamentally good
design which simplified learning and operating the systems. In
the second questionnaire the pilots were asked to specify the
aircraft in their company's fleet which they would prefer to fly.
The results, displayed in Figure X-I (next page), are quite
clear. The only generally negative comments came from a
significant number of pilots who felt strongly that it was "too
much airplane for a two-pilot crew."
Many expressed a sense of pride in being able to fly a state-of-
theuart aircraft, although nearly half of the responses to P4 on
this subject were neutral, and a considerable number were
negative. At the same time, there were almost no "agree"
responses to P22, regarding missing the "good old days" of
simpler aircraft.
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Attitudes Toward Automation in General
As the earlier sections of this report indicate, the views toward
automation were generally positive, but mixed. Again, it was
impossible to treat this as a totally abstract question about
automation as a concept° One's answer might be driven by his
views of specific equipment, and certain experiences. Those who
were positive toward automation most often spoke of its workload
reduction potential, the reliability of the systems, the ease of
navigation, the advanced displays, and the EICAS system.
Those who were generally negative toward automation based their
views on perceived increases in workload at critical times, the
difficulty of programming the CDU, and two fears: making a gross
error, and loss of manual flying skills° Many of those who
expressed negative views were probably not negative toward
automation in any abstract sense, but were expressing a
frustration over the difficulty of operation of the present
generation of systems in the present ATC environment°
Improvements in the human-machine interfaces would probably
reduce some of this feeling_ as would improvements in the
aircraft-ATC interface.
If the money and quality of trips
were the same, what would be your
first choice of aircraft to fly?
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Figure X-I° Aircraft preferences in company's fleet.
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Safety
Many of the flight crews, even those with generally positive
attitudes toward automation, were dubious as to whether
automation represented a step forward in flight safety. This
view was consistent with attitudes expressed in a previous study
of DC-9 to MD-80 transition (Wiener, 1985b). One of the
conclusions in that report stated:
In general cockpit automation was not viewed, even by its
strongest supporters, as a boon to safety. Their attitude
toward the safety aspect of automation was essentially
neutral. (p. 94).
Experience with the Aircraft
Both the open-ended questionnaire items and the interviews
revealed that many crew members expressed the belief that as
one's experience with the aircraft increased, many of the
perceived problems vanished. However, the author's hypothesis
that there would be a general shift toward more favorable views
of automation from the first phase questionnaire to the second
(over a year later) on the appropriate attitude probes was not
supported. Based on quantitative data, we cannot report any
shift in attitude from the first to the second questionnaire
(mid-1986 to mid-1987). In fact the distribution of responses in
the two phases are strikingly similar. Statistical tests were
performed on the Phase-i vs. Phase-2 responses to the 36 attitude
items. Only two of the 36 tests performed (Bowker test for
symmetry of responses) were significant (PI6 and P34). These two
contrasts did show an increasingly favorable view of automation.
See Appendix 5 for these data.
Air Traffic Control and Automation
Although there were considerable complaints about the difficulty
of operating the automatic features effectively, particularly
LNAV and VNAV, due to ATC changes, item P3 (previous chapter)
shows about 60% agreement with the probe "The B-757 automation
works great in today's ATC environment", and almost as many
neutral choices as disagreement. There is virtually no change in
responses to this item from Phase 1 to Phase 2, and thus neither
increased familiarity With the systems on the part of the pilots,
nor of the presumed increase in awareness of 757 performance on
the part of controllers, altered these views.
Loss of Skills
The fear of the loss of basic flying skills arose in nearly every
interview. Most pilots expressed a concern about this, but many
of those are quick to report the perception that they have not
yet suffered any skill degradation, meaning that they felt that
they had been able to combat this with self-imposed discipline
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29. I use autornation mainly because
it helps me get the job done.
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such as voluntarily hand flying a portion of each trip. Most who
had taken proficiency checks by the time of their interviews
stated that they had experienced no problems. P2 expresses the
concern of somewhat surprisingly, given the comments made during
the interviews,of about half of the pilots. P9 (Chapter V) shows
one of the most unanimous opinions, with about 90% of the
respondents indicating their desire to hand fly a portion of
every trip as a means of skill maintenance.
Usage of Automation
P8 and P29 were designed to look into the motivation to use
automation, and should be examined jointly. Clearly these probes
indicate that the crews turn to automation not because it is
expected of them, but because they view it as positively as a
means of getting their job done. These findings are consistent
with the Wiener-Curry guidelines No. 4 and No. 5 (Appendix i),
and the general view that automation should be used as the crew
sees fit, and not as an obligatory selection.
Future Designs
The generally positive view toward automation comes out in
certain questions that deal with views of present and future
aircraft and their equipment, for example PI, P6 and PI4. P1
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shows general agreement with the probe that flying today is more
challenging than ever, and P6 shows strong rejection of the probe
that "they've gone too far with automation." In spite of this,
only about a quarter of the crews agreed with probe in P14, "I
look forward to automation - the more the better." Perhaps the
second part of the probe was ill-conceived -- pilots may have
agreed with the first part, but rejected the notion of "the more
the better". Only a small number of respondents agreed with the
probe in PI9 that automation would be the thing that turned the
industry toward profitability.
To test the consistency of these responses, the inter-correlation
between PI, P6, and PI4 were examined for Phase 1 and Phase 2.
In both phases, the only significant correlations were between
the probes P6 and PI4 (r = -.42 in Phase i; r = -.54 in Phase 2).
The negative sign of the correlation coefficients indicate what
one might expect: those who agreed with P6 tended to disagree
with P14 and vice-versa.
Psychosocial Factors
Many who have written in the field of automation, in aviation and
elsewhere, have predicted that as systems became more automatic,
the workers in those systems would suffer a sense of detachment
and lack of self-worth. These authors foresee the day when
workers in these highly automated industries will perceive
themselves alienated from the goals of the system, playing a
minor or peripheral role, or becoming the servants of the
machines, rather than the other way around (Wiener and Curry,
1980). So far we have seen no evidence in this study, or
previous field studies that such a thing h_s taken place in
cockpit automation. While there are undeniably some crew members
who express some alienation, as seen by those agreeing with the
probe in P31, this is probably the expression of a frustration
over the difficulties of mastering the requirements of advanced
flight guidance systems, and not a deep-seated psychosocial
disturbance over automation.
As reported in the MD-80 study (Wiener, 1985b), the prevailing
psychosocial sentiment would be pride in flying the most advanced
aircraft in the company's fleet. Certainly the question is not
closed, and future studies with ever-increasingly changing roles
for the pilots will have to continue to investigate this
sensitive issue.
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TABLE X-i
Intercorrelation matrix for attitude probes in this chapter.
HIT refers to hours-in-type (B-757).
PHASE 1
HIT pl p4 p6 p8 p14 p19 p22 p29 p31 p33
HIT
pl
p4
p6
p8
p14
p19
p22
p29
p31
p33
1.00 .03 -.18 -.01 -.01 -.04 -.15
1.00 .02 .ii .02 .12 -.03
.05 -.03 .09 -.20
.03 .02 .I0 -o01
1.00 -.08 -.I0 .17 .07 -.14 °04 -.07 .30
1.00 .42 -.42 -.i0 -.42 -.03 .47 -.14
1.00 -.32 -.02 .28 -.05 .40 -.i0
1.00 .27 -.26 .03 -.23 .i0
1.00 -.02 -.ii .04 .28
1.00 -.02 .43 -.35
1.00 .05 .05
1.00 -.18
1.00
For n=166, Irl > .15 necessary for significance
at the 0.05 level
PHASE 2
HIT pl p4 p6 p8 p14 p19 p22 p29 p31 p33
HIT
pl
p4
p6
p8
p14
p19
p22
p29
p31
p33
1.00 .16 -e 20
1.00 oi0
1.00
.09 .04 -.09 -.15 -.07 -.09 .06 -.30
.08 -.07 .i0 -.17 .02 -.03 .17 .15
.03 -.01 .22 .37 -.09 -.02 -.04 .46
1.00 -.44 -.54 -.18 .41 .08 .35 -.19
1.00 -.34 -.14 .27 -.09 .25 .01
1.00 .29 -.36 .04 -.31 .31
1.00 -.15 .12 -.18 .30
1.00 -.02 .38 -.17
1.00 -.01 .05
1.00 -.06
1.00
For n=133, Irl > .17 necessary for significance
at the 0.05 level
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XI° DISCUSSIONAND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the human factors of
the training for and operation of advanced technologytransport
aircraft. Although the Boeing 757 was used as the "laboratory"
in this research, this report should not be regarded as a design
review or critique of that particular aircraft. The B-757 for
our purposes was merely an exemplar of the modern, "glass
cockpit" technology. The author has no doubt that similar
conclusions would have been reached had the study been performed
with some other model employing the same technology and a two--
pilot crew (e.g. A-310 or MD-88).
The conclusions in this study are largely based on pilot opinion,
as well as the observations of the author. These are not
experimental results based on comparing old and new technology
aircraft either in line operations or simulation. Such studies
have not been conducted as yet, and indeed much of what has been
written about human factors in cockpit automation has been
based on opinion surveys of one kind or another. The author is
not aware of any comprehensive, experimental comparison of
traditional versus modern technology aircraft that would meet the
standards of "scientific proof." Hopefully such studies will be
forthcoming, perhaps from LOFT exercises where such comparisons
can be safely performed.
Nonetheless this study contains a vast amount of data based on
the experience of 201 line pilots who have transitioned to the
757, and some who have since left for other aircraft, and can
make a "post-glass-cockpit" comparison. In the preparation of
this report emphasis has been placed on direct quotations from
the participating crews, as they reflect opinions and incidents
based on extensive line experience in the cre%;s' own words.
A. GENERALFINDINGS
In general, the pilots in this study exhibited a high degree of
enthusiasm for the aircraft, their training, and the
opportunity to fly a state-of-the-art transport aircraft. Some
of the enthusiasm for the aircraft was not based on its modern
avionics and automated flight guidance, but on other features
such as performance, engine power, simplicity of systems, overall
reliability, cockpit comfort, and flight characteristics.
It is more difficult to summarize the pilots' attitudes toward
automation in general. For purposes of this discussion, the term
"automation" refers primarily to flight path guidance, including
power plant control, and warning and alerting systems.
Automation of what pilots call "basic systems" (e.g.
environmental control, yaw dampers, fuel systems, etc.) were not
in dispute, and were highly regarded by the crews. Indeed, the
difficulty of summarizing attitudes toward flight-deck automation
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can easily be appreciated by observing the results of the 36
attitude probes, most of which revealed "mixed feelings" and
often almost symmetrical distributions of agreement or
disagreement with the probe (e.g. No. 18, Chapter VIII).
Restricting the term "automation" as noted above, it became clear
that many pilots, while reporting that they enjoyed flying a
modern plane, also indicated strong reservations in two critical
areas: I) safety, and 2) workload reduction. The particular
concerns over safety and workload overlap to a degree, and were
strikingly similar to those voiced by crews who had recently
transitioned from traditional DC-9s to the MD-80 (DC-9-80) in a
previous field study by the author (Wieners 1985b).
As for safety, many of the crews expressed the view that
automation may have gone too far, that they felt they were often
W'out of the loop", probably meaning that they tended to lose
situational awareness, and that they feared that automation led
to complacency, a term used repeatedly in interviews and
questionnaires in this study.
With respect to workload, there was strong disagreement, but at
least half of the respondents reported concern that automation
actually increased workloads that workload was increased during
phases of flight already characterized by high workload, and
decreased during periods of low workload. Even more serious,
many, perhaps most, of the crews reported that in times of heavy
workload, they tended to _'click J.t off, _' that is, revert to
manual modes of flight guidance because they did not have time to
do the programming necessary to exploit the automation. One is
reminded of the recommendation of Curry (1985) that crews be
given what he called "turn-.it-off training°" Curry had noted
that crews were generally trained to make full use of automation,
but were not trained to make partial use, or to revert to more
manual modes when they felt the need.
Certainly it is something of a paradox that J.n times of high
workload, the crews felt that they needed to abandon, in favor of
more manual modes, the very devices that had been placed in the
cockpit in the hopes of reducing workload. Much of this
difficulty can be attributed not to the basic premises of cockpit
automation, but to the difficult human-interfaces, as the
chapters on equipment_ and particularly the subsection on the CDU
reveal° The author's view J s that the present generation of
cockpit automation is going through an evolutionary phase that
must for the time be tolerated, and that the designs of future
generations will be more "user friendly _, or as NASA scientists
have described it, more "human centered°"
Some of the responsibJ.lity can also be attributed to the fact
that the ATC system has not kept pace with the capabilities of
the advanced technology aircraft. This results in excessive
workload due to frequent changes in clearances in busy terminal
areas, and departures from preprogrammed flight profiles,
depriving the crews of the opportunity to exploit some of the
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most effective tools in the modern systems, mainly LNAV and VNAV.
The portion of the problem that can be attributed to ATC will not
improve until the modernization of the present ATC system goes on
line, probably around the end of this century.
B. SPECIFIC AREAS
E_pment
In spite of the conclusions regarding the problems of the
difficult interface, the crews reported satisfaction with the
general layout of the cockpit, and few problems in the area of
traditional human factors. The EICAS was well regarded, and
generally seen as a workload reducing device, and a step forward
in warning and alerting systems.
One of the carriers (Airline-2) was equipped with ACARS,
Airline-i was not. Airline-2 pilots were generally well disposed
toward ACARS, but felt that its full potential was not being
exploited, mainly the capability to interface the ACARSdirectly
to the FMC so that flight plans displayed by ACARSwould not then
have to be typed into the CDU. The capability to transmit a
clearance via ACARS from the company's computer directly into the
FMC exists today and is implemented by some carriers. While this
capability seems quite handy, and undoubtedly reduces workload at
the gate, it does raise some difficult questions about potential
hazards of computer-to-computer communication without human
intervention (Wiener, 1988).
Many pilots expressed the desire for additional features, and
many had learned ways to "trick the computer" to obtain desired
results when no direct method was available. For example_ crews
who wished to start a VNAV descent earlier than their computed
top of descent (TOD) point discovered at least two ways to cause
the FMC to recompute the TOD. One was to enter a point for use
of thermal anti-ice (TAI) on the DES page, even though there was
no intention of using it. The other method was more precise,
simply entering a fictitious tailwind. These methods of course
would achieve the desired result, but would tend to defeat the
purpose of VNAV in computing fuel-efficient descent profiles.
Although pilots can be commended for their ingenuity, it would
seem that if it is desirable for crews to be able to intervene in
the selection of a TOD, they might be given a more direct way of
achieving this. It does not speak well for automation that
pilots of a modern airliner must deliberately enter incorrect
data into a sophisticated computer to achieve a desired
objective. (See Wiener-Curry guideline No. 2, Appendix i.)
A major source of annoyance to the crews was the unavailability
of information on the maintenance pages of the CDU. Many were
quite vociferous in denouncing the policy that locked them out
of the pages in flight, feeling that there was valuable systems
information that could be used for decisions, particularly ozl
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over-water flights° The recommendation by the manufacturer and
the decision to make this information inaccessible was probably
sound, but designers and operators should keep in mind that it is
unacceptable to a pilot to be told, in effect, "there's
information down there_ but you can't have it."
Training
Training for the 757 at both airlines in this study was generally
considered to be well planned and well conducted. A large number
of pilots reported on their questionnaires that 757 school was
the best training program they had ever been through° The two
carriers employed somewhat different approaches to staffing and
conducting their programs. At one carrier, all instruction was
performed by professional ground school instructorsg mostly
retired military personnel. They employed no "stand-up"
instruction, but only a tutorial relationship between the
instructor and two crews (one captain, one first officer each).
At the other carrier, ground school included some stand-up
instruction conducted by line-qualified first officers° At both
carriers, direct instruction was supplemented by self-study
employing auto-tutorials on computers and slide-tape devices.
It would be difficult to say which system of delivering
instruction worked better° The professional ground school
instructors were highly proficient and skilled at their work.
Ground school instruction was their job and their only job; it
was not a temporary assignment° On the other hand, there is
always something to be said for the validity of instruction by
line-qualified personnel, who make up in "credibility" what they
may lack in instructional experience° Line-qualified instructors
are immune from the familiar complaints of "that's fine for
ground school, but that's not the way it is out on the lineo" In
fact the young first officers who gave stand-up instruction were
quite impressive in their knowledge, enthusiasm, and style of
delivery.
The most commonly heardcriticism of ground school was that their
was an over-emphasis on "magic" (automation) to the exclusion of
basic airplane knowledge and skills. The conduct of the first
day of instruction both in ground school and simulator was
particularly criticized on these grounds. In the ground school
it was felt that the first day should have been devoted to
"basic airplane" introduction in the classroom, and likewise
basic handling characteristics in the first day CSS instruction°
Obviously pilots feel the need to understand the basic
characteristics of a new airplane before becoming immersed in the
details of its advanced equipment. As many reported, 'git's still
just an airplane°" Some improvement in this situation has
already occurred in the 757 training at host airlines, where more
emphasis on the "basic airplane" has been added to the first day
of ground school.
Over-emphasis on automation on the first day of ground school
appears to be a valid criticism, and other training departments,
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faced with introducing crews to the advanced technology for the
first time, might consider revising their syllabi to respond to
this need. If nothing else, such a revision might give the crews
more self-confidence before moving into the unfamiliar land of
the details of programming the FMC. It might also be helpful in
overcoming the computer resistance seen in some of the older
captains.
The auto-tutorial devices employed in training for advanced
technology aircraft have not kept pace with the technology. The
slide-tape presentations are clumsy to operate, are difficult and
costly to update and correct. Except for occasional questions
interspersed in the instructional stream, they lacked the ability
to demand responses from the student. Students often fall asleep
at the instructional station. The computer-based devices with
graphics displays and touch-screen response mechanisms offer more
"hands-on" experience, but the present devices fall short of
state-of-the-art computer graphics technology. Display
generation is slow, and the touch screens are inadequate in that
they often either ignore the manual input, or mislocate it. The
older systems still in use are monochromatic, though color
displays are now available.
Clearly computer color graphic devices requiring manual responses
from the student will be the direction the industry must move.
These devices will be expensive for the carriers, both in capital
acquisition costs and in courseware development. But in the end
they should more than pay for themselves, both in quality of
training and in relief from under-utilization of the capabilities
of expensive hardware such as the CSS.
One cannot view 757 training without beinq struck with the need
for a computer-based, part-task simulation device for CDU
operations. The CSS_ which was developed and purchased to
relieve the even more expensive simulators from being used for
teaching routine cockpit operations such as scan patterns,
checklist usage, and "knobology" are now themselves being
misused. Much of the CSS time, particularly in the first week of
ground school, is devoted to CDU programming while the rest of
the CSS capabilities stand idle. Clearly an off-line CDU device
would bring relief to this situation. CSSs now carry multi-
million dollar price tags. The CSS is now where simulators were
a decade ago, inefficiently utilized for training for routine
operations that might easily be moved to far less expensive and
virtually equally effective off-line devices.
The perceived problem of loss of manual flying proficiency
inevitably arises in connection with automation, as it is one
that concerns management, government, and individual pilots
alike. There are two issues here: i) manual reversion in the
event of loss of automatic flight guidance features or enhanced
displays on an advanced technology aircraft; and 2) transition of
crew members from advanced to traditional aircraft ("backwards
transition").
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This question (sometimes over-dramatically referred to as
"automation atrophy") has not been attacked experimentally, as it
should be. Data from this study and other field studies can shed
some light, but are no substitute for a properly designed and
conducted experimental study. The data reported here concur with
that of the author's previous field study on the MD-80 (Wiener,
1988b), in finding little evidence that crews of advanced
technology aircraft have suffered significant skill loss. Crews
report little trouble in the event of loss of automatic features,
and little problem on the manually flown portion of their
proficiency checks. Many have resorted to their own self-imposed
regimens of hand-flying to cruise altituder manually flying
departures and approaches, making flight director only and
occasionally raw data approaches, etc. The pilots tend to design
these programs for themselves, and then stick to them so
conscientiously that in his previous study the author referred to
them as "personal FARs°" In fact_ some first officers have
complained that some captains would not allow them hand-fly as
much as they wanted too
One captain who was interviewed made an interesting comment about
proficiency checks. He said that throughout his career the FAA
examiners had "turned things off°" Now they insist that
everything be turned ono The interviewee expressed the opinion
that (even on proficiency checks) a pilot should be allowed the
use or not use features and modes as he sees fit, a view
consistent with the Wiener-Curry guidelines (Appendix 1).
A number of the crews stated the opinion that the greatest
problem they anticipated, or had already experienced for those
who had made the _'backwards transition 'w, was the loss of the HSI
map display. Many, while feeling that the map mode was one of
the most valuable features of the advanced technology aircraft,
were apprehensive that not so much their manual skills as 'their
cognitive skills had suffered due to the ease of navigation and
maintenance of situational awareness using the electronic map.
Skill loss is a complex issue, and unfortunately this report does
not offer a lot of guidance° The indications from this and other
field studies is that the problem may be less severe than
previously thought. However r we must emphasize that: I) the
proper experimental study not yet been done; and 2) due largely
to rapid movement of crews up the seniority ladder in expanding
airlines, to date there have not been pilots who have spent large
amounts of time in the "glass cockpit" aircraft, so the problemg
if there is one, may lurk out of sight for some time before
surfacing in the operational world_
It is clear that airline training departments worldwide face the
greatest peace-time pilot training challenge in history. The
changing pilot market may exert some pressures on training
departments heretofore unfelt. With the shrinking of the
traditional pilot hiring pools, and the rapid expansion of the
Part 121 and Part 135 airlines, the carriers have been forced to
relax standards for new hires, and in some cases recruit very
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low-time pilots trained ab initio for airline seats. While
making no judgment on the proficiency of these less experienced
pilots, let us combine this fact with the expectation that in the
near future, at many carriers, highly advanced aircraft may be
the junior assignments in the seniority ladder. For example, two
U.S. carriers have recently ordered large fleets of A-320s, and
in the years ahead these may be the junior aircraft in their
fleet. Thus airlines can anticipate that in the decade of the
1990's very inexperienced pilots may be occupying the right seats
of very sophisticated aircraft. This poses an unprecedented
challenge to the training departments of the industry, and
perhaps the suppliers of training devices and software, and to
the human factors profession as well.
Cockpit Errors
The question of automation-induced errors has concerned the
industry for some time. Even before the introduction of the
glass cockpit the problem was recognized in the so-called second
generation aircraft (essentially those with mode control panels
which allowed selection of fairly sophisticated autopilot/flight
director and autothrottle modes, including nav modes in
conjunction with area navigation systems). The problem was that
the more sophisticated systems, while reducing or eliminating
small errors, appear to invite gross errors, that could have
serious consequences (Wiener and Curry_ 1980; Wiener, 1988).
However, balancing this is the great degree to which automation
may prevent errors either through not accepting erroneous input
in the first place (e.go appearance of the "fuel insufficient '_
message on the CDU) or making the errors mo_?e apparent if they
are entered (e.g. plan mode on the HSI map display).
Unfortunately the use of machine intelligence to check erroneous
human behavior is in its infancy; at least the current generation
glass cockpit aircraft have made a beginning. But it is still
very easy for crews to make programming or mode selection errors
which could have serious results, as the errors described in
Chapter VI indicate.
We are not able at this time to assert whether high or low
automation aircraft generate more crew errors. Recently the
Aviation Safety Reporting System of NASA has been conducting
studies of reports from crews of advanced technology aircraft
(Orlady, 1989a,b), but their database does not permit a direct
comparison of error rates of aircraft of differing equipment
sophistication. In one area of great concern, altitude
deviations ("busts"), which is the most frequent topic of ASRS
reports, there is the appearance of an inordinately large number
of reports from the advanced aircraft, including many which were
being operated manually at the time of the deviation. These
deviations, which often result from failure of the aircraft to
perform automatic level-off at the correct altitude, are usually
traceable to human error and almost never to equipment failure.
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On one hand the ability to program automatic level-off maneuvers
should prevent the altitude deviation typical of low technology
aircrafts simply forgetting, usually due to distraction, to
perform the maneuver. But likewise, the devices invite new
errors of their own making such as failing to modify altitudes
with ATC changes, or "killing the capture w' once the level-off
maneuver has begun. But pending further research, we cannot
state whether the high or low sophistication cockpits produce
greater liability to altitude deviations and other errors.
The warning and alerting systems of the 757 deserve high praise
in the view of most pilots. The introduction of the EICAS halted
and reversed the continual upward spiral of the number of
warnings and alerts in the cockpit (Wiener and Curry_ 1980).
Future models will probably see improved formats_ increased use
of computer graphics, prioritizing of alerts, and
increased use of diagnostic aids on the EICAS display. Already
the A-320 offers color graphic systems schematics on their
version (ECAM), as does the B-747-400 on its EICASo
It would appear to be a simple matter to exploit the
computational capability of the FMC even furtherr adding some
features to the flight guidance systems to aid the crews in
avoiding errors. For example, a check of altitude against
altimeter setting could result in a message to reset altimeters
approaching FL ]80 appearing (on various displays) as a backup to
human memory. Similarly, a check of airspeed against altitude
(above/below i0,000 feet) could warn the crew if they were
exceeding the 250 knot speed limits_ or electronically prevent it
through autothrottle control. In maneuvering offshore, "the
warning could be canceled, or ignored. Whether automation should
be used to warn crews of a condition, or intervene to prevent it,
is a basic philosophical design question.
As the field of artificial intelligence develops, we can look
forward to ever more sophisticated warning and alerting systems,
and error-prevention systems. However, each of these contains
its inherent drawback, the possibility of false or erroneous
alarms° It is inescapable that any device capable of sensing an
alert condition with a given probability carries the risk of some
non-zero probability of a false alarm. The two are inextricably
bound. For a system of fixed detectability, as the designer
increases the probability of a valid detection of an alert
condition (makes the system more '_sensitive"), the probability of
a false alarm must inevitably increase. The designer strives to
increase the detectability of the system_ by improving sensors,
filters, alarm logic, etc., but once these are set, he must
decide where to balance the probability of valid and false
alarms_ The only relief is to provide the pilot with means of
corroborating the alert (see Wiener-Curry guidelines, Appendix
i) o
Systems designers and artificial intelligence researchers are
currently speaking of '_error-tolerant" systems, meaning that
human errors which are not prevented in their inception are
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prevented from affecting the system. Thus machine intelligence
recognizes the input as erroneous, and "traps" the error,
preventing it from affecting the system, and calling it to the
attention of the crew. The "insufficient fuel" message on the
CDU, mentioned previously, is an rudimentary example. This and
other philosophies of how one might employ machine intelligence
to prevent or trap errors is covered briefly in Wiener, 1988o
Crew Coordination
Chapter VII pointed to certain issues and problems in crew
coordination that might be seen as characteristic of working in
the two-pilot, advanced technology aircraft. Unfortunately we
have little guidance in this area, as NASA research in cockpit
resource management (CRM) has not yet considered the effect of
the nature of the cockpit equipment, and CRM training now offered
by many U.S. carriers has also not confronted the issue. In
short, research and training in CRM to date has viewed crew
coordination and CRM training as if they were model independent,
except for the consideration of two- versus three-pilot crews.
The data in Chapter VII, as well as interviews and jumpseat
observations during this project have convinced the author that
this may not be the case. Crew coordination for a fixed size
crew may not be independent of the model, and automation probably
exerts an influence on the way the task is managed by the two
pilots. We are assuming in this discussion that all advanced
technology aircraft are served by two pilots; there are a few
exceptions, where labor contracts have led to three-pilot crews
in the new generation aircraft, but not in the U.S. The matter
is still in contention by at least one European carrier that has
ordered the A-320. Because the advanced technology aircraft are
crewed by two pilots, and no doubt all transport aircraft will be
in the future, the subject of crew coordination is of tantamount
importance.
Based on the information in this study, we can summarize the
areas of concern in cockpit resource management of high
technology aircraft:
i. Compared to traditional models, it is physically difficult
for one pilot to see what the other is doing. In the first
generation jet aircraft the setting of the autopilot and
other modes could be easily observed by both pilots;
likewise in the second generation where most of the
selections were made on a mode control panel (e.g. DC-10).
But on the glass cockpit models, the important selections
are made in the CDU (as well as the MCP), and this is not
visible to the other crew member unless he selects the
proper CDU page. Though some carriers have a procedure that
the captain must approve any changes entered into the CDU
before they are executed, this is seldom done; often he is
working on his CDU on another page at the same time.
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o.
It is more difficult for the captain to monitor the work of
the first officer, and to understand what he is doing, and
vice-versa_
Automation tends to induce a breakdown of the traditional
(and stated) role of the pilot flying (PF) versus pilot not
flying (PNF), and a less clear demarcation of _who does
what" than in traditional cockpits° In aircraft in the
past, the standardization of the allocation of duties and
functions has been one of the foundations of cockpit safety.
The modern cockpit seems to produce a redistribution
authority from the captain to the first officer° The first
officers now are able to make decisions (eog. when to slow
the aircraft on descent into a terminal area) that
previously were the prerogative of the captain. Largely
this is unintended, and is a result of the fact that first
officers are often more proficient than their captains in
data entry into the CDU, so the captain, particularly in
times of high workload, may surrender some authority to the
first officer just to get the job done. Often the captain
recognizes the superior CDU skills of his first officerss
and utilizes them to his advantage°
There is a tendency of the crew to _'help" each other with
programming duties when workload increases. This may or may
not be a good thing - it is difficult to say - but it
clearly tends to dissolve the clear demarcation of duties
when one pilot says "here, I_ll do that for you" and rushes
to the CDU or MCP. Computer-based systems seem to invite
such behavior. The same pilot who gladly jumps in and takes
duties away from the other pilot in a high technology plane
would probably not be tempted to do the same in a
traditional aircraft, for example controlling cabin
pressurization.
In summary, the highly automated cockpit may require special
scrutiny for crew coordination and cockpit resource management,
both in the assignment of tasks, and standardization of their
performance. This may prove to be particularly important in the
likelihood that pilots with the least experience may soon be
assigned to the most sophisticated cockpits, as previously
discussed.
Workload
Workload reduction has already been discussed in this chapter
under "Equipment." It is a difficult area, characterized by
strong pilot opinion and little objective data. The question of
how to define, let alone measure, workload baffles the human
factors profession. This is particularly true of the "mental" or
("cognitive'V) component of workload°
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What has emerged from this study is that one cannot make a clear
case for automation bringing an overall reduction in workload,
especially during those times when the reduction is most needed°
As noted previously, the paradox is that when circumstances of
the flight add up to an very high workload, pilots often find the
automatic features so difficult to manage that they abandon them
in favor of more manual modes° Here we must be careful to make
clear what is being abandoned. As stated previously, when a
pilot speaks of "clicking it off" he is referring to flight
guidance systems, possibly including speed control. Certain
important automatic features which do contribute to workload
reduction remain in use, e.g. basic systems, EICAS, and other
warning and alerting systems.
Be this as it may, there is no escaping the conclusion that the
same automatic features (e.g. LNAV and VNAV) that were placed in
the aircraft in the hopes of reducing workload, particularly at
low altitude in terminal areas, are perceived by the pilot as
workload inducing. This is due largely to: l) human-computer
interfaces that are difficult to operate; and 2) an inflexible
ATC system which does not allow the crews to exploit the advanced
features of the aircraft due to frequent changes in flight plan,
off-course vectors, unpublished crossing restrictions, speed
reductions, etc. When these occur, the crews typically attempt
to enter them in the CDU, and then if the clearances continue to
change, give up and "fly it like a 727," as it is often stated.
Some relief could come from software changes. For example, many
pilots have complained of the difficulty of loading a route
involving the intersection of two "J" airways where the
intersection has no name established in the database. In this
case the pilot must construct a "man-made" waypoint, either by
taking place-bearing-distance off of one of the VORs (if the
distance from one of the VORs is shown), or place-bearing off of
two of the VORs, a cumbersome procedure at best. Flying an
assigned heading to intercept a radial outbound from a VOR is
another difficult procedure, which could probably profit from
redesign of the software. [i]
Certain other factors influence the cockpit workload. These are
not necessarily a consequence of automation, but they do impact
two-pilot crews, and hence loom large in the mind of pilots on
the advanced aircraft. These include company calls (often\_
required at very unwelcome times in the flight, such as passing
through i0,000 feet), PA announcements, dealing with cabin
problems, and cabin-generated radio calls such as requests for
wheelchairs, galley supplies, and other passenger services.
[i] Engineers from Honeywell have recently informed the author
that their advanced systems now have the capability of
joining two jet airways on the Route page. One carrier not
associated with this study has created its own intersection
names, which a pilot must look up in a manual and enter into
the CDU as a waypoint (e.g. J4/J86 is EWM ii).
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It is not the author's intention to open up the two- versus
three- pilot crew controversy, but only to note that many pilots
have reported that some of what they perceive as non-essential
duties which were manageable on the three-pilot crews have become
burdensome and even possibly hazardous in two-pilot operations.
Many have recommended particular solutions, such as no company
calls during climb until above FL 180; no departure of a pilot
from the cockpit for non-critical cabin items; and possibly
providing a VHF communications or ACARSunit in the cabin for the
flight attendants to use for passenger-related communications
with the company.
Many pilots suggested that their company has not yet adjusted
their thinking to a two-pilot crew, and still demand procedures
that may have been appropriate when there was flight engineer
backup. If this is true_ there will be a severe test of it ahead
in the two-pilot, long-range models, such as the MD-11 and the
B-747-400o
We should also note that much of the printed information
available to the pilot has not kept pace with the modern cockpit.
Designers of such aids as manuals, takeoff charts, minimum
equipment lists, and even navigation charts have not recognized
the need to revise and simplify printed materials that were once
appropriate for three-pilot crews, where flight engineers could
do the bulk of the "book worko _'
Another problem leading to confusion and hence increased workload
is that fact that the computer-produced flight plan provided to
the crew may contain waypoints whose names are inconsistent with
those in the FMC. This is particularly true of waypoints located
at non--directional beacons (NDBs) o An example is Carolina Beach.
The computer-produced flight plan (KMIA to northeast airports)
reads "...AR3 CLB..o" and the crew quite naturally attempts to
load "CLB" into the FMC, only to receive "not in database" error
messages. The FMC stores this waypoint as "CLBNB", which is on
neither the flight plan nor the chart.
The author has several times seen crews puzzling over their
inability to load such a waypoint before discovering from their
charts that the waypoint is an NDB, and recalling that the "NB"
must be added. It would seem a small matter to program the
computers that furnish the flight plans to be consistent with the
FMC designators, and it would also probably aid crews of
conventional aircraft. Such inconsistencies generate increased
workload and frustration, often leading to abandonment of the
automation, and what is worse, they harbor the potential for
serious error.
We conclude that the present generation of advanced technology
aircraft has failed to realize its potential for workload
reduction for both internal reasons, and reasons external to the
hardware and software design. Hardware changes are unlikely in
the present models, but software changes could be considered
where a potential for workload reduction exists. Efforts must
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continue toward workload reduction and more effective utilization
of the resources of two-pilot crews. It seems imperative, given
the forecasts for increasing traffic in the decades ahead, that
current automation philosophy be reevaluated and that every means
of reducing workload in the high demand environments be pursued.
Air Traffic Control
The impact of ATC on advanced technology aircraft has already
been mentioned several times in this chapter, and it is
unnecessary to belabor it further. We are hopeful that the
changes that will take place in the coming decade with the
implementation of the advanced ATC systems under the National
Airspace Plan (NASP) will relieve some of the problems, and allow
fuller exploitation of the remarkable flight guidance
capabilities of the highly automated aircraft.
It is regrettable that from the beginning, aircraft and ground-
based ATC systems were designed, developed, and manufactured
almost as if they were unrelated and independent enterprises.
Even the current developments in ATC and in flight guidance
systems reflect this proclivity. The proper utilization of
aircraft and airspace will only be achieved when aircraft
designers and those who design and operate ground-based ATC work
in closer harmony. It seems strange that in 1989 it is still
necessary to say that.
C. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In summary, this field study has shown that the modern, advanced
technology transport aircraft is being effectively and safely
operated by two-pilot crews, but that numerous human factors
problems, as well as some problems external to the cockpit,
prevent the safest and most effective utilization of the
aircraft. We find the concepts of the present generation of
automation essentially sound, but lacking in proper user
interface design, resulting in less that optimal working
conditions and under-utilization of the equipment.
We offer the following recommendations:
i. Research should continue on human-automation interfaces.
. Research into making the ATC system more receptive to the
capabilities of advanced aircraft should be conducted on a
priority basis before the new generation ATC systems are
placed on line.
. Training departments of airlines should reexamine their
training programs, syllabi, training equipment, and support
materials to be certain that they have been responsive to
necessary changes in training brought by the new aircraft.
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Operators of modern, two-pilot aircraft should reexamine
their procedures, checklists, flight plans, weather
information, fuel slips, manuals, and company demands on the
flight crew for opportunities to reduce workload and
operational errors by providing optimal support material,
and eliminating unnecessary procedures.
Research should be launched into cockpit resource management
as it may differ in advanced versus traditional cockpits.
FAA should reexamine its certification procedures with the
goal of carefully evaluating the human factors aspects of
new models. Human factors other than merely estimates of
workload should be considered, making use of error-
predictive techniques.
Government agencies should encourage research into error-
tolerant systems and other methods of exploiting machine
intelligence to prevent, trap, or make more apparent errors
made by the crew.
Standardize terminology and designations of navaids across
the CDU, charts, and ground computer-produced flight plans.
In general, future cockpits should be designed to provide
automation that is human centered rather than technology
driven.
D. EPILOGUE
Aviation safety is a living, growing, constantly changing
enterprise. Times change, new equipment appears, and a steady
improvement in machines, materials, training, maintenance,
information, procedures, and supervision is constantly being
sought. Many of the problems pointed out in this report have
already been considered and remedied.
Certain portions of this report, mainly Chapter VI, involve
self-criticism. It is a testimonial to the dedication of the two
host airlines and the professionalism of the volunteer pilots
that they would share their experiences and opinions with the
author, and hence the aviation community. The willingness to
recognizer report, and examine conditions that require remedy is
the foundation of flight safety.
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APPENDIX 1
Automation Guidelines from Wiener and Curry (1980)
Control Tasks
I. System operation should be easily interpretable or
understandable by the operator, to facilitate the detection of
improper operation and to facilitate the diagnosis of
malfunctions.
2. Design the automatic system to perform the task the way the
user wants it done (consistent with other constraints such as
safety); this may require user control of certain parameters,
such as system gains (see Principle No. 5). Many users of
automated systems find that the systems do not perform the
function in the manner desired by the operator. For example,
autopilots, especially older designs, have too much "wing waggle"
for passenger comfort when tracking ground based navigation
stations. Thus, many airline pilots do not use this feature,
even when traveling coast-to-coast on non-stop flights.
3. Design the automation to prevent peak levels of task demand
from becoming excessive (this may vary from operator to
operator). System monitoring is not only a legitimate, but a
necessary activity of the human operator; however, it generally
takes second priority to other, event-driven tasks. Keeping task
demand at reasonable levels will ensure available time for
monitoring.
4. For most complex systems, it is very difficult for the
computer to sense when the task demands on the operator are too
high. Thus the operato r must be trained and motivated to use
automation as an additional resource (i.e. as a helper).
5. Desires and needs for automation will[ vary with operators,
and with time for any one operator. Allow for different operator
"styles" (choice of automation) when feasib]e.
6. Ensure that overall system performance will be imsensitive
to different options, or styles of operation. For example, the
pilot may choose to have the autopilot either fly pilot-selected
headings or track ground-based navigation stations.
7o Provide a means for checking the set-up and information input
to automatic systems. Many automatic system failures have been
and will continue to be due to set-up error, rather than hardware
failures. The automatic system itself can check some of the set-
up, but independent error-checking equipment/procedures should
be provided when appropriate.
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8o Extensive training is required for operators working with
automated equipment, not only to ensure proper operation and set-
up, but to impart a knowledge of correct operation (for anomaly
detection) and malfunction procedures (for diagnosis and
treatment).
Monitorinq Tasks
9. Operators should be t_ained, motivated, and evaluated to
monitor effectively.
i0. If automation reduces task demands to low levels, provide
meaningful duties to maintain operator involvement and resistance
to distraction. Many others have recommended adding tasks, but
it is extremely important that any additional duties be
meaningful (not "make-work") and directed toward the primary task
itself.
ii. Keep false alarm rates within acceptable limits (recognize
the behavioral impact of excessive false alarms).
12. Alarms with more than one mode, or more than one condition
that can trigger the alarm for a mode, must clearly indicate
which condition is responsible for the alarm display.
13_ When response time is not critical, most operators will
attempt to check the validity of the alarm. Provide information
in a proper format for that this validity check can be made
quickly and accurately and not become a source of distraction.
Also provide the operator with information and controls to
diagnose the automatic system and warning system operation. Some
of these should be easy, quick checks of sensors and indicators
(such as the familiar "press to test" for light bulbs); larger
systems may require logic tests.
14. The format of the alarm should indicate the degree of
emergency. Multiple levels of urgency of the same condition may
be beneficial.
15. Devise training techniques and possible training hardware
(including part-- and whole-task simulators) to ensure that
flight-crews are exposed to all £orms of alerts and to many of the
possible conditions of alerts, and that they understand how to
deal with them.
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APPENDIX 2
QUESTIONNAIRENO. 1 (1986)
ID Code:
I. AIRCRAFT EXPERIENCE
We would like to know your past experience in your company's
present aircraft. Please place an "X" in the box for each seat
on each aircraft that you have ever occupied.
SEAT
Captain F/O S/O
-, , ,.......... ,
DC-9 * * * *
-, , , .......... ,
B-727 e * * *
............ , , ,.......... ,
A-300 * * * *
• W W .......... *
L-1011 * * * *
DC-10 _ * * *
• * * .......... W
B-747 * * * *
Which seat in which aircraft did you occupy immediately
before going to 757 school?
Aircraft Seat
Do you think this made a difference in your ease of
transition?
(Yes/No)
If "yes", please explain:
Approximate total time in 757 hours
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(Note:
ATTITUDE-TOWARD-AUTOMATIONSCALE
this section appears on both questionnaires)
This is a 36-item attitude scale. It is called an "intensity
scale" because you can indicate not only your agreement or
disagreement with the statements, but the extent to which you
agree/disagree. Note that the statements can be positively or
negatively stated. The scale is straight-forward -- there is no
attempt to be "tricky."
Place your responses on the colored sheets°
i.
2.
o
4.
®
7.
8.
9.
i0_
iI.
12.
13o
14o
15.
16o
Flying today is more challenging than ever.
I am concerned about a possible loss of my flying skills
with too much automation.
The 757 automation works great in today's ATC environment°
It is important to me to fly the most modern plane in my
company's fleet°
Younger pilots catch on to the new systems (like the CDU)
faster than older pilots.
I think they've gone too far with automation.
I always know what mode the autopilot/flight director is ino
I use the automation mainly because my company wants me to.
I prefer to hand-fly part of every trip to keep my skills up.
Automation frees me of much of the routine, mechanical parts
of flying so I can concentrate on "managing" the flight.
In the 757 automation, there are still things that happen
that surprise me.
I can fly the plane as smoothly by hand as with the
automation.
We make fewer errors in the 757 than we did in the older
models.
I look forward to more automation - the more the better.
I feel that I am "ahead of the plane" more in the 757.
I spend more time setting up and managing the automation
(CDU, FMS) than I would hand-flying or using a plain
autopilot.
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36.
17. Autoland capability definitely enhances safety.
18. Automation does not reduce total workload, since there is
more to monitor now.
19. Automation is the thing that is going to turn this industry
around and make it profitable again.
20. Crew coordination is more difficult in the 757.
21. Flying the 757 in terminal areas such as Washington and
New York is easier than it was with the older planes.
22. I miss the "good old days" of simpler aircraft.
23. The "glass cockpit" instruments and displays are a big step
forward.
24. Training for the 757 was as adequate as any training that
I have had.
25. I am concerned about the reliability of some of the modern
equipment.
26. With the automation available today I prefer the two-pilot
cockpit to the three-pilot operation.
27. Overall, automation reduces pilot fatigue.
28. We have more time to look out for other aircraft in the
terminal areas in the 757 than other aircraft I've flown.
29. I use automation mainly because it helps me get the job done.
30. It is easier to bust an altitude in the 757 than other
planes.
31. Some times I feel more like a "button pusher" than a pilot.
32. Planning and selecting alternatives are more important in
the 757 than they were in other aircraft.
33. After flying the 757, I would never want to go back to
old types of planes.
34. There are still modes and features of the 757 FMS that
I don't understand.
35. In the 757 there is too much programming going on below
I0,000 feet and in the terminal areas.
In the 757, it is easier for the captain to supervise the
first officer than in other planes.
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(Note:
ATTITUDES-TOWARD-AUTOMATION
ANSWERFORM
second page, items 19-36, not shown in this report)
Referring to the 36 statements, place an "X" in the box that best
represents your feeling about the statement. Answer quickly --
your first impression is the best. Be sure that you respond to
all 36 statements.
1 *
2 *
ram9%
3 *
4 *
_m9%
5 *
6 *
7 *
8 *
9 *
neither
strongly agree nor
agree agree disagree
9%
9%
9%
9%
--_.
9%
9%
.-_
disagree
9%
strongly
disagree
9% *
* * 9% *
* * 9% 9%
9% 9% * *
• * 9% 9%
• * 9% 9%
-* 9% ---9% *
• * 9% 9%
• * 9% 9%
9% * * 9%
9% 9% * ......... .
9% 9% * 9%
9% * 9% 9%
._. ...... .__ .--_ 9%
--9% ............. * ............ * ............ 9%............ .--- *
i0" * * * 9% *
----* ............ * ............ 9%............ 9%............ * .... 9%
ii* * * * * *
--_* ............ * ............ * ............ * ............ * ......... *
12" * * * * *
----9%............ 9%............. * ............ * ............ 9%......... *
13" * * * * *
--_* ............. * ----9%............ * ............ 9%......... *
14" * * 9% * *
----* ---* ............ * ............ * ............ * ......... *
15" * * 9% 9%
__. ............ . .... . ..... . ............ .
169% * * * 9%
__. ............ . ............ . --9%............ .
17" * * * *
----* ............ * * ............ * ............. *
18" * * * *
_--* ............. * * ............ * ............ *
9%
9%
9%
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OPEN-ENDEDQUESTIONS
Please answer the following questions in your own words• (Note:
space for the responses was provided on the original forms; the
questions are compacted for this report for brevity.)
I• List the features or mode of the 757 automation,
instrumentation, or avionics that you like and dislike.
Explain why if you wish.
Like Dislike
.
•
•
.
Describe any problems that you had during your IOE and early
months of flying the 757. Are there still areas you have
trouble with, or don't understand?
Describe in detail a error which you made, or observed, in
operating the automatic features of the 757 that could have
led to an incident or violation. How could it have been
avoided? (equipment design? training? crew coordination?)
Please describe specifically what was done.
What would you say about crew coordination on the 757
(compared to other aircraft)?
What did you think of your training for the 757? What topics
should receive more/less emphasis? Any comments on training
aids and devices that were used, or needed?
Do you like the way the 757 automation interfaces to the ATC
environment? Please mention things you have trouble with,
and things that work well, in working with ATe.
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i,
2.
o
4.
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 2 (1987)
ID Code:
I° AIRCRAFT EXPERIENCE
(Approximate) Total 757 flying time
Are you still flying the 757?
a.
b.
If yes_ which seat? Left Right
If no, what aircraft and seat are you flying?
Aircraft Seat
If your answer to this question is no, please also fill
out the yellow form.
hours
If you have retired, please indicate approx, date
a. Are you presently an instructor? yes no
b. A check airman? yes no
Please indicate the approximate number of 757 autolands you
have made (either as PF or PNF).
No.
Approximately how many were actual Cat II or III?
Cat II Cat III
5. Approximately how many 757 non-precision approaches (as PF or
PNF) have you made?
VOR LOC ADF
6. Approximately how many approaches have you made (as PF or
PNF) that were not in the data base (had to be built)?
Number:
7. If the money and quality of trips were all the same_ what
would be your first choice of plane to fly in your company's
present fleet?
Aircraft:
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(Note: Section II, the attitude scales, was identical to that in
Questionnaire No. i, so it is not repeated in this report.)
OPEN-ENDEDQUESTIONS
i. Do you feel that you have experienced any problem with loss
of proficiency (skills loss, or "loss of scan") due to
automation? Did you have any concern about this? If so, what
can you do to prevent it?
2. If you were to leave the 757 for an older model aircraft,
what features would you miss the most? What would you be happy
to leave behind?
3. Describe in detail a critical error which you made, or saw
someone make, which you think could be attributed to automation.
How could the error have been prevented (equipment design?
training? crew coordination?) Please try to describe
specifically what happened, and what should have been done.
(This question was also on the previous form)
4. What can you say about the overall workload of the 757
compared to other aircraft you have flown? Include mental
workload, monitoring etc. What about time for outside scan?
5. Have you ever experienced an altitude deviation ("bust") in
this aircraft? Was it due to crew error, equipment failure, ATC
communication difficulty, crew coordination, or what? Please
describe in detail.
6. What changes in the method of programming of the CDU or
additional features, pages, prompts, etc. would you like to see?
Do you feel that the programming tasks could or should be
simplified? In what way?
197
SPECIAL FORMFOR THOSE WHOHAVE LEFT THE 757
i. Please list all aircraft and seats that you have flown since
leaving the 757, and indicate which seat you occupy now. If you
left the 757 and returned, please indicate.
2. What features of the 757 did you miss after you went to
another plane?
3. Did you have any trouble adjusting to the older model
aircraft? If so, please describe.
4. Based on your 757 experience, please describe your feelings
about flying highly automated aircraft versus less automated
aircraft.
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APPENDIX 3 - GLOSSARYOF TERMS
The following terms refer to the flight guidance system and other
automated systems in the Boeing 757. General abbreviations from
aviation and air navigation are not listed.
ACARS -
AFDS -
A/T -
CO-RTE - company route
CDU - control and display unit [i]
CRS - course
CRT - cathode ray tube
CRZ - cruise
CWS - control wheel steering
D-TO EPR derated takeoff engine pressure ratio
D-TO N1 derated takeoff engine fan speed
DNTKFX down track fix
DSPY - display annunciation on CDU
E/D - end of descent
E/O - engine out
EADI - electronic attitude director indicator
ECON - minimum cost speed schedule
EEC - electronic engine control
EFIS - electronic flight instrument system
EHSI - electronic horizontal situation indicator
EICAS -engine indication crew alerting system
F/D (or FD) - flight director
FLCH - flight level change
FMC(S) - flight management computer (system) [i]
HUD - head-up display
INIT- initialization
INS -inertial navigation system (see IRS, IRU)
IRS - inertial reference system
IRU - inertial reference unit
LAT - latitude
LNAV - lateral navigation guidance
LON- longitude
MAP CTR - HSI map centered on a waypoint
MAX CLB - maximum engine thrust for two-engine climb
MAX CRZ - maximum engine thrust for two-engine cruise
MCP - mode control panel
MSG - message annunciation on CDU
MOD - modification
ARINC communications addressing and reporting system
autopilot flight director system (sometimes A/P F/D)
autothrottle (also ATS - autothrottle system)
[i] The terms CDU and FMC are often used interchangeably by
crews, though they actually refer to different hardware.
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OFST - route offset annunciation on CDU
PBD - place-bearing-distance waypoint
PDB -- performance data base
POS INIT - position initialization
POS REF - position reference
PPOS - present position
RTE - route
SOPA - standard operating procedure amplified (Airline-2)
SPD - speed
SRP - selected reference point
T/C _ top of climb (also written TOC)
T/D - top of descent (also written TOD)
TAI - thermal anti-ice
TMC - thrust management computer
TO EPR - takeoff engine pressure ratio
TO N1 - takeoff engine fan speed
TRK - track to a navaid
V/S - vertical speed
V/TRK - vertical track
VNAV - vertical navigation guidance
W/MOD - with modification of vertical profile
W/STEP - with step change in altitude
WPT - waypoint
XTK - cross track
IL, IR, 2L etco - CDU left line select key I, right i, left 2 etc.
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APPENDIX 4
The following question was included on the Phase-i questionnaire.
It,s purpose was to determine what crew members might have
thought of as important issues in cockpit automation.
Can you suggest a question we should ask crew members in our
interviews?
Do you discipline yourself to maintain visual vigilance and look
outside?
We don't have hand mikes at our airline.
would like them installed.
You might ask if pilots
Would you like to see a "descend direct" function? This would
define a descent profile from present position/altitude to the
next position/altitude constraint in the LEGS page° This would
be especially useful on vectors to an outer marker or approach
fix, when ATC hasn't allowed descent on the optimum profile.
Did you feel as prepared for your first or subsequent proficiency
checks as you did in other aircraft?
What circumstances cause the DRAG REQUIRED message to appear
during VNAV <descent>? Which has greater priority when
descending in VNAV, VNAV path or selected MCP speed?
How do long hours and short layovers affect your performance on
automated aircraft?
Has the company training department become complacent about this
aircraft? Has the training system allowed weak pilots to be
released to the line?
In the event that one crew member becomes incapacitated, how do
you feel you would fare in the event of minimum weather condition
or minor aircraft problems? And would you use automation?
Do you find yourself becoming complacent as you become more and
more familiar with the aircraft and the automatics?
Ask about checklists and procedures.
You are in a descent into ORD and you have been given radar
vectors off the magenta LNAV track <programmed course>. Does the
DESCENT page continue to provide VNAV guidance? If so, to what
point is the deviation from VNAV path computed? Is this
information available elsewhere? Where?
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Is the top of descent and subsequent VNAV path computer using the
first waypoint altitude and/or speed restrictions or is it
computed on an average of all the waypoint altitudes and/or speed
restrictions entered on the LEGS page?
What would be a pilot's response to "full automation" which is
data-linked to the ATC controllers console?
Ask how they use automation in good vs. bad weather. And how
they keep both pilots fully informed about ATC clearances and
progress of alternate procedures of aircraft systems when
required.
Why isn't SOPA more fitted to new aircraft than extension of
older aircraft existing SOPA? Do other pilots perceive this to
be a problem?
Solicit comments on cockpit layout and physical position of
controls°
Ask about crew coordination in emergencies°
Now that we have electronic fuel control and spoiler control, ask
about fly-by-wire. (I do not approve of that concept without
some manual backup.)
It would be nice to compile a list of two-man crew "techniques
and courtesies" that various pilots use from different airlines
that might help everyone. This should be part of SOPApublished
by the company.
If you were going to redesign any part of the 757, what would it
be and how would you improve it?
What can your other pilot (Capt. or F/O) do to facilitate crew
coordination?
If you were exposed to the 757 for the first time all over again,
what would you do differently?
What is your impression of the safety of a two-pilot vs. three-
pilot aircraft?
How do you like the altitude warning system, and how many
altitude busts have you had?
I suggest you ask pilots their experience level not only in
company equipment, but also what other planes they've flown in
their total career. This would give you a more accurate picture
of experience level and their aptitude to adapt to 75'7
automation.
What kind of system errors have you noticed with no reasonable
explanation?
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Do you feel that some automated communication system, with
possibly a printed cockpit readout for such things as ATIS,
weather, gate assignments, fuel requirements, maintenance items,
cabin cleaning and catering etc. would be of value to a two-man
crew?
Do you feel that a head-up display would improve CAT III
assurance?
Can you suggest improvements to the training program?
Do the video readouts increase fatigue? Eye strain?
Do you feel that the yaw damper system is adequate?
Any comments on recirculated cabin air?
Do you feel that the lateral roll rate is adequate?
Would you like to have a Doppler microburst detector? Do you
feel that the 757 is better than other aircraft at escaping low
level wind shear?
Do flight attendants on the 757 complain more or less frequently
of fatigue and dry skin?
How much do you use VNAV below i0,000 feet?
What is the worst C.Io <carried item> to have on a 757? APU?
What is your impression of the radar return?
Do the 757 computers make you feel like a more confident and
competent pilot?
How much total time do you have in airplanes? Some crew members
may have been an S/O for 10-15 years and just moved to F/O seat.
I suggest that their viewpoint might be different from others.
Ask a question that would better quantify heads down time below
1.0,000 feet by one or both pilots.
How do you feel about the FMC in the first I00 hours and were you
confident in the use of the MCP?
Ask questions about how much time spent with head in the cockpit_
How long did it take you to feel truly up-to-speed on the 757
FMC?
What would you like changed about the 757 or automation?
Ask about the radar. Also the in-flight display of the
maintenance pages.
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How much of the FMC capability do you use actively? How often
does ATC allow you to use the programmed descent mode?
Don't 757 pilots feel that this is about the maximum amount of
automation for a while?
Ask about a typical profile, from takeoff to landing, and the
problems that exist.
Ask about ATC problems and changes below i0,000 feet.
204
APPENDIX 5
Results of statistical contrasts between attitude
scale responses in Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the study
The following data matrices represent the two significant
contrasts of the 36 attitude scales subjected to the Bowker test
(also known as McNemar test) for symmetry. This test measures
whether there was a change in responses from the first to the
second phase of the study (1986 vs. 1987). For example, one can
see from the row and column totals that in the first matrix
below, there were 30 level 2 ("agree") responses in Phase I, and
46 in Phase 2. However, examination of the cells shows that 21
persons changed from a 2 response to a 4 ("disagree") in Phase 2,
and only four responses changed from a 4 to a 2. The extent to
which these are different, (21 - 4) in this case represents
asymmetric shift of opinion. If the sum of all differences
squared is large enough, the null hypothesis of no change in
opinion from Phase 1 to Phase 2 is rejected, as it was only in
these two probes.
In the two matrices below, the movement is toward a more
favorable view of automation (more disagreement with a negatively
stated probe). However, because only two of the 36 items are
significantly different, the author's general hypothesis of an
increase in favorable views toward automation with an increase in
experience is not supported.
P16. I spend more time setting up and managing the automation
(CDU, FMS) than I would hand-flying or using a plain autopilot.
Phase 2
Response 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1
P
h 2
a
s 3
e
4
1
5
Total
1 4 1 2 0 9
1 19 4 21 1 46
! 2 5 4 1 13
0 4 5 24 2 35
0 0 0 0 1 1
3 30 15 51 5 ]04
Chi-square = 21, df = 9, p < .05
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P34. There are still modes and features of the 757 FMS that I
don't understand.
Phase 2
Response 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1
P
h 2
a
s 3
e
4
1
5
Total
1 1 0 0 0 2
0 12 8 ii 3 34
0 2 5 7 1 15
0 6 1 31 4 42
0 0 0 6 5 ii
1 21 14 55 14 104
Chi-square = 15, df = 7, p < °05
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APPENDIX6
Graphic presentation of responses to attitude
scales Pl through P36 in Phase 1 and Phase 2
Note: The same graphics which appear in the next nine pages are
also displayed separately in the appropriate chapters, but are
repeated here for the convenience of the reader.
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